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Performance measurement and accountability in the management of public sector 
programs have long been seen as central factors in public management research 
globally. For more than two decades, in many developed countries, heightened 
interest in performance measurement in government organisations has held 
tremendous promise for both academics and practitioners. 
 
Despite the global trend, there has been little research on performance measurement 
and accountability in Indonesia. This paucity exists even though regulations have 
been in existence for more than a decade requiring government organisations to 
prepare and submit an ‗accountability of performance report‘ as a crucial component 
of Indonesia‘s public sector reform. This thesis investigates the implementation of 
performance measurement systems in Indonesia during the first wave of public sector 
reform. Specifically, it examines factors affecting the development and use of 
performance indicators in Indonesian local government (ILG). 
 
Employing a mixed research methodology, the thesis utilises a combination of a 
nation-wide survey and follow-up in-depth interviews with local government senior 
officials who are responsible for preparing performance reports. Specifically, the 
study explores the experiences and perceptions of government officials regarding the 
development and use of performance indicators and accountability practices in 
Indonesian local governments. The research findings contribute not only to the 
academic literature but also to practical public policy. The results indicate that metric 
difficulties, technical knowledge, management commitment, legislative requirement, 
and organisational capacity all have an effect on the development and use of 
performance indicators and accountability practices in ILG. Legislative requirement 
and management commitment have the strongest influence. 
 
The more contextual reasons and motivations behind the implementation process 
were also investigated and are illustrated in this thesis. For this purpose, institutional 
theory was used as the theoretical framework to better explain and understand the 
issues. The findings revealed that institutional isomorphism did contribute to the 
process of decision making. All three institutional components of isomorphism—
v 
 
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures—were found in ILG with coercive 
pressure found to be the strongest influence. 
 
The findings of this research have academic implications for scholars in public sector 
management and practical implications for many different parties, namely: 1) central 
government; 2) local government; 3) government auditors; and 4) universities. The 
findings provide an overview of performance measurement and accountability 
practices in a local government context. Specifically, this thesis provides important 
evidence regarding factors influencing the development and use of performance 
indicators, as well as factors hindering the implementation of performance 
measurement systems. In addition, it reveals the influence of isomorphic pressures in 
the implementation of performance measurement systems in Indonesia. 
 
Results revealed in the thesis are useful in evaluating the success or failure of the 
past implementation process. More importantly, the findings will be essential in 
helping to determine current and future policies and to ensure their continued 
success. This thesis provides analyses on the results of a decade of reform efforts in 
the area of public sector performance measurement and accountability in Indonesian 
local governments. With the recently-launched bureaucratic reform marking the 
second wave of reform (2010-2025) to improve Indonesian government, a reform 
effort that includes for the first time the vice-president‘s office, research into 
performance measurement and accountability practices in the first wave of reform 
(1999-2009) is especially timely. 
 
In summary, the significant contributions this thesis makes to performance 
measurement and accountability literature are threefold. Theoretically it provides a 
relevant exemplar regarding the application of institutional theory on performance 
measurement research in a developing country. Methodologically it contributes to the 
increasing use of mixed-method research. Analytically it provides evidence of the 
use of partial least squares as a relevant analytical tool. Further, this thesis paves the 
way for future research in the relatively unexamined area of public sector 
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Following a decade of major reform, this research aims to examine how performance 
measurement and accountability as the core of public sector reforms in Indonesia 
were implemented. Specifically, it examines factors affecting the development and 
use of performance indicators in Indonesian local government (ILG) agencies. The 
thesis provides an in-depth and comprehensive study of the area of performance 
measurement and accountability. In particular, it examines the implementation of 
Instruksi Presiden (Inpres)
1
 No. 7/1999 regarding accountability reporting known as 
Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Institusi Pemerintah (LAKIP)
2
, and its supporting 
related regulations. In doing so, the study explores the experience and perception of 
government officials regarding the development and use of performance indicators 
and accountability practices in an ILG context. The issues are investigated 
empirically through a complementary sequential mixed-method research approach 
using a combination of a nation-wide survey and follow-up in-depth interviews with 
local government senior officials (SOs) responsible for the preparation and 
submission of accountability reports. This chapter covers the background of the 
thesis (Section 1.2), the research context (Section 1.3) and research methods (Section 
1.4), the significance and contribution of the research (Section 1.5), the limitations of 
the research methods used (Section 1.6), the organisation of the thesis (Section 1.7), 




Governance in organisations has been a compelling and much discussed issue since 
the beginning of civilisation. Many philosophers (e.g. Aristotle, Confucius, Adam 
Smith, and Karl Marx) have made their contribution to the subject. This thesis, 
however, raises issues on governance in the public sector in the modern era. 
Specifically, it aims to address the role of accountability and performance 
                                                 
 
1
 Presidential Instruction 
2
 Government Institution Accountability of Performance Report 
2 
 
measurement systems (PMS) as crucial pillars of public sector governance that have 
become increasingly important since the 1980s. At that time, a movement emerged in 
a number of Organisations for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries towards a new management approach in the public sector. This new 
approach was labelled New Public Management (NPM). 
 
The rise of NPM during the 1980s was accompanied by changes in public sector 
accounting in a number of OECD countries. In this regard, accounting was viewed as 
a key element in the new conception of accountability due to its function as an 
effective medium for fostering high trust in market and private business methods. In 
the public sector, the notion of NPM was associated with the doctrines of public 
accountability and its related issues, and was viewed as the best practice in managing 
public organisations (Hood, 1995). 
 
NPM is based on a fundamental concept that public sector organisations can, and 
even should, borrow many of the management strategies used in the private sector. 
This worldwide trend resulted in public sector transformation in the 1980s and 
1990s, ranging from decentralisation and privatisation to the development of goal-
driven and client-oriented organisations (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). In relation to 
this movement, management techniques from the private sector (i.e. PMS) were 
introduced to many public sector organisations across the world. A great number of 
government entities in developed countries have now introduced elements of NPM 
(ter Bogt, 2004). 
 
As a result of globalisation, some less developed countries have also introduced 
NPM elements such as accountability and performance reporting (e.g. Tooley et al., 
2010). Indonesia is no exception. Studies examining accountability and performance 
reporting have been conducted in developed countries where the public are perceived 
to be more sophisticated. However, given there are different levels of sophistication 
within each population group, similar studies are required in less developed countries 
to provide more empirical evidence. This is important, as generalising across both 
developed and developing countries should be done with caution given the difference 
mentioned earlier (Pollit, 2006). 
3 
 
1.3 Research Context 
 
A reasonable knowledge of the context of the matter under examination is important 
to fully understand the significance of any research project. This section provides 
that context by introducing a brief history of Indonesian reforms and their subsequent 
impact on government. 
 
1.3.1 Indonesian reform 
 
Since 1998 Indonesia, as the largest archipelagic nation in the world, has experienced 
immense change following the downfall of the Orde Baru
3
 regime that claimed 
absolute power for more than three decades. A year later, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
(DPR)
4
 made pivotal changes by passing important new laws. These two crucial 
laws, Undang-Undang
5
 No. 22/1999 regarding decentralisation of local government 
and Undang-Undang No. 25/1999 regarding fiscal balance between central and local 
government, were enacted to mark the beginning of a new era called Reformasi.
6
 As 
a consequence of these new laws, Indonesian society is experiencing a crucial 
transformation process towards a more robust democracy, which is marked by a shift 
in governmental style from an authoritarian and centralist government to one that is 
democratic and decentralised. 
 
The ending of the authoritarian Orde Baru regime also opened up a new era of 
possibility for a democratic civilian administration based not on the dictates of an all-
powerful president, but upon the rule of law and the disciplines of democratic 
accountability (Alm & Bahl, 2000). In the past two decades decentralisation has 
become a principal element of governmental reform in many developing countries 
(Bastian, 2007). As well, decentralisation as a strategy for economic and social 
development and for nation building has become accepted around the world. Most 
developing nations have by now adopted a decentralisation program in one form or 
another (Alm & Bahl, 2000). Decentralisation could well be the right policy for 
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Indonesia because it moves government decisions closer to the people. It is seen as a 
crucial ingredient of governance in a country that is so large and so diverse in 
population. With meaningful local elections, it is expected that decentralisation will 
lead to better public services, better public servants, and more public participation. In 
turn, decentralisation could make Indonesia a stronger, more stable, and more 
democratic nation (Alm & Bahl, 2000). 
 
The population of Indonesia is about 240 million, of whom more than half reside on 
Java Island, where they are served by 115 local governments. Before 1999 under the 
Orde Baru administration, this island was the centre of major development programs 
whereas other islands, especially in the central and eastern region of the Indonesian 
Archipelago, were left far behind. Local autonomy is thus also intended to alleviate 
the development gap between in-Java and out-of-Java jurisdictions. 
 
The new laws, Undang-Undang No. 22/1999 and Undang-Undang No. 25/1999, 
constituted a breakthrough from a centralistic government administration to a more 
balanced distribution of power, functions, and financial resources between central 
and local government. The two new laws were officially implemented on January 1, 
2001, and gave wide-ranging autonomy to the district and city governments. These 
laws provided ILG with full authority in the planning-cycle process, and control over 
their finances (revenue and spending), civil services, and organisational setup. The 
law on fiscal decentralisation made fundamental changes to planning methods seen 
in the previous three decades, by introducing a unified budget and performance 
budgeting (Podger & Perwira, 2004).  
 
Following the reform movement, Indonesia has experienced several major changes in 
its budgeting systems. For example, prior to the reform, Indonesia used a dual budget 
system whereby there was a separation between routine (operating) and development 
(capital) budgets (Blondal et al., 2009). The rationale behind this division was to 
emphasise the significance of development assistance from donors to Indonesian 
government. Unfortunately this division created much redundancy and duplication. 
The newly unified budget emerged to overcome this problem by combining routine 




Unified budgeting was considered a major transformation in Indonesia. This change 
resulted in a more coordinated budget process and avoided many of the previous 
budget duplications. The newly-adopted unified budgeting system enables enhanced 
interaction between planning and budgeting functions within government. In 
addition, following the practices of many modern countries, performance budgeting 
was also introduced in the beginning of the reform era. The performance budgeting 
was adopted to improve control on expenditure as well aspublic services delivery. It 
included the adoption of performance measurement and new financial accounting 
systems. 
 
Another important regulation, Undang-Undang No. 28/1999 on Clean Government, 
came into force in the same fiscal year. This law is important because it establishes 
essential principles of good governance such as transparency and accountability. 
These principles are highly relevant to the planning and performance budgeting 
process in Indonesian government at all levels. Finally, still in the same year, the 
second President of the Republic of Indonesia Habibie signed Inpres No.7/1999 on 
accountability reporting, which requires, from 2001, all government organisations to 
prepare and submit annual performance reports to central government. 
 
Five years later two supporting regulations—Peraturan Pemerintah (PP)
7
 No. 
24/2005 regarding government accounting standards and Peraturan Menteri Dalam 
Negeri (Permendagri)
8
 No. 13/2006 regarding financial management guidelines—
were issued by the Indonesian central government to advance government policies 
regarding local autonomy. These two regulations were intended to help ILG in 
preparing three new kinds of annual report: 1) balance sheets; 2) financial 
statements; and 3) cash-flow reports. These financially-oriented reports were 
intended to accompany LAKIP (which is a more program-oriented report). 
 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to provide an overview of a decade of reform in 
the field of performance measurement and accountability in Indonesia‘s public 
sector. Therefore, its focus is on the implementation of the LAKIP report as the first 
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kind of government accountability report required in Indonesia since the beginning 
of the reform era in 1999. In addition, the majority of ILGs have continued to 
struggle to produce these new reports, as the accounting systems on which these 
three new reports were based were not yet well established when this research began 
in 2007. 
 
1.3.2 Indonesian local government 
 
Indonesia is currently a democratic country with three tiers of government: central 
government; provincial government; and local government. The central government 
administration resides in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. At the lower level, 
there are 33 provinces and 497 (as of 2009) local governments. There are two types 
of local government across Indonesia: 1) Kabupaten (district), and 2) Kota (city). In 
the past (before Reformasi), provincial and local governments were simply an 
extension of central government at the regional and local level. Government policies 
and programs were determined by central government. As a result the Gubernur 
(Head of Province) and the Bupati/Walikota (Head of Kabupaten/Kota), directly 
appointed by the president, were simply responsible for the implementation of the 
policies and programs issued by central government. Figure 1.1 presents the structure 
of Indonesian government from central to local level. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Government Structure in Indonesia 
 
A pivotal change occurred in many aspects of local government management 











aspect was that the centralised government changed into a decentralised one. In other 
words, local government gained more autonomous power in managing its own 
business and resources. Autonomous power is required to provide better service 
quality to the local people as the main stakeholders in local government (Mardiasmo, 
2002). 
 
Just as there are in many democratic countries across the world, in Indonesia there 
are two branches of government: 1) the executive branch, and 2) the legislative 
branch. At the local level the executive branch of government is represented by a 
Bupati and Walikota. Both are now elected through a free and open election by local 
citizens under a democratic election process. On the legislative side there is Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) 
9
 whose members are also elected directly by 
local citizens through the same process. The election processes for the legislative and 
executive branches are held every five years. Both branches work together to serve 
local citizens. Every fiscal year, a district/city budget is proposed by the executive; 
the budget needs approval from the legislative branches before implementation 
commences. Financial resources to support the budget mostly come from the central 
government, except in the cases of several very rich ILGs. 
 
Figure 1.2 presents a brief description of a typical local government in Indonesia. 
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Figure 1.2: Overview of Local Government Structure 
 
Both DPRD as the legislative and Bupati/Walikota as the executive branch are 
staffed by elected officials and form the top layer of ILG structure. The Secretary of 
an ILG as the highest-ranked official (appointed by the Head of ILG) and the Heads 
of Department are in the second and third layer respectively. 
 
1.3.3 Accountability and performance measurement in Indonesian government 
 
As Indonesia is a developing country, the socio-economic condition in which 
Indonesian public sector organisations operate is characterised by the scarcity of 
available resources, rising demands from the community for services, and enhanced 
accountability. The latter arose as a result of Reformasi, commencing in 1998. In this 
context, the assessment and reporting of performance is crucial to any effort to 
achieve performance and accountability goals. Therefore, there was a need to adopt 
new management strategies such as PMS in order to ensure improvement in 
organisational performance and accountability. This is crucial as the absence of 
information regarding the results achieved by programs and activities conducted by 
government agencies would hamper internal continuous improvement and external 
accountability. 
 
In the last ten years, the Indonesian government has shown strong interest in 
improving government accountability and performance. This development has been 











organisations. PMS has been one of the most important fields of reform. The 
emergence of Inpres No. 7/ 1999 marked the beginning of an important reform effort 
in Indonesia‘s public sector. 
 
The enactment of regulation on performance reporting at the beginning of the reform 
era has marked the introduction of an NPM component (eg. performance 
measurement) by the Indonesian government. The PMS introduction was undertaken 
as a response to public demand for productivity, transparency and accountability. 
This response to public demand is in line with trends in developed countries across 
the world, wherein performance measurement has become the core of management 
reform designed to enhance accountability (de Lancer Julnes, 2006). 
 
The Inpres on LAKIP requires government organisations at central, provincial, and 
local levels to develop performance indicators and prepare annual performance 
reports starting from the fiscal year 2000. This requirement was based on the premise 
that the government organisations that have developed performance indicators can 
improve public policies, service deliveries, and reporting methods to the many 
stakeholders within their operations. 
 
The benefit of adopting and implementing PMS is hence provided by the utilisation 
of information collected to assist the decision-making process and to improve 
internal and external accountability (de Lancer Julnes, 2006). For decision making 
the measurement of performance indicators is the component that enhances 
organisational capacity to diagnose many managerial problems and stimulates 
organisational performance. In regards to enhanced accountability, measurement 
guarantees the transparency of results and encourages stakeholders‘ participation 
both within (internal accountability) and outside the organisation (external 
accountability). However, prior research revealed that the use of performance 
indicators has been very limited.  
 
Problems related to the limited use of performance indicators have been discussed in 
the public sector management literature. This literature focuses mainly on the role of 
the organisational context as both an enabling and hindering factor. The perceived 
problems associated with the process of using performance indicators are: 1) 
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performance indicators have not been developed; 2) performance indicators were 
developed in a very limited way; and 3) performance indicators were developed but 
not used or were only partly used. It is therefore crucial to understand the process of 
developing and using performance indicators to encourage and promote the adoption 
and implementation of PMS in public sector organisations. 
 
With that in mind, this thesis was designed to contribute to the existing theory and 
practice of PMS through a comprehensive analysis (using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods) of the factors affecting the development and use of performance 
indicators in ILG. 
 
1.4 Research Methods 
 
This thesis employed complementary mixed methods by utilising two data sets 
gathered through two phases of study (phase 1: survey; phase 2: interviews). Both 
quantitative and qualitative data required for the analysis were sequentially collected. 
This approach was selected to ensure that the objective was achieved and all research 
questions were addressed comprehensively and coherently. The first phase was 
conducted between August 2008 and February 2009, and the second phase between 
July and August 2010. 
 
Phase 1 was undertaken using structured closed-ended questions (see Appendix A.4-
1) focusing on two main themes: performance measurement and accountability. 
These themes were selected to examine the perceptions of ILG officials regarding 
PMS practices. Phase 2 was more unstructured, and focused on the motivation 
behind the implementation of PMS through interviews (see Appendix A.4-3) to gain 
more insight into the issues affecting the development and use of performance 
indicators and accountability practices within the ILG. 
 
1.4.1 Research objective and questions 
 
The objective of this research is to develop a conceptual model that identifies the 
factors that influence the development and use of performance indicators in ILG. The 
primary research question is: "What factors affect the development and use of 
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performance indicators and accountability practices in ILG?" Specifically, based on 
the research objective mentioned above, this study was conducted to answer the 
following secondary questions: 
 
1) Does ILG develop and use performance indicators? 
2) Do metric difficulties, technical knowledge, management commitment, and 
legislative requirements influence the development and use of performance 
indicators in ILG? 
3) Do management commitment, legislative requirement, and organisational 
capacity influence accountability practices in ILG? 
4) Does institutional isomorphism exist in the development and use of PMS and 
accountability practices in ILG? 
 




Previous studies have claimed that there is a need for more research in the public 
sector (for example, see J Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992). The reforms imposed on the 
public sector create an opportunity to study several issues, including the effect of 
public sector reform at various levels of government. For example, Hoque and Moll 
(2001, p. 322) studied whether reform in the Australian public sector resulted in a 
greater efficiency and effectiveness or merely provided a "window dressing" to 
increase the legitimacy of local government operations. In Indonesia, even though 
the regulations that require ILG to develop and report performance indicators have 
been in existence for a decade, there has been little research in the area of 
performance measurement and accountability. 
 
This research focus has not previously been undertaken in an Indonesian context and 
hence will significantly contribute to the literature on PMS and accountability within 
Indonesia‘s public sector. The role of the researcher, as a former local government 
consultant, offers a unique perspective and strengthening of theoretical knowledge 
with working knowledge. Therefore, by conducting this study and identifying the 
factors that are likely to affect the utilisation of performance indicators, an 
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explanation of existing practices will be provided. As well, improvement programs 
can be suggested if required. As claimed by van Dooren (2005, p.363), to set up a 
performance measurement policy "a good insight into the organisational factors that 
foster performance measurement is crucial". 
 
The thesis is significant in that it establishes a conceptual platform for examining 
PMS and accountability practices within ILG in particular as well as the NPM 
environment in Indonesia in general. Despite a decade of reform efforts, there has 
been little or no application of the available PMS research by ILG organisations in 
the development and use of performance indicators. It follows that this research has 
further significance, in that it recognises the association between the technical and 
organisational factors affecting the implementation of PMS and accountability and 
the motivations underlying those factors. The thesis provides a new, improved model 
with which to test the relative impact of those factors; this model can, in turn, be 
used in other developing countries. This approach is supported by de Waal (2003) 
who identified the important role of variables such as organisational factors in 
affecting the implementation of PMS. Hence, the issues raised in this thesis not only 





Academically this thesis makes three major contributions. First, theoretically the 
study contributes to both the performance measurement and the institutional theory 
literature by linking the three institutional isomorphism mechanisms—coercive, 
mimetic and normative—to the factors associated with the utilisation of PMS. 
Second, methodologically this thesis shows the advantage of using mixed-method 
research rather than a single research method in the field of public sector 
management, specifically in the area of performance measurement and 
accountability. Third, analytically this thesis provides a good example of the 
utilisation of the two generations of multivariate analysis tools, namely Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and Partial Least Squares (PLS), to provide assurance of the 




Practically the explanation of the impact of isomorphism on the implementation 
process investigated in this study will provide invaluable information to government 
officials and other interested parties. This study will help them to better understand 
the institutional pressures experienced by ILG and the potential problems they would 
face in implementing PMS in their organisations. In addition, in the last decade 
Indonesian government has adopted financial management and reporting reforms 
and, like other countries across the world, has embraced the idea of NPM. The results 
of this study reveal the current progress of the reforms, especially with respect to 
performance measurement and accountability and, in turn, will form a foundation for 
further research in the area. In this sense, the study offers insight to many different 
interested parties, as it presents an overview of ILG‘s endeavours in implementing 
PMS and accountability in practice. Many issues emerging from the findings will be 
of great interest to local and central government, government auditors, and 
universities and hence will contribute to better future policies and practices within 
Indonesia. 
 
1.6 Limitations of Research Methods 
 
As in most survey research, there are two methodological issues that may be raised 
with regard to the use of a survey as the data collection method of this study. First, 
the choice of Indonesia as the research site may raise questions about the study‘s 
external validity, as Indonesia has a unique history, culture, economy, and political 
environment. Nevertheless, it is not unusual to apply Western theories, especially in 
the area of management, organisational theory, and organisation behaviour, to non-
Western democratic countries (e.g., Kim, 2004; Kim & Lee, 2006). 
 
The second issue is the absence of ‗hard‘ measures of performance such as the actual 
number and frequency of performance indicators or actual outcomes. Such measures 
are assumed to be more objective and less biased. For this study such information 
could not be obtained due to difficulty in gaining the data. However, when such 
objective performance data are not available or impractical to collect, subjective 
(perceptual) performance measures may offer a reasonable alternative (Allen & 
Helms, 2002; Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Dess & Robinson, 1984; Dolinger & 
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Golden, 1992; Laegreid, Roness, & Rubecksen, 2007; McCracken, McIlwain, & 
Fottler, 2001; Schmid, 2002; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). 
 
Therefore, a survey can be seen as a practical alternative to employ in this study. 
Even though there is inherent bias in self-reported and perceptual measures of 
performance, there is evidence of a high correlation between perceptual and 
objective measures at the organisational level. Some studies have found that 
measures of perceived organisational performance correlated positively to objective 
measures of organisational performance (Dolinger & Golden, 1992; McCracken, et 
al., 2001; Powell, 1992; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). Another study found 
strong positive correlation between perceptual data and financial performance (Dess 
& Robinson, 1984). 
 
Finally, the empirical evidence provided is context-specific to ILG as the third tier of 
government in Indonesia. However, the approach and conceptual analysis have a 
general validity and hence can be applied in other government contexts for future 
research. 
 
1.7 Organisation of Thesis 
 
In achieving the goals of the study, this thesis is organised in eight chapters as 
follows: 
Chapter 1 provides an overall introduction to the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the most relevant literature in the field of 
performance measurement and accountability as the theoretical background for the 
basis of analysis. 
Chapter 3 offers a discussion regarding institutional theory, specifically institutional 
isomorphism, as the theoretical framework utilised in this thesis. This chapter also 
presents the proposed conceptual model, along with respective hypotheses, 
developed to answer the research questions. 
Chapter 4 discusses both the quantitative and qualitative research methods 
employed. The development of the survey and in-depth interview protocol as 
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research instruments is also presented and discussed in detail. In the final part of the 
chapter the procedures of conducting pre-test and pilot studies, along with the results 
from the pilot study, are illustrated. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the survey. The first part of the chapter uses 
descriptive analysis, and the second part applies a first generation multivariate 
analysis, or OLS. This chapter reveals and discusses the results of hypothesis testing 
undertaken. 
Chapter 6 provides the results of a quantitative analysis using structural equation 
modelling, or PLS, as an alternative tool. This chapter also discusses the results of 
hypothesis testing undertaken using the PLS analysis. The comparison between the 
results from OLS and PLS analysis is provided and discussed at the end of the 
chapter. 
Chapter 7 provides the results from the second phase of the data collection, which 
consisted of face-to-face in-depth interviews of selected respondents. Thematic 
analysis was used as the analytical tool to analyse the qualitative data gathered from 
the interviews. 
Chapter 8 concludes the whole thesis and discusses implications of the results found 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The contributions of the study and potential areas for further 
research are also considered here. 
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provided a brief, yet complete, overview of the structure of the thesis. 
The research was designed to extend the work of previous studies in the field of 
performance measurement and accountability by investigating the development and 
use of performance indicators in the Indonesian public sector. It is expected to 
contribute to both theoretical and practical aspects of performance measurement and 








This chapter presents a literature review on accountability and performance 
measurement in the public sector within an NPM and good governance environment. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section presents the rise of 
public management reform, in which NPM and good governance are discussed. The 
second section provides a background to the concept of accountability. Then, in the 
third, performance measurement in general, and in ILG in particular, is addressed 
along with an overview of the most relevant literature. 
 
2.2 New Public Management and Good Governance 
 
NPM and good governance are considered as two different but parallel reform 
movements in the public sector. Both NPM and good governance are concerned with 
issues around accountability and performance measurement. These issues, when 
applied to government organisations, should improve the quality of public service 
delivery (Hartley, 2005). 
 
Since the early 1980s the public sector has experienced significant changes in its 
management approach. Public organisation management has become more similar to 
private sector management in many respects (Halligan, 2001). Different economic 
crises also may have played a role in some of these changes. Kettl (2005) argued that 
in most OECD nations, governments adopted this new private sector management 
style in order to better achieve goals with less cost. Kettl (2005, p.60) observed that: 
 
The management reform movement has had a powerful effect on 
government action throughout the world as nations move into the twenty-
first century. The level of activity—from New Zealand‘s vigorous efforts to 
reshape the state to those of many developing countries to accelerate their 
own transformation—has simply remarkable. Perhaps never before have so 
many governments tried to change so much so fast in such similar ways 
 
The concept of NPM emerged also in the 1980s to represent these global changes. 
Management techniques (i.e. performance measurement) used in NPM were mostly 
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borrowed from the private sector managerial approach. The underlying assumption 
was that private sector firms were more efficient in their operations than public 
sector organisations. Proponents of NPM characterised the movement with features 
such as: 1) greater disaggregation of public sector organisations into small and thus 
more manageable units; 2) adoption of a measurable standard of performance; 3) 
enhanced competition; 4) use of private sector managerial techniques; 5) 
decentralisation of authority; and 6) focus on efficiency (Hood, 1991; Pollit & 
Bouckaert, 2004). 
 
Following on from the reforms of the 1980s, the concept of corporate governance 
emerged (Halligan, 2001) with many considering appropriate corporate governance 
arrangements as a crucial element to public sector management (Barrett, 2003). 
Agere (2005) stated that good governance has also been seen as a new paradigm in 
the public sector. Agere (2005, p.1) pointed out that: 
 
as an aspect of the New Paradigm in Public Administration which emphasis 
the role of public managers in providing high quality services that citizen‘s 
value; advocates increasing managerial autonomy, particularly by reducing 
central agency control, demands, measures and rewards both organisational 
and individual performance. 
 
In the literature three approaches to innovation in the public sector have been 
identified and are well-known across the world. Hartley (2005) viewed the three 
approaches as competing paradigms in public sector innovation. Appendix A.2-2 
illustrates the characteristics of the three paradigms to show the changing ideological 
conceptions of governance and public management in the public sector. Benington 
and Hartley (2001) presented three paradigms, which may be linked to a particular 
historical period, of governance in the public sector. Each paradigm contains 
particular assumptions about the nature of the world. These include assumptions on 
context, population, problems/needs, strategy, actors, and key concepts.The most 
important difference is in the way these three paradigms view the product of public 
organisation. In the traditional administration‘s view, a public agency is responsible 
for public goods. However, in NPM and good governance, a public organisation is 





Since the post-war period there has been an increase in innovation in the public 
sector under the combined umbrella of traditional public administration, the NPM 
movement, and the good governance framework (Hartley, 2005). At the end of the 
1970s the traditional public administration paradigm gave way to these new 
concepts. During the early 1980s the NPM paradigm emerged and dominated public 
sector reform for more than two decades. The public sector around the world has 
been continuously changing, whilst experiencing volatile and complex problems 
coupled with increased risk. These changes saw a shift of strategy in governance 
from a market orientation towards more collaborative partnerships. The collapse of 
some prominent private sector corporations in recent years has been seen as the 
emerging pretext for the adoption of the good governance paradigm (Shipley & 
Kovacs, 2007). Within the public sector there was a shift of focus from the NPM 
components to a corporate good governance approach (Kluvers & Tippett, 2010). 
This approach placed citizens and partnerships at the centre of the governance 
framework. In a manner similar to NPM, good governance focuses on accountability 
and outcome-based public services deliveries (Olson, 2000). 
 
Many international institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the World Bank, and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 
(UNCHS) have identified the characteristics of good governance, as presented in 
Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Principles of Good Governance 
UNCHS UNDP World Bank 
Decentralisation Participation Participation 
Equity Equity  
Transparency Transparency Transparency 
Accountability Accountability Accountability 
 Rule of law  
Citizenship Responsiveness Sensitivity 
 Consensus  
Efficiency Efficiency and effectiveness Cost Effectiveness 
Strategic vision Strategic vision  
Sustainability   
Security   




Despite slightly different views, UNCHS, UNDP and World Bank share common 
characteristics in regard to the principles of good governance. The shared key 
elements of good corporate governance are: 1) transparency, 2), accountability and 3) 
efficiency and effectiveness. As can be seen from its components, NPM and public 
sector corporate governance are closely related to each other. Accountability is a core 
component of both corporate governance and performance measurement. 
Performance measurement, in turn, is an important element of NPM and is seen as a 
means to discharge accountability. Therefore, this study focuses on these two pivotal 





Accountability is a complex and elusive concept. In different contexts it can present 
different meanings. Despite its complexity, accountability is an attractive term and 
many people from practitioners and academics to politicians frequently use it. In the 
modern era there is no argument regarding the need for accountability in any society 
across the globe. Accountability has even been considered to be one of the 
cornerstones of good governance (Sheehan, 1996). When it comes to defining 
accountability, however, scholars have offered diverse approaches, conceptions, and 
ideas. 
 
Originally, the word "accountability" came from the old French "compter" or 
"conter", which means "to count" or to "enumerate" (Matek in Cutt & Murray, 2000, 
p.3). According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1989), someone is accountable 
when they are responsible and bound to give account. Further, to account means to 
"discharge of any responsibility; answering for conduct" (1989, p.7). 
 
In organisational studies the word "accountability" has a complex and multifaceted 
meaning. No single definition has been generally approved and accepted by scholars. 
However, the basic notion of accountability is that "those acting on behalf of another 
person or group, report back to the person or group, or are responsible to them in 
some way" (Hughes, 2003, p.237). The essence of accountability is the obligation to 
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render an account for a responsibility that has been given (Cutt & Murray, 2000). 
Glynn and Murphy (1996, p.127) defined accountability, in a broad sense, as "the 
process via which a person or group of people can be held to account for their 
conduct", whilst Hyndman and Anderson (1995, p.10) defined accountability as 
follows: 
 
Accountability involves explaining or justifying what has been done, what 
is being done and what has been planned. Thus one party is accountable to 
another in the sense that one of the parties has a right to call upon the other 
to give an account of his activities. 
 
Boland and Schultze (1996, p.62) state that accountability is concerned with giving 
explanations through a "credible story of what happened, and a calculation and 
balancing of competing obligations, including moral ones"; Hoskin (1996, p.265) 
described accountability as: 
 
more total and insistent…accountability ranges more freely over time and 
space, focusing as much on future potential as on past accomplishment, 
connecting and consolidating performance reports to plans and forecasts. 
 
Given the complex nature of accountability, one strategy to better explain the subject 
is to break it down into smaller topics. By doing that, complex and elusive concepts 
become more manageable and therefore easier to understand. Many authors have 
proposed their views with regard to the elements of accountability. 
 
2.3.1 Five forms of accountability 
 
In her study on forms and discourses of accountability, Sinclair (1995) found 
different forms of accountability. The study shows that accountability exists in many 
forms and has an extra dimension of meaning according to its context. Sinclair 
considered five forms of accountability: 1) political accountability; 2) public 
accountability; 3) managerial accountability; 4) professional accountability; and 5) 
personal accountability. Although Sinclair‘s analysis does not provide the basis for 







This concept comes from Athenian democratic and Westminster traditions. Here, 
public servants exercise authority on behalf of elected representatives, who are in 
turn directly accountable to the people (Day & Klein, 1987). In a democratic 
government, instead of being directly accountable to the people, the executive 
officials formally discharge their accountability to politicians in parliament as 




In addition to the indirect type of accountability discussed in political accountability, 
public servants can also choose to explain the responsibility of the public 
organisations they manage directly to the stakeholders. Various mechanisms are 
available to account for an organisation‘s policies and activities such as public 
hearings, provision of government reports in the media (i.e. newspaper), or even via 
real time communication tools (i.e. hotline number) that enable people to 




An accountability relationship is also found inside the organisation itself. This 
managerial accountability concept calls lower level officials to account to superior-




This concept "invokes the sense of duty that one has as a member of a professional or 
expert group, which in turn occupies a privileged and knowledgeable position in 
society" (Sinclair, 1995, p.229). In this sense, government employees and officials 
are supposed to act and behave professionally to provide the best service they can 







This concept relates to individual accountability and points to the ultimate form of 
accountability. Here, accountability rests on personal adherence as the logical 
consequence of the internalisation of moral and ethical values. This type of 
accountability involves human relationships such as respect for human dignity, and 
implies acting in a manner that accepts responsibility for affecting the lives of others 
(Harmon & Mayer, 1986). 
 
Accountability has many other meanings and is usually used in association with 
other words such as responsibility, responsiveness and answerability. However in a 
governmental context, it is used in relation to two different, but closely related, 
domains. The first is the domain of political accountability, and the second is the 
domain of managerial accountability (Day & Klein, 1987; Gregory, 2009; Hughes, 
2003). Table 2.2 presents a matrix on domain of accountability. 
 
Table 2.2: Political and Managerial Accountability 
 Domain 
Political Managerial 








Source: (Gregory, 2009) 
 
The first domain focuses on the mechanism of balancing power within liberal-
democratic systems to prevent authority holders from abusing the power in their 
hands and, at the same time, to maintain organisational legitimacy over time. This 
balance of power is necessary to achieve organisational effectiveness. Despite 
exercising the same formal powers of office, some presidents, for instance, have been 
more effective than others in maintaining his/her legitimacy in the eyes of the citizen 
(Neustadt, 1990). For example, a President may use electronic media such as 
television network or internet to build a good image of his/her leadership. The key to 
this success is their ability to maintain a balance between the force of authority and 





The second domain is about ensuring that organisations operate in a manner that is 
consistent with key values such as fairness, impartiality, efficiency, economy, and 
effectiveness (Gregory, 2009). Thus, managerial accountability is concerned with the 
internal relationship between subordinate and superior within a certain organisation. 
An effective accountability relationship within an organisation is needed to 
determine organisational success in achieving its goals. In other words, political 
accountability focuses on the ways in which those who exercise the authority of the 
government are prevented from abusing it. Managerial accountability, in contrast, 
focuses on ensuring that governmental organisations actually operate properly in 
achieving goals that are in the best interest of their stakeholders (Gregory, 2009). 
 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2003) proposed two similar forms of accountability, 
namely: 1) public/political accountability that involves the public as the principals 
and is concerned with issues of democracy and trust, and 2) managerial 
accountability that is concerned with day-to-day operations of the organisation. 
 
In the United States of America (USA), the Government Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB) also acknowledges the existence of several accountability issues and 
limitations in the document "Concepts Statement No.1: Objectives of Financial 
Reporting for State and Local Governments" (GASB, 1987).
10
 Those issues include: 
 
(1) The term accountability is used extensively…but suffers from imprecise 
meaning (Para. 80); 
(2) An accountability perspective in financial reporting complicates the cost-
benefit analysis of information (Para. 73); 
(3) Users of state and local government financial reports are diverse…it may be 
impossible to provide information in any one report sufficient to meet all the 
needs of all users (Para. 72); and 
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(4) Financial reporting is only one source of information…users …combine the 
information provided by financial reporting with other pertinent information 
(Para. 71). 
 
In constitutional government systems, there are two types of accountability, namely: 
1) internal accountability, which is a more direct type of accountability that applies 
within a certain organisational system and involves direct reporting by subordinates 
to a superior who holds the power of direct action, and 2) external accountability, 
which is an indirect type of accountability, involving reporting to parties outside the 
organisation (Matek, 1977). Leclerc, Moynagh, Boisclair, and Hanson (1996) defines 
internal accountability as a rendering of account within a management hierarchy 
from the lowest echelon to the top, and external accountability as the accounting 
managements provide to their governing bodies who serve as owners on behalf of the 
public. 
 
It is obvious that accountability has multiple meanings depending on the context. 
Given the lack of consensus on the meaning of accountability, and to make it clear 
and operational for ILG, this thesis—following Matek (1977) and Leclerc et al. 
(1996) —was concerned with trying to understand the concept from the respondent‘s 
point of view. In this context, accountability is categorised here as: 
 
(1) Internal accountability, which is the accountability of SOs (the highest level 
of appointed official in local government) to the major/head of district 
(elected official). According to Mejier (2003), internal accountability exists 
within the bureaucracy of the organisation. For example, the general manager 
in a local authority is answerable to the elected council members. Internal 
accountability refers to the relationship between superiors and subordinates 
within an organisation (Stewart & Walsh, 1994). 
(2) External accountability is the accountability of local government entities to 
their stakeholders such as central government, parliaments and citizens. 
External accountability operates when public organisations give an account 
to, and are held accountable by, external individuals or agencies (Boyne, 




Therefore, it is important to note that for the rest of the thesis, when discussing 
accountability, this study is using these two categories—internal and external 
accountability. 
 
2.3.2 Government and accountability 
 
The movement towards NPM in the latter part of the twentieth century broadened the 
dissemination of the concept of accountability. The level of public and academic 
debate regarding accountability, along with related ideas such as efficiency and 
effectiveness, has been increased, especially in the Western countries—New 
Zealand, Australia, Britain and USA. During the last three decades notions of public 
sector accountability have become widely used, with formal systems of 
accountability being built into rules and legislation for government entities (Fowles, 
1993; Hyndman & Anderson, 1995). 
 
During the reform era, the increasing lack of trust in Indonesian government 
organisations at every level and the continued concern about the public money they 
spent led to an emphasis on the issues of government accountability. Hence, 
accountability has been a central issue for reformers. With the onset of reform, 
government entities have a responsibility to report to central government (vertical 
accountability) and also to the local community (horizontal accountability) via 
DPRD
11
 (Mardiasmo, 2002). 
 
There have been considerable changes in accountability mechanisms as NPM has 
advanced. Reporting performance via performance reports to stakeholders has been 
given priority. These reports have been considered as the forefront of accountability 
innovation in the sector public in developed countries (Christensen & Skaerbaek, 
2007). Important aspects of local government accountability to central and local 
stakeholders are measured by using performance indicators provided within an 
annual performance report. In Indonesia, performance measurement has also been 
seen as an essential part of public sector management reform (Podger & Perwira, 
2004). 
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Accountability in local government is provided by the use and publication of both 
financial and non-financial performance indicators. Performance indicators play a 
significant role in managerial or internal control in ensuring that organisations are 
managed in the best interests of all stakeholders. In this sense the focus is on the 
issue of internal accountability within individual organisations. In addition, many 
believe that performance measurement is important to demonstrate both external and 
internal accountability (Kloot, 1999; McPhee, 2005; Tilbury, 2006). Cameron (2004) 
argues that the reporting of performance information is fundamental to government 
organisation accountability. 
 
To summarise, there is a requirement for government organisations to account for 
their actions to stakeholders. In other words, government organisations have the 
obligation to discharge accountability through the provision of performance 
information. Therefore, this performance-based accountability process requires a 
performance measurement system that is capable of producing information about an 
organisation‘s outputs and results as measured against its pre-determined goals and 
objectives. This information is crucial in enhancing both internal and external 
accountability. 
 
2.4 Performance Measurement 
 
Performance measurement has been a matter of interest to public sector organisations 
around the world. It has been claimed that performance measurement offers a 
solution to the problem of containing public expenditure and improving service 
delivery to users (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). Performance measurement puts 
emphasis on the management of results and the ability to measure public 
organisations on the basis of an input-output (outcome) model (Johnsen, 2005). 
 
In Indonesia, interest in performance measurement was demonstrated when President 
Habibie signed Presidential Instruction No.7/1999 regarding performance reporting 
for government organisations. This act was seen as an appropriate response to 
improve government performance and accountability as required by the reform 
movement. The enactment of this regulation followed the path of other countries 
27 
 
such New Zealand, Australia, the USA, Canada, and countries of Western Europe 
where similar legislation can be found at the national or state (provincial) level 
(Halachmi, 2002). 
 
Over the last three decades the idea of performance measurement has been the focus 
of considerable attention from both academics and practitioners (Armstrong & 
Overton, 1977). Initially, research in the field mainly concentrated on performance 
measurement in the private sector (Chenhall & Smith, 2007; Hussain & Hoque, 
2002; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan, 1983). However, a substantial number of 
studies have addressed issues of performance measurement in the public sector 
(Yang & Hsieh, 2007; Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004; Hood, James, Jones, Scott, R 
Travers, 1998; Smith, 1995). Public sector organisations, particularly governments in 
Western countries (e.g. Australia, United Kingdom (UK), USA and Canada) are 
using performance measurement in their efforts to improve organisational 
management and provide the best possible value to taxpayers. 
 
In Western countries, the need for better performance from government organisations 
is unavoidable. Ingraham (2005) points out that the issue of performance has gained 
increasing popularity in nations around the world. However, performance is also a 
hard-to-define term and like accountability has multiple meanings. Dubnick (2005, 
p.391) stated: 
 
Outside of any specific context, performance can be associated with a range 
of actions from the simple and mundane act of opening a car door to the 
staging of an elaborate re-enactment of the Broadway musical "Chicago". 
In all these forms, performance stands in distinction from mere "behaviour" 
in implying some degree of intent. 
 
Government provides a broad range of services to its stakeholders, including ones 
that are uneconomical for private firms to provide. Building and maintaining waste 
management systems are examples of services that government usually has to 
provide. No other firms are willing to undertake these tasks because the costs are 




Unlike profit-oriented firms in the private sector, which emphasise financial targets, 
government organisations as not-for-profit entities have multiple goals to provide 
services to diverse stakeholders. Free-market competition that triggers organisations 
to improve efficiency also does not exist in government contexts. Consequently, 
assessing government performance merely on the basis of efficiency is not only 
inappropriate but also misleading as the financial aspect is not the ultimate goal of 
public sector organisations. 
 
Performance measurement for governments is defined as "regular measurement of 
the results (outcomes) and efficiency of services or programs" (Hatry, 2006, p.3). 
The relationship between the amount of input required and the amount of output 
produced is measured in terms of "efficiency", whilst the impact and quality of the 
service delivered is measured by "effectiveness". In other words, efficiency is doing 
something with the least possible expenditure of resources (such as time, energy, 
etc.) and effectiveness is doing it well, doesn't matter what it takes (Drucker, 1994). 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) claimed that to win public support, government officials 
need to demonstrate the results achieved. Managing and measuring performance has 
been one of the key drivers in the reform of the public sector. It is one of the "central 
planks of the reinventing government movement" (Gianakis, 2002, p.36). From this, 
one could ascertain that local government should manage and measure its 
performance using PMS in order to better serve the citizens and in turn gain their 
support. 
 
In an era of increasing decentralisation and autonomy, ILG is under more pressure 
for delivery and performance of their public services than ever before. As the form of 
government that is closest to the people, it has been recognised as the sphere of 
government that has the largest capacity to deliver real outcomes at a local level 
(LOGOTRI, 2003).
12
 This development, in turn, should increase the quality of life 
for its citizens. In order to do this, however, local government must have some way 
of measuring the success, failure, and progress achieved in the pursuit of the 
objectives. Increasingly, performance measurement has been considered a vital tool 
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for local government to not only measure its activities, but also to then provide 
feedback into the management process to help improve future performance 
(LOGOTRI, 2003). Further, the development and use of performance measures is 
considered a key element of NPM implementation (Lapsley, 2008). 
 
Within the Westminster system, executives have the responsibility of developing and 
implementing performance policy (Kettl, 2005). If there is something wrong, top 
executive management are considered to be responsible. Consequently, the 
legislative branch and the voters have the right to be informed about the actions of 
executives (Fountain, 1991). Patton (1992) argues that, unlike in the private sector 
where investors have free access to capital markets, in the public sector voters do not 
have the freedom to choose between alternative entities. Therefore, it is even more 
important for stakeholders to be able to make informed judgments about the 
performance of public sector organisations. Thus, performance reporting by public 
sector organisations such as local government is crucial to the accountability 
relationship with external stakeholders. 
 
2.5 Performance Measurement Systems 
 
This section provides a review of relevant previous studies on PMS and 
accountability as a base in designing this thesis. Given the large numbers and diverse 
approaches of studies conducted in this field, the focus of the review was directed 
and limited to the literature that was relatively close to the approach of this thesis. In 
this section some findings, along with the strengths and weaknesses of relevant prior 
studies, are briefly reviewed. 
 
Wang (2002) conducted a study regarding public accountability in government. This 
study provided the results of a national survey on accountability practices in U.S. 
municipal administrations. It examined possible causes and effects of accountability 
and found that city administrations used a variety of political and legal accountability 
tools. City administrations revealed more financial information than performance 
information to their stakeholders. Some factors revealed in the study had association 
with accountability (e.g. government workers‘ concerns about exposing their 
performances, responsiveness, public consensus, and stakeholder trust), whilst the 
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other factors under examination (e.g. stakeholder fiscal commitments and 
administrative service capacities) were not associated with accountability. Wang‘s 
study was relatively strong in terms of methodology as it employed a combination of 
survey and follow-up interviews. However, it targeted only city administrations. 
Generalisation of Wang‘s findings to other levels of government should be 
undertaken with caution. 
 
In his study Ho (2005) tried to answer a fundamental question, "Does performance 
measurement matter?" by examining how and why Midwest mayors perceive value 
in performance measurement. The study found that although the tool is perceived 
positively, its impact on decision making depends on whether performance 
measurement is integrated into strategic planning, goal setting, and internal 
communication between city council members and departmental staff, and on 
whether major stakeholders are involved in developing performance indicators. Ho‘s 
study, like many others, used a survey as the data collection method. However, to 
compensate for any potential limitations of the survey, fourteen follow-up interviews 
were conducted. Like Wang‘s study, this study was relatively strong in terms of the 
method used as it employed a combination of survey and follow-up interview. 
 
There are, in practice, many different uses of performance information. In 
organisational literature the uses of performance information, such as strategic 
planning, budgeting, and accountability reporting, are examined (see Appendix A.2-
1for further list). These studies were significant in providing the basis for future 
research focusing on performance measurement – as this thesis does. 
 
Various studies of the local government use of performance measurement suggest 
that the practice of collecting performance measures, at least at a rudimentary level, 
is fairly well established in many countries, including the USA, the UK, and 
Australia. According to Behn (2003, p.586), "everyone is measuring performance". 
Despite this growing practice previous studies found that the development and use of 
performance measurement in the public sector is problematical. 
 
One study conducted in Australia revealed that there are indications that the use of 
performance measures is not as extensive as is theoretically possible (Bellamy & 
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Kluvers, 1995). The findings of the survey and case study conducted by Bellamy and 
Kluvers confirmed what has been found by other researchers (for example, Ammons, 
1995; Midwinter, 1994): that few local governments are using performance 
measures. A decade after Bellamy and Kluvers‘ study, more evidence of the use of 
performance indicators was found by Pilcher (2005) through her study of local 
government key performance indicators in New South Wales Australia, where it was 
determined that not all performance indicators met the original goal of 
accountability. 
 
In their study on usefulness and adoption of performance information in the 
Australian public sector, Lee and Fisher (2007) found that most types of information 
were regarded as having some degree of relevance to performance measurement for 
particular decisions. Nevertheless, it was found that the actual use of performance 
information did not match the level of its perceived usefulness. Similar results were 
found by Hatry (2002) and Ammons and Rivenbark (2008) in the United States. 
 
In regard to factors influencing the use of performance data, Ammons and Rivenbark 
(2008) found that many local governments measure and report their performance, but 
the record of these governments in actually using performance measures to improve 
services is more modest. The survey responses and supporting material revealed 
extensive use in some cities, showed less use in others, and suggested possible 
factors influencing the difference. The strength of this study was in the multi-method 
data collection approach used. Hence it eliminated some of the weaknesses inherent 
in single method research. 
 
Some previous studies have investigated the factors influencing the use of 
performance measures in the public sector to obtain an explanation for the 
implementation of PMS (for example, Ammons & Rivenbark, 2008; Cavalluzzo & 
Ittner, 2004; de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Johnsen, 2005; Moynihan & Pandey, 
2004; van Dooren, 2005; Yang & Hsieh, 2007). Some of the essential factors found 
to be associated with the use of performance measures included measurability, 
management commitment, technical knowledge, environmental pressures, and 
organisational scale. These factors will be further investigated in this study. Along 
with the investigation of these factors influencing the use of performance 
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measurement, this study will examine the actual practices of performance 
measurement for both internal management use and external accountability 
reporting. 
 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004), for example, studied the factors influencing the 
implementation of PMS in government. They examined some of the factors affecting 
the development, use, and perceived benefits of results-oriented performance 
measures in government activities. It was found that organisational factors such as 
top management commitment to the use of performance information, decision-
making authority, and training in performance measurement techniques have a 
significant positive effect on measurement system development and use. 
 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) also found that technical issues, such as information 
system problems and difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance 
metrics in hard-to-measure activities, play an important role in system 
implementation and use. The extent of performance measurement and accountability 
are positively associated with greater use of performance information for various 
purposes. However, Cavalluzzo and Ittner found relatively little evidence that the 
perceived benefits of recently mandated performance measurement initiatives in the 
US government increase with greater measurement and accountability. Their study 
provides exploratory evidence that some of the technical and organisational factors 
interact to influence measurement system implementation and outcomes, often in a 
complex manner. However, the use of a survey as the only data collection approach 
suggests the limitations of their study. 
 
Wang and Berman (2000) investigated the prevalence of performance measurement 
in US counties. Their study focused on organisational relationships, structures, and 
goals that are relevant to theories of management reform in government. It found that 
legislative and citizen support, the active involvement of central management, and 
mission orientation further the deployment of performance measurement. The use of 
a survey as the sole approach of data collection placed some limitations on the 




De Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) conducted research into the factors influencing 
the implementation of PMS with emphasis on the factors that affect the utilisation of 
performance measurement, specifically on the adoption (development of indicators) 
and implementation (actual use of indicators). Their findings indicated that policy 
adoption is driven more heavily by factors emerging from rational and technocratic 
theory, whereas actual implementation is influenced by factors addressed by political 
and cultural considerations. Recognising the two stages (adoption and 
implementation) of performance measurement utilisation is one of the strengths of 
the study. However, as in the Wang and Berman (2000) study, their methodology 
was limited to the use of survey data. 
 
Yang and Hsieh (2007) studied the adoption and effectiveness of performance 
measurement in Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan. This study used a survey 
instrument as the data collection method. It used structural equation modelling 
(SEM) to test a model that assessed the relationship among factors related to 
performance measurement adoption and effectiveness. The factors under 
examination included the political environment, stakeholder participation, 
organisational support, training, the adoption of performance measurement, and the 
managerial effectiveness of performance measurement. They found that external 
political support affects performance measurement‘s managerial effectiveness both 
indirectly (through external stakeholder‘s participation, organisational support, and 
technical training) and directly. It also affects adoption indirectly (through 
organisational support, and technical training). Providing a middle-range theory test 
utilising SEM was the particular strength of this study, given the scarcity of theory 
construction in the field. However, using a mailed survey as the only data collection 
approach suggests the study‘s main limitation. 
 
Finally, Tooley et al. (2010) conducted a study on performance measurement and 
accountability in Malaysian local authorities focusing on the stakeholder‘s need for 
performance information. Using relevant data obtained from a survey the Tooley et 
al. (2010) study focused on the scope, nature, and importance of performance 
information in discharging public accountability. They found that stakeholders view 
non-financial performance and future-oriented information as more important than 




In summary, many past studies focused on how performance measurement and 
accountability were integrated. Unfortunately, most of them were conducted in 
developed countries and mainly in Western countries. Despite the importance of 
performance measurement as a pillar of accountability in the reform era, literature 
concerned with this issue is still very rare in a developing country such as Indonesia. 
 
2.6 Performance Measurement Systems in Indonesia 
 
Since 1999, performance measurement has become increasingly important in 
Indonesian government especially at the local government level. Performance 
measurement, in its simplest terms, means obtaining information useful to someone 
in assessing how well an organisation, program, or activity is working. Deciding 
what should be measured in performance measurement is essential, but is not easy. 
 
Following the emergence of the reform era in 1998, the public began to demand 
more transparency and accountability from government. During this era, the role of 
ILG was an important one given decentralisation had become the main pillar of 
Indonesian reform. Therefore the role of local government is crucial in providing 
information regarding government accountability. One important element of the 
accountability process, which is widely recognized, is performance reporting 
(Tooley, Hooks, and Basnan, 2010). The public require performance information so 
that they can make informed decisions and gain a clearer understanding of 
government performance. 
 
To measure performance several questions need to be addressed. These questions 
include: 1) what is the entity (activity, program, or organisation) whose performance 
is to be measured; 2) who is the user of performance information; and 3) what is the 
purpose of using performance information? Once these questions are answered, the 
local government official charged with the task of developing performance indicators 
is ready to consult the relevant specific guidelines provided by central government, 
or other general guidelines on performance measurement, for assistance in deciding 




Unfortunately, in the implementation process different guidelines provided by the 
Ministry of Finance Affairs (MoFA) and Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) caused 
more confusion. The MoFA put more emphasis on financial performance whilst 
MoHA is more concerned with program performance. No single set of guidelines 
currently exists for Indonesian local government that has been generally accepted as 
being the best for performance measurement. From time to time scholars who are 
concerned with this issue have suggested various different measurement categories 
that can give direction to performance measurement data collection efforts. The 
categories most commonly used by a number of scholars are listed in Table 2.3. 
 































































ICMA (1958) x     x x x  
Altman (1973)  x  x   x x  
Wu (1973) x   x  x x x x 
Cadoo (1976) x   x   x x x 
Bahl & Burkhead (1977) x x x x      
Hatry (1980) x x  x x    x 
Hudson & Shephard (1998) x  x   x x   
Ostrom et al. (1999) x    x  x x x  
Wholey (1999)  x x   x  x  
 
Different categorisations found in the literature are not the only problem creating 
confusion. A given label for measurement categories may not refer to the same 
concept when used by different writers. For example, "workload measure" most 
commonly refers to quantifying the amount of work done. Others say that workload 
measures describe the type of services requested and the amount of work required to 
deliver them, and note that workload will not equal output. Further confusion comes 
from different labels being given to the same concept. Some use different terms to 
refer to the same concept (i.e. final output/outcome/impact). 
 
In Indonesia, in times of reform and tight budgets, ILG is being asked to do more 
with less. In addition they must justify expenditures on their programs compared 
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with planned targets by demonstrating the results achieved for their stakeholders 
(i.e., local representatives (DPRD), local citizens, higher level governments, NGOs 
and the media). Performance measurement is typically a continuing activity intended 
to measure and monitor progress towards predefined goals. It periodically provides 
ILG with insight into how programs contribute to their goals and in turn how to 
improve the performance of the programs. 
 
Performance measurement involves measuring program activities and results. 
Specific performance indicators are internally generated with written general 
guidance provided by central government. PMS guidelines based on SK Kepala 
Lembaga Administrasi Negara (LAN)13 No. 239/IX/6/8/2003 have provided a 
model (see Figure 2.1) to clarify the expectations of program managers and other 
stakeholders about how the program is supposed to work, and through what 
mechanism and by what means the intended results will be achieved. This model was 
developed to help communicate program intentions to executives and legislators. It 
ensures a reasonable level of agreement among stakeholders regarding expectations 
for the program, and identifies and develops the performance indicators needed to 
assess the program‘s results. 
 
The LAKIP model uses the following performance categories to assess government 
entity performance: input, output, outcome, benefit and impact. These guidelines 
were provided to avoid the confusion referred to above. Table 2.4 presents the 
definition for each category. The first three categories of LAKIP indicators are quite 
popular in the literature, whilst the last two are rarely found in the literature. 
However, these types of indicators basically are only an extension of outcome 
indicators. In other words, LAKIP categorises outcomes into three different time 
frames, namely: 1) direct outcome labelled as outcome, 2) intermediate outcome 
labelled as benefit, and 3) final outcome labelled as impact. 
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Figure 2.1: LAKIP Model 
 
The LAKIP model identifies the needed program inputs (such as staff, financial and 
other resources); the kinds of activities carried out (where and by whom); and the 
results those activities are supposed to achieve. The results are assessed in different 
steps: output; outcome; benefit; and impact. Outputs are the goods and services—the 
direct results of the activities. Outcomes refer to the short-term benefit of the 
programs, whilst benefits describe the medium-term impact of the program. Impacts 
are the long-term benefit of the programs—the program‘s ultimate benefits to 
society. To measure the level of achievement of programs, both quantitative and 
qualitative performance indicators need to be developed. 
 
Table 2.4: Types of Indicators 
Indicators Descriptions 
Input Anything needed to enable programs to achieve results 
(i.e. human resources, materials, and technology) 
Output Direct results from undertaking activities/programs 
(i.e. goods and services) 
Outcome Anything that reflects the functioning of outputs of 
activities (i.e. customer satisfaction) 
Benefit The benefit of output received by the society (i.e. 
public/citizen satisfaction) 
Impact The level of social, economic, environmental and 
other public interest influences resulted from 




This chapter presented an overview of public sector reform across the world. In 
doing so, the notion of NPM and good governance has been presented concurrently 
with background information on the emerging practices of performance measurement 
and accountability in ILG. A gap in the literature was identified, which this thesis 

















development of a critical model. The next chapter will discuss institutional theory, 
the conceptual framework, and hypothesis development. 
 
It was also found that the ILG mainly provides indicators on inputs (i.e. money 
spent), which are relatively easy to access. Despite their important role, however, 
information on outcomes ( i.e. program achievement) has not been sufficiently 










This chapter presents important aspects of the theoretical framework, the conceptual 
model, and the hypotheses development used in this thesis. The chapter starts by 
considering the theoretical background of this thesis (Section 3.2).The use of 
institutional theory—particularly the concept of institutional isomorphism—and a 
discussion of prior studies using isomorphism are presented in the next two sections 
(Section 3.3 and 3.4). Sections 3.5 and 3.6 provide information on the thesis‘ 
proposed conceptual model and hypotheses development. Finally, a summary 
(Section 3.7) is presented to conclude the chapter. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
 
A number of researchers have studied why organisations develop and apply PMS, by 
examining various theories such as agency theory, legitimacy theory, the political 
economy of accounting theory, and stakeholder theory (Johnsen, 2001; van der Laan, 
van Ees, & van Witteloostuijn, 2008; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000). In agency theory, 
the relationship between the two parties (principal and agent) is contractual in nature. 
The agent is rewarded for its performance according to the contractual terms 
specified by the principal. In other words, an agent reacts to the requirements of the 
principal. Similarly, legitimacy theory contends that an organisation responds by 
disclosing performance information according to the perceived importance of the 
stakeholder. The public sector context is not contractual in nature. This explains why 
much of the research applying agency theory has been conducted in private sector 
organisations rather than in public sector organisations (Johnsen, 2001). There 
traditionally are multiple principals in the public sector. An agent has to deal with 
different principals simultaneously. As a result it does not appear easy to measure 
performance, and research has tended to use indicators drawn more the political 
economy. Stakeholders‘ theory also acknowledges the impact of multiple 
stakeholders on organisational responses to providing performance indicators. In 




However, a unanimously accepted theoretical framework for PMS in developing 
countries does not appear to exist—a fact that makes this thesis even timelier. It has 
been claimed that stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and political economy theory 
are neither separate nor competing (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995), and this claim 
has been supported by Deegan (2007) who suggests that legitimacy theory is a 
positive theory. Deegan finds many similarities between stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory. Both theories examine the interaction between an organisation and 
its different stakeholders. An organisation conducts a legitimating activity (i.e. 
reporting performance indicators) which is valued and demanded by different 
stakeholders. These two theories are largely overlapping (Deegan & Blomquist, 
2006), however, they are different in regard to issues of resolution. Stakeholder 
theory focuses on how an organisation interacts with particular stakeholders, whilst 
legitimacy theory focuses on the interactions of the organisation with society as a 
whole. 
 
An alternative theory advocated by Deegan (2007), institutional theory, has 
similarities with legitimacy theory in permitting an understanding of how 
organisations recognise and respond to changing social and institutional pressures 
and expectations. Specifically, Deegan (2006, p.305) stated: 
 
Among other factors, it links organisational practices (such as accounting 
and corporate reporting) to the values of the society in which an 
organisation operates, and to a need to maintain organisational legitimacy. 
There is a view that organisational form of homogeneity—that is, the 
structure of the organisation (including the structure of the reporting 
systems) and the practices adopted by different organisations tend to 
become similar to conform to what society, or particular powerful groups, 
considers to be ‗normal‘. Organisations that deviate from being of a form 
that has become ‗normal‘ or expected will potentially have problems in 
gaining or retaining legitimacy. 
 
From the above explanation, it seems clear that the central issue in gaining 
legitimacy is homogenisation towards and conformance with social values and 
norms. These aspects of organisational practice are considered essential for social 
acceptance by society. The two sources of legitimacy emerge from internal 
41 
 
organisational factors and external stakeholders‘ influence (Lodhia, 2008). The 
features of institutional theory are further discussed in the following section. 
 
3.3 Institutional Theory 
 
As a theoretical framework, institutional theory is a very broad concept and has 
many strands that have evolved since the development of the theory in the early 
twentieth century. Institutionalism in organisations has a long history; the foundation 
of early institutionalism (old institutionalism) and its application to organisations has 
been outlined by Selznick (1948). In contrast, modern institutionalism (new 
institutionalism) emerged in the 1970s, as has been shown in the work of Silverman 
(1971). Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1977) further extended the ideas 
Silverman proposed. 
 
Selznick, as a supporter of the old model of institutionalism, claimed that 
institutionalisation is a process that added value beyond the technical requirements of 
tasks (P. Selznick, 1957). He further described organisations as rational systems that 
act through their leadership and membership to achieve objectives in an efficient 
manner. Conversely, the supporters of the new institutionalism, which focuses on a 
sociological approach, emphasise that organisations operate in a symbolic matrix of 
practices in order to obtain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, not all 
institutional theorists agree with this distinction. Selznick (1996), for instance, 
claimed that the new institutionalism is simply a continuation of the old 
institutionalism, as the similarities outweigh the dissimilarities. 
 
In the field of organisational study, the concepts of institution and institutionalisation 
have been defined in many different ways (Scott, 1987). Scott (1987) proposed four 
formulations for institutional focus. They were institutionalisation as: 1) a process of 
instilling value; 2) a process of creating reality; 3) a class of elements; and 4) distinct 
societal spheres. Institutionalisation as a process of creating reality is relevant for this 
study as this form of institutional theory is based on a shared social reality, which in 
turn creates a human construction in social interaction. In other words, organisations 
operating in the same field react similarly and, over time, develop similar responses 
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or adopt similar practices when facing certain situations. Scott (1987, p.496) defined 
institutionalisation as: 
 
The social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition 
of social reality— a conception whose validity is seen as independent of the 
actor‘s own views or actions but is taken for granted as defining the "way 
things are" and/or the "way things are to be done". 
 
With regard to institutionalisation, DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.147) made the 
following comment: "institutionalisation is a rational response; one of the key 
outcomes of institutionalisation is a homogeneous organisational structure". 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contended that an organisation becomes increasingly 
similar to others in the same field, as the result of isomorphic power rather than 
market power. This statement was given in response to previous opinions, such as 
that of Weber (1952), who suggested that the engine of organisational rationalisation 
came primarily from the competitive marketplace. According to Weber (1952) there 
are three related factors that cause rationalisation: 1) competition among capitalist 
firms, 2) competition among states, and 3) bourgeois demand for equal protection 
under the law. The first factor was the most important for Weber. Conversely, 
DiMaggio and Powell argued that the cause of organisational rationalisation has 
changed. DiMaggio and Powell wrote (1983, p. 147): 
 
Bureaucratisation and other forms of organisational change occur as the 
result of processes that make organisations more similar without necessarily 
making them more efficient. 
 
The study by DiMaggio and Powell then sought to explain homogeneity among 
organisations. They proposed that over time, in a well-established field, organisations 
tend to move towards homogenisation, even though they show considerable diversity 
at first. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) claimed: 
 
Once disparate organisations in the same line of business are structured into 
an actual field (as we shall argue, by competition, the state, or the 
professions), powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more 




The term used that best describes the process of homogenisation is isomorphism. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) maintained that the concept of isomorphism consists of 
two types: 1) competitive isomorphism, and 2) institutional isomorphism. The former 
is most relevant for cases in which open competition exists, while the latter is 
suitable if free competition is absent. An example of the latter is the public sector 
environment in which an organisation must strive for political power and institutional 
legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness. 
 
This study adopts the second basis of institutional isomorphism, as within ILG free 
and open competition does not exist. However ILG does compete for legitimacy 
through political power via provincial and central government. In addition, 
isomorphism describes the process of the homogenisation of an organisation within a 
given environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Accordingly isomorphism "is a 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p.149). 
 
Institutional isomorphism is a useful concept in the modern era in which politics and 
ceremony are embedded in organisational life. The central notion of 
institutionalisation is that organisations act to reflect an evolution of structural 
pattern in doing things over time. Eventually this evolution becomes legitimised. 
Eisenhardt (1988, p. 489) claimed: 
 
Therefore, it is possible to predict practices within organisations from 
perception of legitimate behaviour derived from cultural values, industry 
tradition, firm history, popular management folklore, and the like. 
 
Every theory has its own key ideas and assumptions that define its parameters and 










Table 3.1: Institutional Theory Aspects 
Key idea Organisational practices arise from imitative forces and firm 
tradition 
Basis of Organisation  Legitimacy 
View of People Legitimacy seeking satisfiers 
Role of Environment A source of practices to which organisations conform 
Role of Technology Technology moderates the impact of institutional factors or 
can be determined institutionally 
Problem domain Organisational practices, in general 
Independent variables Industry traditions, legislation, social and political beliefs, 
founding conditions that comprise the institutional context 
Assumptions People satisfied, people conform to external norms 
Source: Eisenhardt (1988) 
 
From the institutional perspective organisational legitimacy is the basis for the 
existence of organisations. Hence to maintain their existence organisations need to be 
legitimate. Legitimacy is obtained by organisations through a pattern of actions 
undertaken within their environment (Pfeffer, 1982). By using structures and 
processes that are considered legitimate within the environment in which they 
operate organisations would appear to be responsible. That way they satisfy their 
stakeholders and avoid the negative impact of being blamed if something goes wrong 
in the future (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
 
Built upon the work of Meyer and Rowan‘s (1977) cultural systems and Zucker‘s 
(1977) cognitive systems, Scott (2001) proposed three "pillars" of institutional 
process as mechanisms of institutionalism. Scott takes a different approach from 
DiMaggio and Powell, however, they have one thing in common and that is that they 
both consider isomorphism in some of their studies. Table 3.2 presents these three 











Table 3.2: Three Pillars of Institutions 
 Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of 
compliance 
expedience social obligation Taken-for-grantedness, 
shared understanding  
Basis for order regulative rules binding 
expectations 
constitutive schema 
Mechanisms coercive normative mimetic 
Logic instrumentality appropriateness orthodoxy 
Indicators rules, laws, sanctions certification, 
accreditation 
common beliefs, shared 
logics of action, 
isomorphism 
Affect fear guilt/innocence shame/ honour certainty/confusion 
Basis of 
legitimacy 
legally sanctioned morally governed comprehensible, 
recognisable, culturally 
supported 
Source: Scott (2001) 
 
The regulative pillar comprises regulations and laws within a certain domain (i.e. the 
national or international level). Regulatory requirements imposed by central 
government are an example of their potential coercive
14
 power over society or lower 
levels of government. The enactment of a law requires conformity in order to avoid 
sanctions and also to gain or maintain organisational legitimacy. There is agreement 
among scholars in the field of organisational theory that maintaining a good 
relationship with the external environment is equally important to improving internal 
efficiency and organisational performance. In this sense, the role of social legitimacy 
is crucial in keeping good relationships with the environment (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). 
 
Other than coercive isomorphism, which occurs as a result of imposed regulations 
and laws, organisations may also gain legitimacy over time due to widespread 
practice. A certain management practice may be adopted in order to gain perceived 
legitimacy (through normative pressure) rather than to achieve better performance 
(Glynn & Abzug, 2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Widespread adoption over a relatively long period of time would then become taken 
for granted practice and, hence, represent the cultural-cognitive pillar. 
 
                                                 
 
14
 Coercive and other isomorphic pressures are discussed in more detail below. 
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Social legitimacy can be maintained by accepting the socially taken-for-granted 
cognitive or normative symbolic components and hence complying with institutional 
requirements from the external environment. Consequently organisations operating 
within the same field, such as ILG, generally show similarity in structures and 
practices. This similarity among organisations as a result of normative and cognitive 
processes is called institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
In this sense, Scott (2008) claimed that pressures to adopt new management practices 
can come from regulative and normative systems. However, the adoption is in some 
cases symbolic only (Westphal & Zajac, 2001). Hence, from this perspective, the 
change processes in PMS are diffused throughout organisations by means of three 
mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). As the study of performance measurement in government entities emerged as 
a result of public sector reform, it is appropriate to refer to the concept of 
institutional isomorphism here (Pilcher, 2007). 
 
With regard to public sector reforms Tolbert and Zucker (1983, p.25) claimed that 
"the rapid institutionalism of the reform rested on the assumed isomorphism between 
it and the ideal rational bureaucratic form". It is a common practice that in the reform 
era many private sector management tools such as PMS were brought to the public 
sector based on an assumption that private sector organisations operate more 
efficiently than public sector organisations. This adoption reflected the drive to 
rationalise government organisations, and isomorphic pressures play an important 
role in accelerating the process of adoption. 
 
In addition, institutional theory considers institutional roles in society and the way 
they act to comply with societal norms. The theory "traces the emergence of 
distinctive forms, processes, strategies, outlooks and competencies as they emerge 
from patterns of organisational interaction and adaptation" (Selznick, 1996, p.271). 
Institutional theory suggests that organisations pursue legitimacy by conforming to 
isomorphic pressures in their environment (Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2007). 
 
Finally, institutional theory has become more widely used on a global basis, gaining 
acceptance in the study of organisations and becoming a dominant theory in the field 
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(Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). However, there is a tendency to 
apply institutional theory in contexts far beyond its core purposes (Suddaby, 2010). 
Suddaby (2010) claimed that there is a need to bring institutional theory back to its 
core assumption and objectives. Many researchers used institutional theories in their 
researches following the famous ―iron cage‖ paper written by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), which argued that organisations become isomorphic with their environtment. 
However, in many cases, these researchers misinterpreted the original idea and 
argued that organisations are passive recipients of pressures from their environments. 
DiMaggio‘s (1988) paper resoonded to this misinterpretation and suggested that 
researchers should attend to the idea that organisations also strategically respond to 
organisational pressures (Suddaby, 2010). 
 
3.3.1 Institutional theory and performance measurement systems 
 
To explain the adoption of management innovations and their homogeneity within 
social systems, many scholars utilise two main theoretical approaches: efficiency 
theory and institutional theory (Strang & Macy, 2001; Strang & Soule, 1998; 
Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983). The former theory puts more emphasis on efficiency, while the latter relies 
more on legitimacy as the reason for adopting new practices. 
 
Over the years, management control systems in which performance measurement has 
became an integral part of the system have been studied from functionalist, 
behavioural, interpretive and critical perspectives. Recent studies, however, have 
been particularly influenced by institutional theories (Berry, Coad, Harris, Otley, & 
Stringer, 2009). Studies that were undertaken based on this theory assumed that 
organisations, especially public sector organisations, compete not only for resources 
and customers but also for political power and institutional legitimacy. 
 
Adoption of PMS as an important component of management reform in the public 
sector has become more prevalent in the last two decades. Some scholars claimed 
that the arguments for this movement were mainly rational or technical in nature, and 
that PMS was adopted as an effort towards achieving an efficient and effective 
organisation (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2006; Meier, O‘Toole Jr, Boyne & 
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Walker, 2006; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). As a result of PMS implementation 
better substantive performance would occur due to the expected benefits of enhanced 
efficiency, accountability, and quality of public service delivery. However, a 
different point of view is offered by institutional theory, which argues that the main 
reason underlying organisational change is gaining legitimacy rather than improving 
substantive performance (Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2009). 
 
This thesis investigates the development and use of performance indicators in 
conjunction with influencing factors and accountability practices in ILG. The 
possible influence of institutional isomorphism in the adoption and implementation 
of PMS within an institutional theory framework is also investigated. The 
development and use of performance indicators within government may depend on 
the power relationship between its constituents and itself. For example, it is very 
likely that when facing a more powerful government, a local government would have 
to conform to a performance measurement regime required to satisfy the central 
government‘s interest. 
 
Even though institutional theory has other elements (legitimacy & decoupling), they 
were not included in the thesis as isomorphism was determined to provide a clearer 
explanation of the findings in the current context. Legitimacy (which focuses 
primarily on voluntary organisational behavior) and decoupling ( which explains 
disconnection between two structures, one formal and one actual) were not included 
as in the Indonesian context the performance reporting (LAKIP/performance report) 
is mandatory not voluntary and there was no performance measurement system in 
place before the implementation of regulation on LAKIP. Hence, at the time of doing 
this research, LAKIP was a relatively new and untried practice. LAKIP is the first 
structure of its type in Indonesia and, as such, performance reporting did not exist 
prior to its adoption. Therefore, institutional isomorphism (coercive, mimetic and 
normative) was considered more appropriate and used as theoretical lens to explain 
performance reporting practice in ILG. ―Symbolic‖ action in ILG was driven by 





In a decentralised government such as Indonesia, the central authority normally has 
greater coercive power over local government than other constituents (Brignall & 
Modell, 2000). Given this situation, institutional theory, particularly coercive 
isomorphism, will provide a better explanation for this phenomenon than the other 
theories considered and rejected (see Section 3.4). Next, the sources of pressures 
involved in the adoption of PMS in ILG are discussed using DiMaggio and Powell‘s 




Coercive isomorphism stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy, 
and comes from both formal and informal pressures from other organisations. In a 
decentralised environment, central government normally has greater coercive power 
over local government (Brignall & Modell, 2000; Modell, 2001). Despite the 
decentralisation, by law central government has the continuing privilege to maintain 
control over local government units through the enactment of a new law or 
regulation. In the case of PMS, a local organisation is obliged to take account of the 
central government‘s mandate by annually submitting a performance report. As well, 
central government has the power to impose administrative sanctions in cases of 
nonconformity. 
 
In institutional theory, coercive isomorphism may take place when organisations are 
forced to adopt similar methods (i.e. PMS) in order to comply with rules and 
regulations. Relevant rules and regulations are enforced by central government 
regarding performance reporting and accountability. Hence, in Indonesia, the sources 
of isomorphic pressures potentially come from central government via the enactment 
of laws and regulations that affect government organisations including local 
government. These regulations include Inpres No. 7/1999 that require all government 
entities, including local government, to report on their performance to central 
government. This coercive pressure tends to occur due to the fact that most local 





Even though ILG is required to submit performance reports to central government, 
this does not mean that they actually use performance information in their day-to-day 
management practices. In a study on performance measurement for accountability 
purposes, Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) found that implementation of externally 
mandated PMS in United States government organisations was used merely to fulfil 
regulatory requirements, and tended to be symbolic in nature, without substantive 
impact on internal operations. Therefore, an understanding of the factors influencing 
the development and use of performance measures is very important. The knowledge 





Mimetic isomorphism emerges as a result of an effort to respond to environmental 
uncertainty in the field. Where organisations operate in this type of environment, 
they tend to mimic others in order to achieve legitimacy. There are 445 ILG, all of 
which differ in terms of size, assets, population, human resources, financial 
capabilities, and managerial skill. With regard to management practices, such as 
producing and using LAKIP, they are not all at the same stage. Most ILG are still in 
the very basic stages of implementation, although a few have achieved a more 
advanced stage. Councils can learn from each other to improve their management 
capabilities through any kind of media facilitated by the central government. These 
media include universities, consultancy firms, and local government associations 
such as Badan Kerjasama Kabupaten Seluruh Indonesia (BKKSI) for regencies and 
Asosiasi Pemerintah Kota Seluruh Indonesia (APEKSI) for cities. 
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There have been several major projects undertaken in Indonesia by professional 
consultancy firms in collaboration with Indonesian central government. These 
projects provide technical assistance on relevant public management tools to selected 
ILG, and disseminate the outcome of the projects to other ILG. Mimicry can happen 
indirectly through the media of consulting firms and trade associations (DiMaggio & 








Powell, 1983). Therefore, in day-to-day practices, it is suggested here that the 
potential exists for councils to mimic others that they assume have succeeded in their 
implementation process. As suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.150) 
"mimetic isomorphism provides that organisations tend to model themselves and 





Normative isomorphism is usually associated with professionalism to provide a 
better insight, and hence a better explanation, to the findings of the research. 
Normative isomorphism takes place when norms are internalised within 
organisations along with outside coercive social pressure (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). 
Organisations are sometimes pressured to follow best practices or normative 
guidelines (Dacin, 1997). According to Ryan and Purcell (2004, p.10) "normative 
influences refer to shared norms of organisational members, that is, those values that 
may be unspoken, or expectations that have gained acceptance within organisations". 
Appari et al. (2009, p.4) wrote: 
 
Normative pressure stems from the cultural expectation that agents feel 
compelled to honour, often because they are rooted in professional 
affiliations, including educational background, professional networks, and 
consultant arrangements. 
 
Given the low level of human resources capacity in ILG, there has been a trend in the 
last decade to give more attention to the education of government employees and 
officials (Mera, 2000). As this demand emerged, many universities in Indonesia 
began offering programs (degree and non-degree) that are specially designed to 
respond to government employee and official needs. Thousands of government 
employees and officials have graduated from such programs. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) argued that the more educated the workforce becomes, in terms of academic 
qualification and participation in professional and trade associations, the greater the 




Different actors in the government context interrelate in a complex web of 
interactions. In Indonesia, the set of organisations that interact with the ILG in terms 
of PMS and accountability practices are: 1) Central Ministry (e.g. MoHA); 2) 
Provincial government offices (e.g. Governor Office); 3) Legislatures (e.g. Local 
Parliament); 4) Audit agencies (e.g. BPKP); 5) Non-Government Organisations 
(NGO). 
 
Despite this fact, most literature on government performance measurement assumes 
that there is a relatively simple principal-agent relationship, and makes little room for 
the "multiple principals" issue. Consequently, studies of performance in the public 
sector within an institutional context are limited (Talbot, 2008). Therefore this thesis 
attempts to fill the gap by examining within an institutional theory context the 
interaction between actors involved in the practices of PMS and accountability in 
ILG. 
 
Most of the previous studies on PMS and accountability utilised agency theory. 
Given the issues discussed above, this study will employ institutional theory. In this 
case institutional theory is more appropriate to explaining the adoption of PMS and 
accountability practices within public sector organisations. Specifically, this thesis 
uses the idea of isomorphism to explain the symbolic rather than substantive 
adoption and implementation of PMS among ILG. 
 
3.4 Prior Studies Using Institutional Isomorphism 
 
The concept of isomorphism has gained popularity among scholars of organisations 
and thus has been widely used as a theoretical framework within many studies 
conducted all over the world. The following is a summary of the prior research in 
this area. 
 
Using a diverse set of archival data and interviews with key actors, Mir and Rahaman 
(2005) studied the adoption of international accounting standards (IASs) in 
Bangladesh. Their study found that the major factor behind the decision to adopt 
IASs was the desire to gain institutional legitimacy. Like many other developing 
countries, both public and private organisations in Bangladesh were operating under 
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a lending scheme from an international donor institution (i.e. IMF and World Bank). 
Hence, government and private organisations in Bangladesh needed a strong 
accountability arrangement with the lending institution, and credibility with foreign 
investors. This reality resulted in extreme pressure to conform to these international 
bodies‘ required accounting standards. 
 
In 2006, Barreto and Baden-Fuller developed an important strand in the institutional 
literature, by undertaking a study of international imitation. This study offered new 
insight into mimetic isomorphism and its reliance on legitimacy. Barreto and Baden-
Fuller (2006) examined Portuguese bank branch decisions between 1988 and 1996, 
and found that there was a tendency for the banks in the study to imitate other banks. 
Another important finding was that mimetic practices produced a negative effect on 
bank profitability. They concluded that legitimacy pressures played a major role in 
organisational decision making, and produced the tension between the pressure to 
conform and the pressure to perform. 
 
In their effort to propose remedies for the drastic reduction in the diversity of topics 
within the academic accounting literature, Tuttle and Dillard (2007) applied 
institutional theory to the field of academic accounting research in the United States. 
They found that all three types of institutional isomorphism—coercive, normative, 
and mimetic—appeared to shape the organisational field of accounting research. 
Normative isomorphism within professional associations such as the American 
Accounting Association (AAA) was central in affecting the choice of topic in 
accounting research. In this sense, theoretical relevance was often eclipsed by 
institutional pressures. Appropriate programs and actions for enhancing diversity 
were proposed to counter the institutional forces acting within the field of academic 
accounting research. 
 
Trevino, Thomas, and Cullena (2008) examined institutional reform in sixteen Latin 
American countries between 1970 and 2000. This study applied an institutional 
isomorphism concept to its examination of the process of institutionalisation and 
legitimisation and its impact on organisational decision making regarding inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Results indicated that mimetic and normative 
isomorphism (e.g. educational attainment, privatisation, bilateral investment treaties, 
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and political uncertainty) were more effective than coercive isomorphism (e.g. tax 
reform, trade reform, and financial account liberalisation) in promoting inward FDI. 
 
Kim, Kim, and Lee (2009) applied institutional analysis in an e-government system 
for anti-corruption in Korea. Using a single case analysis this study evaluated the 
development of an anti-corruption system called OPEN (Online Procedures 
Enhancement for Civil Application) in the Seoul Metropolitan Government. The 
findings indicated that the regulatory dimension (coercive isomorphism) was most 
effective, and that strong leadership was crucial to the success of the OPEN system. 
 
In their study, Arnaboldi, Azzone, and Palermo (2010) explored the adoption of 
managerial innovation in the Italian public sector, specifically Italian central 
government. Their study used institutional theory, and identified the reasons why the 
uptake and use of managerial innovation may fail. The problems were investigated 
by way of a case study approach. The study found that failure in the adoption and use 
of managerial innovations was caused by a complex interplay of external forces. 
After a decade, adoption turned out to be merely for the sake of formality, without 
any real impact on organisational performance. The decision to adopt was forced by 
legislation, implying the presence of coercive isomorphism. External consultants also 
played a major role, reflecting the influence of normative isomorphism. 
 
Judge, Li, and Pinsker (2010) studied the national adoption of IASs from the 
institutional perspective. This study was conducted to seek an understanding of why 
some countries have embraced IASs, some partially adopt, and others continue to 
resist. They found that all three forms of isomorphism were predictive of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption across the world. 
Specifically, they found that foreign aid (coercive), import penetration (mimetic), 
and level of education (normative) were all predictive of the degree to which IASs 
were adopted, or not, by 132 developing, transitional, and developed countries. 
 
Han and Koo (2010) conducted a study that drew on the idea of isomorphism and 
decoupling to explain the rapid diffusion of performance compensation systems 
among Korean firms. Utilising a survey the study found that all three components of 
isomorphism—coercive, mimetic, and normative—had a significant influence on the 
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adoption of performance compensation systems where there was a compromised 
form between seniority and performance pay. Table 3.3 summarises the studies 
surveyed above. 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of Prior Studies 
No Researchers Year Topics Contexts Types of 
Pressures 
1 Mir & Rahaman 2005 IASs Bangladesh‘s 
public and private 
organisations 
coercive 




Portuguese Banks mimetic 
3 Tuttle & Dillard 2007 Research topic US Universities normative 




5 Kim et al. 2009 e-Government Seoul Metropolitan 
Government 
coercive 






7 Judge et al. 2010 IASs 132 countries coercive, 
mimetic & 
normative 




It is clear from the table above that institutional isomorphism has been used in a large 
number of studies in the past, and has been proven effective in explaining the reasons 
underlying the adoption and implementation of a certain system of practices within 
an organisation. All the studies overviewed found the existence of at least one 
component of isomorphism. In general coercive isomorphism was found to be the 
strongest. 
 
In a manner similar to the prior studies surveyed above, this study employs 
institutional isomorphism as its theoretical framework. It expands the application of 
institutional isomorphism in the area of performance measurement and accountability 
and widens the context to Indonesia, specifically ILG. Hence, this study is expected 




3.5 Conceptual Schema 
 
Despite the increasing trend towards performance measurement research, only 
limited attention has been paid to hypothesis testing and theory construction (e.g.de 
Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Wang & Berman, 2000; Yang & Hsieh, 2007) The 
majority of the studies in this field have been descriptive or prescriptive in nature. 
This section outlines the conceptual framework designed to facilitate hypothesis 
testing and theory construction. 
 
The development of a conceptual framework is crucial to explaining what actually 
occurred in the reform process. A framework is needed before one can explain 
meaningful relationships between variables. Mintzberg (1979, p.587) claimed that 
"explanation is, of course, the purpose of research". Performance measurement 
(detailed in Section 3.5.1) and accountability (detailed in Section 3.5.2) are the two 
dependent variables under examination in this study. 
 
3.5.1 Performance measurement: development and use 
 
The adoption of PMS is an important factor in an organisation‘s ability to achieve its 
goals. One central goal of public sector organisations such as ILG is to provide a 
high level of accountability to their stakeholders. "Performance measurement has 
long been promoted as a method of achieving greater accountability in local 
government" (Ammons & Rivenbark, 2008, p.313). The collection, analysis and 
publication of performance information will enable legislatures and the public to 
hold both ministers and public servants more accountable. Without relevant 
performance information, it is very difficult for any organisation including ILG to 
track the progress of its efforts. Simply having performance indicators, however, is 
not sufficient for organisations, as the effective use of them is far more important. 
The real use of indicators should be to enable organisations to improve their 
management and governance (Ho, 2005; Moynihan, 2005; Hatry, 2002; Wholey, 
1999). 
 
There are two antecedents of accountability that arise as consequences of PMS 
implementation. The events are the development and the use of performance 
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indicators (de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; 
Moynihan, 2005). Development refers to the design and production of performance 
indicators related to a certain program/activity, whereas use refers to the utilisation of 
indicators for a certain purpose such as day-to-day managerial decision making. 
Some scholars used the term adoption in referring to development of indicators and 
implementation to refer to the use of indicators. However, this thesis will use the 
former terms. 
 
Determining and understanding the factors that influence the development and use of 
performance indicators is therefore crucial given the central role of PMS in 
organisations. This study tests influencing factors associated with the development 
and use of performance indicators. The development and use of performance 
indicators in turn may have various determinants. However, there is no convincing 
evidence regarding either the extent to which or the way in which the two aspects 
(development and use of indicators) differ in their determinants (Yang and Hsieh, 
2007). Hence, the model in this study uses the same set of factors as independent 
variables for both events (refer to Figure 3.1 at the end of the next section). 
 
3.5.2 Accountability: internal and external 
 
A large number of studies have focused on either performance measurement or 
accountability. Research is not so forthcoming in Indonesia when it comes to 
integrating performance management and accountability within a single study. . "A 
parallel field of study, but most often unconnected to performance, has been the 
accountability of public organisations and institutions" (Talbot, 2008, p.1575). 
Improved accountability is a crucial requirement in democratic governance. This 
requirement, in part, is considered as a corollary of improved management practice 
including performance measurement (World Bank, 2006). Bearing those 
observations in mind, this study combines the model of accountability from Wang 
(2002) and the model of performance measurement from Cavalluzzo and Ittner 
(2004) to form one integral study. What develops will be a new model designed to 




Accountability has always been a central concern of both the study and the practice 
of public management. As discussed in the literature review the concept has also 
been elusive and controversial. In political and academic contexts accountability is 
viewed as a very broad term as it functions as an umbrella that covers various 
concepts, such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, 
responsibility, and integrity (Mulgan, 2001). 
 
This thesis, however, takes a relatively narrow, but operational, perspective on 
accountability by breaking it down into only two terms: internal and external 
accountability. The model proposed within this study focuses on internal and 
external aspects of accountability as these two aspects are also closely related to 
performance measurement. Internal accountability focuses on the interaction between 
the manager and the head of the ILG. External accountability focuses on the 
interaction between ILG and the stakeholders (e.g. central government, local 
parliament). By separating internal and external accountability, the factors affecting 
the two concepts can be determined and analysed separately. 
 
For the sake of meaningful explanation, Figure 3.1 was developed to depict the 
conceptual model tested in the analysis. As mentioned earlier, the model, modified 
and extended in a way to enable it to fit within the ILG context, is based on previous 
studies relating to performance measurement and accountability—mainly from the 
study of Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) and Wang (2002). The first four independent 
variables were adapted from Cavalluzzo and Ittner‘s study and the fifth from Wang‘s 
work. With regard to dependent variables, the first three variables were adapted from 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner‘s research, while the last two variables were from Wang‘s 
study. In addition, the model in this thesis integrates institutional theory as the 
theoretical framework to further explain the practice of PMS and accountability. The 
hypothesised relationships between all constructs will be discussed in the following 
sections along with the hypotheses proposed. 
 
To permit better understanding of the model used in this study, operational 
definitions of the variables used are provided below. The terms used in the model of 




1. Metric Difficulties: difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate 
performance metrics in hard-to-measure activities. 
2. Technical Knowledge: knowledge related to design, implementation and use 
of performance indicators. 
3. Management Commitment: top management support for the development and 
use of performance indicators. 
4. Legislative Requirement: mandated performance measurement initiatives via 
laws and regulations. 
5. Organisational Capacity: organisational capabilities related to management 
information, accounting and budgeting systems. 
6. Development of Indicators: the process of producing performance indicators 
within an organisation. 
7. Managerial Use of Indicator: use of performance indicators at the managerial 
level (i.e. Head of Department). 
8. Higher Use of Indicators: use of performance indicators at a higher level (i.e. 
Head of District). 
9. Internal Accountability: accountability mechanism within an organisation 
(i.e. between manager and mayor). 
10. External Accountability: accountability mechanism between an organisation 





Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model 
 
3.6 Hypotheses Development 
 
The research starts by asking questions about how technical (metric difficulties, 
knowledge, and organisational capacity), organisational (management commitment) 
and institutional factors (legislative requirement) affect the development and use of 
performance indicators in ILG. 
 
This study adopted metric difficulties, technical knowledge, management 
commitment and legislative requirement from Cavalluzzo & Ittner‘s study (2004) 
and organisational capacity from Wang‘s study (2002) as independent variables to 
explain the practices of development and use of performance indicators in ILG. It 
also integrates relevant dependent variables of accountability from the study of Wang 
(2002) into the model. The rationale for this inclusion is that accountability is a 
crucial concept in democratic governance and a better standard of accountability is a 
Management Commitment  



























reflection of improved management practices such as performance measurement 
(World Bank, 2006). In addition, the purpose of performance measurement is to 
establish a system that can measure results through the indicators and use the 
information to improve management and accountability, and not merely to develop 
indicators (Ho, 2005; Moynihan, 2005; Hatry, 2002; Wholey, 1999). 
 
Five dependent and five independent variables were employed in the research model. 
Table 3.4 presents hypothesised inter-variable relationships to be tested in this study. 
 





a. Dev b. MUse c. HUse d. IAcc e. EAcc 
     1.Metric Difficulties H1a (-) H1b (-) H1c(-)   
     2.Technical Knowledge H2a(+) H2b(+) H2c(+) 
 3.Management Commitment H3a(+) H3b(+) H3c(+) H3d(+) H3e(+) 
     4.Legislative Requirements H4a(+) H4b(+) H4c(+) H4d(+) H4e(+) 
     5.Organisational Capacities  H5d(+) H5e(+) 
Legend: 
Dev=Development of Indicator, MUse=Managerial Use of Indicator, HUse=Higher Use of Indicator, 
IAcc=Internal Accountability, EAcc=External Accountability 
 
This section presents all the hypotheses developed in this thesis based on the 
conceptual model discussed above. Associations among variables are discussed first, 
prior to the development of hypotheses. 
 
3.6.1 Metric difficulties 
 
The first independent variable refers to measurability of organisational output or 
outcome. In public sector organisations the complexity of programs is not 
homogenous. Some outputs and effects are relatively easy to measure yet some are 
difficult or cannot be quantitatively measured at all. Naturally, "more tangible 
outputs and outcomes can be measured in a more precise way compared to non-
tangibles" (van Dooren, 2005). This issue is not public-sector-specific as the same 
phenomenon also exists in the private sector. 
 
In Indonesia, Mahmudi (2003) found that local government officials had difficulties 
in determining higher level indicators such as outcome, benefit and impact. 
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Therefore, in practice, they placed more weight on input measures rather than 
outcome measures. Further, the problem in the public sector is that "clear and 
logically consistent methods have not been readily available to help managers 
understanding of performance indicators" (McLaughlin & Jordan, 1999, p.65). 
 
Given the situation, it is logical to expect that there will be a tendency among 
performance measurement users to give more weight to the easy-to-measure 
indicators. Consequently, it is assumed that there is a negative association between 
metric difficulties and development and use of performance indicators. Therefore the 
first three hypotheses proposed are: 
 
H1a: The development of performance indicators is negatively associated 
with metric difficulties. 
 
H1b: Managerial use of performance indicators is negatively associated 
with metric difficulties. 
 
H1c: Higher use of performance indicators is negatively associated with 
metric difficulties. 
 
3.6.2 Technical knowledge 
 
An organisational factor that is expected to influence the development and use of 
performance indicators is the extent to which training on related knowledge is 
provided to support the implementation (Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004; Shields, 1995). 
Shields (1995) argues that training in the design, implementation and use of 
management accounting innovation allows organisations to articulate the link 
between the new practices and the organisational objectives. This, in turn, provides a 
mechanism for employees to understand, accept and feel comfortable with the 
innovation. 
 
Learning from the implementation process of PMS in Indonesia, it appears that a 
lack of understanding of the system has had an impact on PMS practices (Riandi, 
2003; Sukarno, 2006). Technical knowledge enables improvement in the ability of 
internal stakeholders to understand and use PMS, and will positively improve the 
development and use of performance indicators (de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; 
Laurensius & Halim, 2005). Different types of efforts, from technical training to 
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formal degree programs, have been undertaken in Indonesia to increase the 
knowledge of government employees and officers (i.e. MEP-UGM).
17
 In that 
context, normative mechanisms as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) may 
also ensue in practice. It is a logical assumption that there is a positive association 
between improved technical knowledge and development and use of performance 
indicators. Therefore the second three hypotheses proposed are: 
 
H2a: The development of performance indicators is positively associated 
with related technical knowledge. 
 
H2b: Managerial use of performance indicators is positively associated with 
related technical knowledge. 
 
H2c: Higher use of performance indicators is positively associated with 
related technical knowledge. 
 
3.6.3 Management commitment 
 
The implementation of PMS in government requires changes in the operation, 
personnel, structure, or even culture of the organisation. These kinds of changes are 
likely to create resistance within an organisation. When it comes to developing and 
using performance indicators, as in any organisational change, it is very important to 
build high levels of commitment among senior management first and then gather 
support from middle managers and staff (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006; Rainey, 2003). 
 
Therefore, to succeed in the process of developing and using performance indicators, 
support from within the organisation in the form of management commitment is 
highly crucial. Moreover Wilkins (in de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001) stated that 
changes can only occur if top management has commitment to the adoption and 
implementation of PMS. De Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) also found that internal 
stakeholder support was positively related to the adoption of PMS. 
 
In addition, management provides the political support needed to encourage and 
motivate individuals who resist the innovation. Other than financial resources, time, 
                                                 
 
17
 Program Magister Ekonomika Pembangunan, Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta offers 
intensive training and post-graduate degree in public sector management area. www.mep.ugm.ac.id 
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and personnel, a tangible internal commitment, especially among top level 
management within an organisation, is required for the implementation success of 
performance reporting in Indonesia (Sukarno, 2006). It appears that management 
commitment is a crucial factor in the success of innovation related to performance 
measurement and accountability practices. Based on this context the next three 
hypotheses are: 
 
H3a: The development of performance indicators is positively associated 
with management commitment. 
 
H3b: Managerial use of performance indicators is positively associated with 
management commitment. 
 
H3c: Higher use of performance indicators is positively associated with 
management commitment. 
 
In the reform era, which is characterised by demands for accountability from external 
stakeholders, providing greater transparency and accountability can be used as 
strategies to appease these stakeholders. Accountability is facilitated when 
government employees or officials are willing to be held accountable for their tasks. 
Accountability is also improved when they are active in making an effort to create 
new ideas to improve it (Wang, 2002). Therefore: 
 
H3d: Internal accountability is positively associated with management 
commitment. 
 
H3e: External accountability is positively associated with management 
commitment. 
 
3.6.4 Legislative requirements 
 
Many have perceived that the desire to be more accountable, efficient and effective 
has led to the widespread adoption of PMS by public organisations across the world. 
Indonesian government (including ILG as its third-tier government) as a newly 
democratic country was no exception. However, development of performance 
measurement practices may be driven by external institutional pressures (Moynihan, 
2005). There has been some evidence from other countries to this effect. A large 
survey, conducted to find evidence of performance practices across the UK public 
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sector, revealed that "public managers rated legislation as one of the main drivers for 
change" (Talbot, 2008, p.1572). 
 
Institutional theory suggests that regulatory requirements are an organisational factor 
that is relevant to the success of reform implementation in government organisations 
(e.g. Brignall & Modell, 2000). Further, in an institutional environment such as ILG 
that primarily depends on an external organisation (i.e. central government) for its 
financial support, external bodies have the authority to impose organisational 
practices on subordinate units. Regulation inside government implies that one 
organisation (e.g. central government) shapes the activities of others (e.g. ILG). In 
the case of performance reporting, central government has certain mandates to 
scrutinise the behaviour of the ILG and seek to change it. These include the external 
audit function conducted by the central government audit office (e.g. BPKP). 
 
Consequently, ILGs as subordinate organisations will implement the required 
practices, but the actual results tend to be superficial (Scott, 1987). The 
implementation process of Inpres No.7/1999 on accountability in Indonesia was 
highly centralistic. The Inpres has had a major impact on the growth of planning 
practices throughout government (Podger & Perwira, 2004). Most entities now 
prepare strategic plans (or at least have hired consultants to prepare them), and most 
prepare annual performance reports. However, few entities have related the 
performance report back to planning and budgeting (Podger & Perwira, 2004). 
Turner (2000) claimed that the imposition of structural changes enhancing regional 
autonomy would curtail much of the centrist orientation but would not necessarily 
increase local government accountability. 
 
Further, in a study of the US government‘s attempt to apply multi-dimensional 
performance measurements for accountability purposes, Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) 
found that implementation of externally mandated PMS was used to meet legal 
requirements. The outcome of this development was that the measures had little 
influence on internal operations. In other words, it was just more "to conform than to 
perform" (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006, p.1559). From this perspective, coercive 
mechanisms as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) may take place in 
practice. Like management commitment, legislative requirement is a crucial aspect in 
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the success of innovation with respect to both performance measurement and 
accountability practices. Hence, the next five hypotheses are: 
 
H4a: The development of performance indicators is positively associated 
with legislative requirements. 
 
H4b: Managerial use of performance indicators is not associated with 
legislative requirements. 
 
H4c: Higher use of performance indicators is not associated with legislative 
requirements. 
 
H4d: Internal accountability is positively associated with legislative 
requirements. 
 
H4e: External accountability is positively associated with legislative 
requirements. 
 
3.6.5 Organisational capacity 
 
The final factor employed in the model concerns the impact of organisational 
capacity and resources on accountability practices. Previous studies claimed 
insufficient resources provided an explanation for implementation failure (i.e. 
developing without using). Ammonds & Rodrigues (1986) found that only very 
modest amounts of executive and staff time are devoted to appraisal systems in cities 
in the USA. The importance of capable staff in regards to the intensive use of 
performance measurement information has been studied by Wang and Berman 
(2000). They also looked at other factors such as information systems as a 
requirement for measuring organisational capacity. 
 
Further, van Dooren (2005) argued that lack of resources is an issue in performance 
measurement practice. Hence, organisations conclude that they do not have enough 
resources to implement performance measurement. Laurensius & Halim (2005) 
found that in Indonesia resources have statistically significant effects on developing 
performance indicators. Their findings support de Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) 
who claimed that committed resources had a significant effect on the development of 




H5d: Internal accountability is positively associated with organisational 
capacity. 
 
H5e: External accountability is positively associated with organisational 
capacity. 
 
To summarise, five independent variables (metric difficulties, technical knowledge, 
management commitment, regulatory requirement, and organisational capacity) have 
been discussed in association with the five dependent variables (development of 
indicators, managerial use of indicators, higher use of indicators, internal 
accountability and external accountability) to generate hypotheses used in the model 




This chapter has reviewed the application of institutional isomorphism in 
performance measurement and accountability practices in the public sector, 
especially in local government. Three aspects concerning isomorphic pressure —
coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism and their relationship to 
accountability and performance measurement practices—have been discussed. 
 
This chapter also has presented a conceptual framework relating five independent 
variables to five dependent variables. This framework is built upon the literature 
review discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
The next chapter discusses the research design employed in the thesis. 
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Based on the literature review presented in the previous two chapters, this chapter 
considers how the research strategies and methods deployed in this thesis were 
developed. It provides an explanation on how the thesis was conducted and the 
reason behind the selection of the methods used. The chapter begins with an 
explanation of the paradigm debate in the field of management accounting (Section 
4.2), followed by the research plan (Section 4.3). A discussion on the development of 
the research instrument is presented in Section 4.4. The data collection method is 
described in Section 4.5, with quantitative and qualitative data analysis provided in 
Sections 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. Section 4.8 provides information regarding the 
pilot test conducted, whilst Section 4.9 presents ethical considerations. Finally 
Section 4.10 concludes the chapter with a summary. 
 
4.2 Paradigmatic Debate 
 
A philosophical assumption or paradigm is generally required in any scientific 
research as a foundation upon which the whole investigation is conducted. This 
assumption provides the framework for determining the choice of research 
methodology and methods employed in a study. 
 
When it comes to classifying research paradigms, various scholars offer different 
categorisations (see, for example Creswell, 2003; Crotty, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 
2000). However, among those many different categorisations the most prevalent ones 
in accounting research are positivism and interpretivism. These two classifications 
differ in three ways. First, ontologically the advocates of positivism believe in the 
objectivity (independent from human experiences) of reality whilst the advocates of 
interpretivism emphasise the subjectivity of reality (constructed through human 
interactions). Second, epistemologically, positivists utilise a hypothetic-deductive 
approach to test and build a theory. Interpretivists, in contrast, contend that 
knowledge should be obtained through the understanding of human and social 
interaction by which subjective reality is constructed. Third, methodologically 
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positivists point out that researchers should test a theory in a value-free position and 
utilise objective measurement in collecting research evidence. In this context, a 
quantitative method (e.g. survey) is an instrument typically used by positivists. In 
contrast, interpretivists argue that in understanding the meaning embedded in human 
and social interaction, researchers need to be involved in the context under 
investigation. In-depth interviews with respondents are an example of the data 
collection methods used by interpretivists (Creswell, 2003). 
 
Philosophical underpinning (paradigm) of research is diverse (refer to Figure 4.1). It 
is important to understand this distinction in order to determine where mixed method 
research fits in the research process.  
 




There are three philosophical dimensions of research, namely:  1) ontological 
dimension, 2) epistemological dimension, and 3) methodological dimension. From 
an ontological dimension, research may be undertaken from two extreme positions – 
realist or idealist views of the world. The main distinction is on the debate about 
whether reality is constructed based on the concepts the mind brings to the process of 
observation or whether it exists independently of the observer. Epistemologically, 
there is a choice between positivist or interpretivist‘s point of view. Positivists argue 
that to be valid knowledge must be based on hypothesis testing and it will have 
survived many rounds of empirical testing. On the other hand, interpretivists view 















interpretation as the key means of justifying a claim for a certain knowledge. 
Methodologically, there are two extremes – quantitative or qualitative method. 
 
In the field of management accounting, there has historically been a continuing 
fundamental debate regarding the philosophical assumption or paradigm on which a 
research study is to be based. This debate resulted in a dichotomy of research 
paradigms known as "the mainstream" and "the alternative". The mainstream, which 
is positivist (economics-based), and the alternative, which is interpretivist 
(sociology-based), have created a paradigm divide in management accounting 
research (Modell, 2010). 
 
Historically, mainstream accounting research is grounded in a common set of 
philosophical assumptions under positivism. Unfortunately, this has limited the range 
of problems studied and also inherently has limited research methods used. In 
addition, it prevents the researcher obtaining alternative insights into the problem 
being analysed (Chua, 1986). Two main alternatives emerged: interpretivism and 
critical/pragmatism (Chua, 1986; Howe, 1988). Proponents of positivism believe in 
objective, external reality whereas proponents of interpretivism believe in multiple, 
subjective realities (Greenberg an Folger, 1988). The concept of pragmatism focuses 
on the compatibility between quantitative and qualitative methods. Tashakori and 
Teddlie (1998) contend that pragmatism differs from positivism and interpretivism. 
The main distinction is that pragmatism allows the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a single study.  
 
4.2.1 The role of mixed-method research 
 
This section is intended to explain and position mixed-method research as the 
method of choice in this thesis. Generally, there are two main classifications in 
research practices, namely quantitative and qualitative research. However, in many 
areas of research there has long been a tendency to utilise a combination of these two 
methods in a mixed-method research strategy in order to achieve enhanced validity 
and richer results. Theoretically, one important objective of the use of a mixed-
method approach is to bridge the paradigm divide (Modell, 2010). More than two 
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decades ago, for instance, Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989, p.256) defined 
mixed research methods in a simple way as: 
 
Those that include at least one quantitative method (designed to collect 
numbers) and one qualitative method (designed to collect words), where 
neither type of method is inherently linked to any particular inquiry 
paradigm. 
 
Statistical techniques used in quantitative methods are rarely able to provide an 
indepth depiction of the effects of causal powers in a particular social context. 
Instead, statistical analysis may simply reveal covariations amongs variables 
indicating "certain tendencies in the occurrence of events" (Modell, 2009, p.212). 
Further, Modell (2009, p.212) claims that these tendencies "should not be interpreted 
as direct reflections of real mechanisms …". 
 
In response to this situation, researchers need to go beyond such tendencies and 
move further to specify, in more detail, the contingent conditions underlying the 
causal relationship (Tsoukas, 1989). Hence, the research needed to be expanded to 
include "human experiences of actual events" (Modell, 2009, p.212) in order to 
consider causal explanations regarding the existence of coercive pressures in ILG 
performance reporting practices.This need for more insight into what context specific 
factors are involved in the causal relationship suggests that qualitative methods may 
be important in complementing statistical analysis (Downward and Mearman, 2006; 
Mingers, 2006; Sayer, 2000). 
 
Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches into a mixed-method research 
strategy is occurring more often, and is likely to continue to grow in popularity in 
management accounting research (e.g.,Anderson & Widener, 2007; Lillis & Mundy, 
2005; Modell, 2005). The growing interest in the mixed-method approach emerged 
as a result of increased complexity in modern accounting research. This approach has 
generally been considered as more desirable to enable researchers to combine the 
breadth of the quantitative approach with the depth of the qualitative approach within 
a single empirical study. In addition, this approach would enhance the validity of 
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research findings through triangulation and would facilitate the utilisation of multiple 
theories (Modell, 2005). 
 
In the area of PMS, many prior studies have identified technical and organisational 
factors associated with the implementation of PMS, as well as the use and usefulness 
of performance indicators developed within the systems (see for example Cavalluzzo 
& Ittner, 2004; Wang, 2007). In spite of the heightened interest in performance 
measurement research many fundamental questions remain unanswered, especially 
regarding the behavioural or institutional (i.e. motivation) aspects behind the 
implementation process. 
 
Frank and D‘Souza (2004) claimed that the single research method normally 
employed in the field of performance management is unlikely to answer these types 
of questions. They further claimed that the majority of the research in the field has 
been simply in the form of either one-jurisdiction case studies or fixed-response mail 
surveys. Those research methods, in many cases, permitted only a limited 
contribution to the field, and often created a serious mismatch between method 
employed and substance of the topic under examination (Stallings, 1986). 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, this thesis employs a mixed-method research 
process in order to overcome the disadvantages of a single approach. By doing so it 
enhances the validity of the research and at the same time answers a wide array of 
questions regarding behavioural and institutional aspects of PMS implementation. 
The nation-wide survey conducted in phase one provided more breath for empirical 
inquiries, and the in-depth interviews undertaken in phase two provided greater 
insight into the underlying motivations. Using the mixed-method approach enables 
this thesis to offer significant contributions to the area of public sector performance 
measurement and accountability at both the practical and theoretical level. 
 
Mixed method consists of both a quantitative and qualitative phase in a single study. 
Figure 4.2 depicts nine possible mixed method designs. The notation used is 
provided at the bottom of the figure. Mixed method research can occur in many 
different combinations (refer to Figure 4.2). Two primary decisions should be made 
by researchers: 1) which one is the dominant paradigm; and 2) how the research is 
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conducted - concurrently or sequentially. This study used sequential and equal 
design. First, a quantitative phase was conducted followed by a qualitative phase 
with equal weight.  
 
Figure 4.2 Mixed Method Approach Matrix 
 
Note:  Qn= Quantitative, Ql=Qualitative, + = concurrent, / = sequent,  
bigger font denote high weight, smaller font denote low weight, * = approach used in this study 
 
Selecting the most appropriate research methods to answer the research questions in 
this thesis was not an easy task. First, like in developed countries, there is no 
accessible single source of data about performance measurement and accountability 
in ILG. Second, this thesis addressed topics of accountability and performance 
measurement, which are still under-researched in Indonesia in general and at the 
local level in particular. Therefore, it was necessary to design a combination of the 
research methods available to accommodate the complexity of the research 
questions. 
 
To answer the research questions a mixed-method approach was chosen. Quantitative 
and qualitative data were collected sequentially using questionnaires for the first 
phase and in-depth interviews for the second phase. The advantage of using a mixed 
method is that the quantitative side can be used to measure outcomes and the 
qualitative side can provide a greater depth of understanding about a complex 
phenomenon: a dynamic process seen from an insider‘s viewpoint (R. B. Johnson & 
















































































Though regression-discontinuity is strong in internal validity and can 
parallel other non-equivalent designs in terms of validity threats, 
interpretation of results might be difficult. Outcomes might be the result of 
combined effects of factors. 
 
Depending on the statistical results, it might also be difficult to assess the study 
findings comprehensively. Therefore, adding a qualitative approach to the 
quantitative approach is a good strategy for overcoming some of these problems. 
 
As noted by Sechrest and Sidana (1995), the use of a mixed-method research strategy 
has the potential to reduce some of the problems associated with using a single 
method. By utilising quantitative and qualitative techniques within the same 
framework, mixed-method research can incorporate the strengths of both 
methodologies. Each of these two data collection methods is described in the 
following section. 
 
4.3 Research Plan 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were combined in a single study to 
enhance the ability of the study to answer the complex research questions posed. To 
achieve its goals this thesis used a postal questionnaire and face-to-face interviews to 
gather data for further analysis. The methods used were designed to answer four 
research questions (RQ 1 to RQ 4). The research plan was, therefore, based on two 
phases of inquiry. Accordingly, a survey instrument was developed during the first 
phase, whilst an interview protocol was developed in the second phase. 
 
Initially, experts in the field of local government were consulted and pilot testing 
undertaken before sending out the questionnaire. First, the draft survey instrument 
was sent to both academic and practical experts from a university and a local 
government in the city of Yogyakarta in order to get constructive feedback to 
improve the questionnaire. Second, the draft was pilot tested with post-graduate 
students pursuing their master‘s degree in public sector management. As a result of 
this process only one minor amendment (see Appendix A.4-1) to the questionnaire 
was needed. Then a package containing the questionnaire, cover letter, participant 
information sheet, consent form, and endorsement letter was posted to the targeted 
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SOs in both types of ILG (district and city) across Indonesia. The main objectives of 
the survey were: 
 
 To identify the extent of performance indicator development and use in ILG 
(RQ 1); 
 To identify factors affecting the development and use of performance 
indicators in ILG (RQ 2); 
 To identify factors affecting the accountability practices in ILG (RQ 3); 
 To recruit voluntary participants from ILG for further data collection process 
(interview in phase-two of the study). 
 
In phase two, semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected ILG SOs. The 
interviewees were selected on the basis of the willingness of respondents to volunteer 
once they had completed the survey. Qualitative data was collected in this interview: 
 
 To obtain evidence as to whether institutional isomorphism existed in the 
development and use of performance indicators and accountability practice in 
ILG (RQ 4). 
 
The research process was conducted in several steps as presented in Table 4.1. The 
first and the most crucial part of the research process is the literature review 
(presented in detail in Chapter 2). All research questions under investigation in this 
thesis were developed based on a comprehensive review of the previous literature 
regarding PMS and accountability discussed in Chapter 2. The next section presents 





 Table 4.1 Research Steps 
 
Phase One 
1. Literature Review 
2. Modelling and Hypothesis Development 
 
Phase Two 
1. Research Instrument Design and Validation 
2. Expert Consultation 
3. Pilot Study 
4. Revision of Instrument 
5. Quantitative Data Collection 
6. Quantitative Data Preparation 
7. Quantitative Data Analysis 
8. Interpretation of Results 
 
Phase Three 
1. Interview Protocol Design, Validation and Test 
2. Revision of Protocol 
3. Qualitative Data Collection 
4. Qualitative Data Preparation 
5. Qualitative Data Analysis 
6. Ethical Considerations 
7. Summary 
 
4.4  Quantitative Phase 
 
The research instrument utilised in this thesis was developed and adapted from 
previous studies in the field of performance measurement and accountability, 
focusing especially on previous studies of public sector organisations. Table 4.2 
presents the constructs used in the model proposed in this thesis (see Appendix A.4-1 




Table 4.2: Constructs Used in the Model 
No. Construct Items 
1 Development of Indicators 1. Input (i.e. labour, material) 
2. Output (i.e. quantity of products or services 
provided) 
3. Outcome (i.e. customer satisfaction) 
4. Operating efficiency (i.e. cost/unit) 
5. Benefit (i.e. public/citizen satisfaction) 
6. Impact (i.e. achievement of social objectives) 
7. Process (i.e. narrative analysis of performance) 
2 Managerial Use of 
Indicators 
1. Setting strategy and program priorities 
2. Allocating resources 
3. Adopting new program approaches or changing 
work processes 
4. Coordinating program efforts with other internal 
or external organisations 
5. Refining program performance measures 
6. Setting new or revising existing performance 
goals 
7. Setting individual job expectations for 
government employees I manage or supervise 
8. Rewarding government employees I manage or 
supervise 
3 Higher Use of Indicators 1. Performance measures from my activities are 
used to develop my LG ‗s budget 
2. Funding decisions for my activities are based on 
performance measures 
3. Changes by management above my level are 
based on performance measures 
4 Internal Accountability 
 
1. Officials at my level are held accountable for the 
results of their activities 
2. Employees in my LG receive positive recognition 
for helping the LG accomplish strategic goals 
3. The individual I report to periodically reviews 
my activity‘s results with me 
4. Lack of incentives (e.g. reward, positive 
recognition) has hindered using performance 
information 
5 External Accountability 
 
1. Organisation-wide policy priorities/goals 
2. Program goals and objectives 
3. Program functions and activities 
4. Program output measures 
5. Program outcome measures 
6. Program narrative performance information 
7. Trends of performance measures 




No. Construct Items 
6 Metric Difficulties 
 
1. Difficulty determining meaningful measures 
2. Results of our program(s) /operation(s)/ 
project(s) occurring too far in the future to be 
measured 
3. Difficulty distinguishing between the results 
produced by the program and results caused by 
other factors 
4. Difficulty determining how to use performance 
information to improve the program 
5. Difficulty determining how to use performance 
information to set new or revise existing 
performance goals  
7 Technical Knowledge 
 
1. I receive training on development and use of 
performance measures 
2. My staff receive training on development and use 
of performance measures 
3. I receive published information on how to 
develop performance measures 
4. My staff receive published information on how to 
develop performance measures 
5. My LG involve external experts or consultants in 
developing performance measures 
8 Management Commitment 
 
1. My institution‘s top leadership demonstrate a 
strong commitment to achieving results 
2. The lack of ongoing top executive commitment 
or support for using performance information to 
make program/funding decisions hindered 
measuring performance or using performance 
information? 
3. The lack of ongoing congressional commitment 
or support for using performance information to 
make program/funding decisions hindered 
measuring performance or using performance 
information?  
9 Legislative Requirements 
 
1. I have been involved in my local authority‘s 
effort in implementing LAKIP 
2. My staff has been involved in my local 
authority‘s effort in implementing LAKIP 
10 Organisational Capacity 
 
1. Management information systems 
2. Performance-based budgeting 
3. Capable staffs 
4. Budgetary surplus 
 
A brief explanation of all the constructs is provided in the next sections. 
 
4.4.1 Dependent variable constructs 
 
There were five dependent variables (construct numbers 1 to 5) within the model 
proposed (refer to Figure 3.1). They were: 1) development of performance indicators; 
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2) managerial use of performance indicators; 3) higher use of performance 
indicators; 4) internal accountability; and 5) external accountability. The items 
included within each of the constructs were either adapted from previous studies or 
included as a result of the researcher recognising a gap in the model. 
 
Development of performance indicators 
 
In determining the first dependent construct in the proposed model—the 
development of performance indicators—seven items were adapted and modified 
from Cavalluzzo and Ittner‘s (2004) research. Five items (1, 2, 3, 5, and 6) were 
modified by using a family of measures derived from LAKIP guidelines. One item 
(4) was directly taken from Cavalluzzo and Ittner‘s (2004) study. The last item (7) 
was added by the researcher following the review of the literature. This construct 
reflects the extent of performance indicators developed by ILG. 
 
Managerial use of indicators 
 
For the second dependent construct—managerial use of indicators—all items used 
were directly taken from Cavalluzzo & Ittner‘s (2004) study. This construct was 
designed to measure the extent to which performance indicators are used by ILG 
officials at mid-level. 
 
Higher use of indicators 
 
As was the case for the second construct above, for the third dependent construct—
higher use of indicators—all items used to measure the extent of use of performance 





The internal accountability construct was designed to measure the extent of the 
accountability relationship between superior and subordinate within ILG 
organisations. All four items used to measure internal accountability were adopted 
from Cavalluzzo and Ittner‘s (2004) study. 
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 External accountability 
 
The external accountability construct was designed to measure the extent of the 
relationship between ILG organisations and their stakeholders. Wang‘s (2002) model 
was used as a template, and the eight items used to measure external accountability 
were adjusted to suit ILG contexts. 
 
4.4.2 Independent variable constructs 
 
There were five independent variables identified within the model (refer to Figure 
3.1). These were: 1) metric difficulties; 2) technical knowledge; 3) management 




The metric difficulties construct was used to measure the level of difficulty 
experienced by ILG officials in their effort to develop or use performance indicators. 
Five items were derived from Cavalluzzo and Ittner‘s (2004) study and used to 




The technical knowledge construct was used to measure the level of training received 
by ILG employees and officials in their effort to deal with the complexities related to 
developing and using performance indicators. Again, the five items required were 




The management commitment construct was used to measure how intensely top level 
ILG officials were committed to improving the use of performance information to 
enhance organisational performance. Three items derived from Cavalluzzo and 







This construct was used to measure the extent to which top level officials and their 
staff have been involved in implementing legislative requirements regarding 
performance measurement and reporting. The two items used to measure this 




The organisational capacity construct was developed to measure the level of 
organisational support for the effort to develop and use performance indicators. To 




The constructs used to develop the questionnaire deployed in this thesis were initially 
developed for use in Western countries (Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004; Wang, 2002). As 
the target respondents were Indonesian, all the questions needed to be translated from 
English into Bahasa Indonesia. There are several techniques to do this, such as 
direct-translation, back-translation, parallel-translation and mixed technique 
(Usunier, 1998). This study used the direct-translation method, as it is a relatively 
simple and straightforward but effective method as long as a qualified and 
experienced translator is employed. Under this procedure one experienced National 
Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) certified translator 
was invited to translate the questions and instructions used in the research 
instruments. To mitigate the disadvantage of direct-translation, the study conducted a 
pilot test to ensure that a satisfactory level of reliability was achieved (Sin, Cheung, 
& Lee, 1999; Usunier, 1998). 
 
4.4.4 Quantitative data collection phase: questionnaires 
 
The survey and follow-up interviews targeted SOs. They were selected as 
respondents due to their position as officials responsible for administrative and 
financial affairs (i.e. prepare annual budget and performance report) within their 
organisations. Hence, their position is very important and central to public 
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management reforms in ILG. The sample included all ILG authorities throughout 
Indonesia. Their mailing addresses were obtained from the MoHA website. 
 
As described in Section 4.4 the survey instrument was a combination of questions 
from Cavalluzzo and Ittner‘s (2004) and Wang‘s (2002) studies. The survey 
consisted of three major sections. Section 1 gathered information about development 
and use of PMS in ILG. Section Two solicited respondents‘ views on their 
understanding and experience of accountability. Section Three collected 
demographic information (see Appendix A.4-1 for complete questionnaire). 
 
In order to get a relatively high response rate, an endorsement letter obtained from 
Directorate General of Local Government Affairs of the Indonesian Ministry of 
Finance accompanied the questionnaire and cover letter (see Appendix A.4-4 for 
supporting documents of the survey). In order to prevent response bias that might 
occur as a result of the endorsement, the statement that this study was not sponsored 
by the Indonesian government was provided, and the researcher was identified as an 
Indonesian student studying at an Australian University. Return envelopes were 
provided and directed to Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta-Indonesia, with 
which the researcher is affiliated. Identifiers were placed on the surveys for the 
purpose of coding only, and confidentiality was ensured in the cover letter. 
 
4.4.5 Quantitative Data Analysis 
 
To gain rigorous results various statistical tests and analyses were employed in this 
study. These include validity, reliability and normality tests, descriptive statistic, t-
tests, and both first and second-generation multiple regression—OLS and PLS, 
respectively. 
 
Ordinary least squares 
 
Over the last decade, the importance of utilising relatively modern statistical 
approaches to management accounting research has been stressed (Chenhall, 2005). 
Despite this, a large number of published research studies in this area continue to 
report statistical analysis based on OLS methods such as multiple regression. That 
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fact indicated that traditional OLS statistical tools remain relevant. Multiple 
regression is indeed still the most common form of regression analysis. As a 
predictive analysis, multiple linear regression is used to describe data and to explain 
the relationship between one dependent variable and two or more independent 
variables. 
 
This thesis was designed to test a model regarding PMS and accountability and the 
factors influencing their use. Multiple regressions would help in conducting the 
fitness test of the model. The most common goals of multiple regressions are as 
follows: 
 
1. Describe: Develop a model to describe the relationship between independent 
variables (explanatory variables) and dependent variables (response 
variables). 
2. Predict: Make predictions by using a set of sample data collected (e.g. from 
the survey). 
3. Confirm: Determine if the contribution of each explanatory variable in the 
proposed model captures much of the variability in the response variables. 
 
Accordingly, a data set from ILG is used in this thesis to: 1) describe the 
relationships between five explanatory variables (metric difficulties, technical 
knowledge, management commitment, legislative requirements, and organisational 
capacity) and five response variables (development of indicators, managerial use of 
indicators, higher use of indicators, internal accountability, and external 
accountability); 2) predict response value from explanatory variables within the 
range of sample data from ILG; and 3) confirm or reject existing theories by testing 
the eighteen hypotheses proposed at the beginning of the study. 
 
Before proceeding to further analysis, the final survey instrument was tested for its 
validity and reliability to determine its feasibility as a good data collection 
instrument (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). These tests aimed to minimise survey 
instrument measurement errors. A normality test was also conducted to enable 






This test was required to indicate the degree to which a test (i.e. a series of questions 
and their corresponding scores) captures the underlying construct purportedly 
measured by the test. A validity test was conducted using a non-parametric bivariate 
correlation to see whether the score of each question correlated to the score of the 
construct, confirming its validity. In this study Spearman‘s correlation was used to 




A reliability test was conducted to determine how well the final questions on the 
main survey focused on their corresponding individual construct and provided inter-
item consistency. The underlying assumption of this test is that there is only one 
construct being measured; thus it is appropriate when respondents answer questions 
in which a 5-point Likert scale is used. An instrument is considered reliable if it 
shows consistent results. Reliability indicates the accuracy of the instrument. One 
way to determine the reliability of multi-item variables is by looking at Cronbach‘s 
alpha value. It is a measure of the inter-correlations between the various components 
used to capture the underpinning constructs employed in a model. This test is 





Before a model equation is considered acceptable, the model‘s assumptions must 
first be checked. Models based on OLS require the assumption of normally 
distributed errors with constant variance. In many statistical tests it is assumed that 
the sampling distribution is normally distributed. It is for this reason that a normality 
test was conducted for each of the variables employed for analysis. One way to 
determine whether a distribution of scores is normal is by checking the value of its 
skewness and kurtosis (Field, 2009). The histogram and normal probability plot of 
residuals are used to show whether the data is normally distributed (refer to Section 






In this thesis testing of the hypotheses was undertaken in two stages. The first stage 
was conducted using OLS or traditional multiple linear regression. A number of 
sensitivity tests were also undertaken to determine which independent variable, if 
any, was closely related to the development and use of performance measurement in 
ILG. In addition to using total revenue as a proxy for size, population and number of 
employees were tested to determine whether there was any effect on development 
and use of performance measures. The second test was conducted using PLS (see 
next section). 
 
The regression model of this research is defined as follows: 
 
DEV = α 1 + β1.1MET + β1.2 KNO+ β1.3 COM + β1.4 LEG + ε 
        USE = α 2 + β2.1MET + β2.2 KNO+ β2.3 COM + β2.4 LEG + ε 
        IAcc = α 3 + β3.1 COM + β3.2 LEG+ β3.3 CAP + ε 




DEV = Development of Performance Indicators 
USE = Use of Performance Indicators 
IAcc = Internal Accountability 
EAcc = External Accountability 
MET = Metric Difficulties 
KNO = Technical Knowledge 
COM = Management Commitment 
LEG = Legislative Requirement 





Partial least squares 
 
Previous scholars detailed the process of evaluating a research model in a two-step 
approach (see for example, Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 1995; Santosa, Wei, & 








There are two types of SEM techniques: covariance-based techniques and variance-
based techniques. PLS is the most prominent representative of the latter (Henseler, 
Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). PLS is a second-generation multivariate data analysis 
technique that allows the simultaneous assessment of reliability and validity whilst 
also estimating the relationships among constructs (Barclay, et al., 1995). 
 
This analysis is a latent variable modelling technique that incorporates multiple 
dependent constructs and explicitly recognises measurement error (Fornell, 1982). 
PLS has been used in a number of accounting studies (Chenhall, 2004, 2005; 
Anderson, Hesford, & Young, 2002; Vandenbosch, 1999; Ittner, Larcker, & Rajan, 
1997), and is particularly suited to this study because it makes minimal data 
assumptions and requires relatively small sample sizes (Wold, 1985). SmartPLS Rel 
2.0 M3 software was utilised in conducting the analysis. In addition, considering the 















argued here that it would be more appropriate to conduct further analysis. Therefore, 
in order to gain a rich and more rigorous result, further analysis using PLS was 




Sample size is an important issue in the SEM approach as it has implications for the 
results of the analysis. Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau (2005) argued that the sample size 
should be no lower than 10 times the number of items within the most complex 
construct of model tested. Given the rule, the sample size for this study would need 
to be a minimum of 80 cases (n=8 items related to managerial use of indicator and 
external accountability x 10). There are 98 valid responses in this study (refer to 
Table 5.2). Therefore the minimum number required was exceeded, and thus the data 




Before proceeding to further data analysis, it was considered appropriate to eliminate 
any outliers that may produce misleading results (Alrect & Settle, 1995). As such, 
the data set was scanned on a line-by-line basis to find any errors (i.e. missing data or 
disordered records). After the scanning, no errors were found and the data set was 
ready for further PLS procedures. Unlike in OLS regression, PLS regression analysis 
does not require the data to be normally distributed (Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 
2003). Consequently, tests for normality such as skewness, kurtosis and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov are not necessary. 
 




The measurement model of PLS analysis consists of two phases: convergent validity 
followed by discriminant validity. The first phase is undertaken to assess the model‘s 
convergent validity using two measures: individual item reliability and internal 
consistency (Santosa, et al., 2005). Individual item reliability measures the 
convergence of each indicator variable on its associated construct. Item reliability is 
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assessed by examining the loading (i.e. correlations) of the indicator with their 
respective construct. Convergence, then, is assessed by comparing the loadings with 
a certain benchmark. 
 
 Internal consistency 
 
The second phase in reliability testing of PLS analysis is measuring the internal 
consistency of constructs. Composite reliability as used by Fornell and Larcker 
(1981) was utilised to determine internal consistency. This measure is considered 
superior to the traditional measure of consistency (Cronbach‘s alpha) because it does 
not depend on the number of indicators. Adequate reliability is gained when the 
composite reliability value is greater than 0.5. 
 
Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggested that convergent validity can also be determined 
by using a more conservative test, which is achieved by considering the Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE). This test measures the amount of variance captured by 
the construct in relation to the amount of variance attributable to measurement error. 




The third measure in the PLS approach is to test discriminant analysis at both 
indicator and construct levels using a cross-loading matrix, and then comparing a 
correlation of the construct and the AVE. This measurement was suggested by 
Fornell and Larcker (1981). Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which a 
given construct differs from the others (Hanlon, 2001). Regarding indicator level 
validity, Barclay et al. (1995) suggested that no indicator variable should load more 
highly on another construct than it does on the construct it is supposed to measure. 
 
Structural model assessment 
 
After ensuring that all the criteria were fulfilled for assessing the measurement 
model, one can proceed to the next step, which is the assessment of the structural 
model. The structural model examines the relationships between the constructs in the 
research model. Given the fact that PLS does not assume a normal distribution of 
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data, it is inappropriate to use traditional tests to ascertain the statistical significance 
between constructs (Chin, et al., 2003; Hanlon, 2001). Instead, scholars of PLS have 
developed two non-parametric approaches to test the relationship between variables: 
jack-knife or bootstrap techniques (Gefen, et al., 2005; Santosa, et al., 2005). In this 
study bootstrap was used as it is considered to be the more sophisticated approach 
(Chin, 1998). It provides two measures of the structural model: a t-value (similar to 
the t-test) and R
2 
(interpreted similarly to the traditional multiple regressions 
analysis). The predictive power of the research model can be assessed by using R
2 




To test the hypotheses, it was necessary to interpret the construct equations with 
standard errors and test statistics. The construct equations measure the extent to 
which one factor relates to another, that is, the structural path coefficient and t-values 
between hypothesised constructs, reflecting direct relationships (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996). These path coefficients and associated t-values identify and 
demonstrate the direction and strength of each relationship and, as indicated 
throughout this chapter, are obtained by using a bootstrapping technique in 
SmartPLS software. The t-values (robust scores) need to be significant to support the 
hypothesised paths and should be above 1.64 or 2.33 for alpha protection level of 
0.05 and 0.01, respectively (Byrne, 1994; Gefen, et al., 2005). 
 
4.4.6 Pilot Testing of the Survey Instrument 
 
The survey instrument was pilot tested by using the draft as an in-class survey with 
three different groups of post-graduate students at Universitas Gadjah Mada, 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia in July 2008. Most of the students participating were affiliated 
with different local governments across Indonesia. The pilot tests were administered 
directly by the researcher. For the sake of clarity, a brief explanation regarding the 
study was provided to the participants at the beginning before they completed the 
questionnaire. A discussion session regarding the survey was also provided in each 
group following the completion of the survey, to collect some feedback. No major 




The only change that was required related to the use of negative-style sentences, 
which, according to the group, created confusion in understanding the point of the 
questions. In addition to creating confusion for the respondent, following the 
statistical analysis, the negative questions were also responsible for reliability issues. 
This was evidenced by a low validity score (Cronbach‘s alpha < 0.6). 
 
As a result, minor changes were made in the wording of three negative-style 
statements. To avoid misunderstanding the negative-style statements, these were 
changed into positive-styles statement (see Appendix A.4-2). The format of the 
survey instrument mailed to the ILG was an A5 booklet made up of four folded A5 
sheets of white paper, printed on both sides. 
 
4.5 Qualitative Phase 
 
4.5.1 Qualitative data collection phase interviews 
 
To gain a deeper insight into performance measurement practices and to determine if 
isomorphic tendencies existed, in-depth interviews using standardised semi-
structured questions were conducted with a sample of ILG. This is a common 
approach to collecting qualitative data, especially when the study involves 
investigation of the respondents‘ experience (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). 
 
Purposive sampling was employed to select participants to be interviewed to enhance 
the understanding of development and use of performance measurement. Babbie 
(1990, p.97) stated that "occasionally it might be appropriate for you to select your 
sample on the basis of your own knowledge of population, its elements, and the 
nature of your research aims". The sample represented both types of ILG (Districts 
and Cities) and also of ILG locality (in-Java and out-of-Java). When it comes to the 
sample size for the interview, Cooper and Schindler (2006, p.203) claim that "sample 
size for the qualitative research varies by technique but is generally small". 
 
Qualitative data collection was conducted by interviewing 24 selected ILG SOs. The 
questions were based on the survey results. As well, additional questions (refer to 
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Appendix A. 4-3) were developed around possible isomorphic pressures. These 
questions were constructed in order to provide an explanation of the motivation 
behind the development and use of performance indicators in ILG. Interviews were 
needed, as the results from the survey only provided some indications regarding the 
existence of institutional isomorphism during the PMS implementation in ILG. In 
this sense the survey, as a quantitative approach, was mainly aimed at revealing 
relationships among variables under investigation and not to explain what is 
happening in a given context. That goal was achieved, as will be shown in Chapters 5 
and 6. Hence, to provide information on the motivations or drivers behind the 
implementation of PMS, in-depth interviews were required to supplement the survey 
results (see Chapter 7). 
 
Following contact by phone to make appointments, the interviews were conducted in 
the premises of the interviewees. On average the interviews lasted for 60 minutes. 
All interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The data analysis was 
carried out using thematic content analysis. This is a systematic way of identifying 
all the main concepts that arise in the interviews, and then trying to categorise and 
develop those concepts into common themes. Given the relatively small number of 
interviewees, the data from the interviews was processed manually. 
 
4.5.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
Qualitative data collected during the interviews was in the form of audio files saved 
in a digital voice recording device. The audio data was subsequently transcribed by 
the researcher to convert the data into text data, which enabled the application of text 
analysis. Thematic content analysis was used to interpret the text data. In this study, 
themes were identified and built arround the main issue under investigation. The 
main theme included the three components of isomorphism (coercive, mimetic, and 
normative). 
 
Transcription of data 
 
Transcription is the process of transforming audio data gathered in the interviews 
into text documents, which enables the researcher to systematically classify and 
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analyse the data (Cope, 2009). In this process, the researcher was the only one 
conducting the transcription. One important reason for doing this was that nobody 
else could do it as well as the researcher, as all the interviews were directly 
conducted by him. Cope (2009) points out that conducting self-transcription provides 
the following benefits to the researcher: 
 
1. Provides an opportunity for the researcher to experience another round of 
reflection and analysis as the researcher has another chance to listen to and 
review the talk-based material from the interview; 
2. Enhances the researcher‘s understanding on the topics under investigation, as 
they are familiar with the context and have already heard it beforehand during 
the interview process; 
3. Enables the researcher to recall (and confirm using key references to written 
notes taken during the interviews) more of the non-verbal elements of the 
recorded materials, such as humour, tension, facial expressions, and body 
language. 
 
All of these benefits contribute to more accurate and richer transcription with 
additional description and supporting information. 
 
 Thematic analysis 
 Thematic analysis is utilised in this study to assist in transforming qualitative 
information into manageable and meaningful concepts. The analysis was carried out 
manually. 
This method has been adapted from Glaser and Strauss‘s (1967) grounded theory 
approach, and from various scholars‘ work on content analysis (Babbie, 2007; Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967). Boyatzis (1998, p.4) pointed out that: 
 
Thematic analysis is a process to be used with qualitative information. It is 
not another qualitative method but a process that can be used with most, if 
not all, qualitative methods that allows for the translation of qualitative 
information into quantitative data, if this is desired by the researcher. 
 
The transcription process merely transforms the audio data collected during the 
interviews into a bulk of text data. An analytical tool is required to transform the data 
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into meaningful information. This transformation involves encoding qualitative 
information and hence requires an explicit code. 
 
A code may be: 1) a list of themes; 2) a complex model with themes, indicators, and 
qualifications that are causally related; or 3) somewhere between 1 and 2. A theme is 
a pattern found in the information that at least describes and organises the possible 
observation and at most interprets aspects of the phenomenon. Themes can be 
identified directly from the information (manifest level) or from underlying 
phenomena (latent level). A theme can be generated inductively from the raw 
information or deductively from theory or prior research. 
 
The reasons for undertaking this analysis are: 1) as a way of seeing; 2) as a way of 
making sense out of seemingly unrelated material; and 3) as a way of analysing 
qualitative information. Boyatzis (1998, p.128) further explained that: 
 
Using themes coded from "raw information" is conducive to a verbal 
description of phenomenon, people, organisations, cultures, or events. Even 
if the researcher is conducting statistical analysis, aspects of the inquiry and 
its communication to others can be enriched through use of the qualitative 
"depth" of the thematic information available. 
 
4.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical considerations were taken into account in both phases One and Two. Both 
quantitative and qualitative data collections were conducted in accordance with the 
ethical rules and regulations outlined by Curtin University. According to the Curtin 
Human Research Ethics Committee, FORM C is to be completed and approved by 
the Human Research Ethics Committee. FORM C is designated for "low and 
negligible risk" research projects. Low risk projects are those in which the 
probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not 
greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life. In low 
risk research "participants have the potential to suffer no harm, but where there is 




This research posed no risk to the people involved. According to the requirements of 
FORM C, the research method discussed above has been designed to protect the 
privacy and confidentiality of the information obtained through the research. Names 
of the key person were sought with a formal request in accordance with the 
appropriate ethical requirements as stipulated by Curtin University. Form C 
(Application for Approval of Research with Low Risk) was completed prior to the 
ethics approval. 
 
This research was conducted using both survey and interviews in the process of data 
collection. The interviews were conducted as a follow-up to the original survey. 
Interviewees were asked to sign a consent form after being provided with a copy of a 
Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix A.4-5). This information sheet detailed, 
amongst other things, the promise of complete confidentiality. Interviews were 
recorded with permission of the interviewee. This information was explicitly stated 
on the consent form. The information sheet emphasised that information participants 
provided would be treated in the strictest confidence. Only the aggregate results of 
the interviews were used and no individual or council details would be identified. In 
line with this requirement the name of each Kabupaten or Kota (ie. local 
government) presented in this thesis was replaced by a code using a combination of 




This chapter detailed the research design of this thesis. The next three chapters 
discuss data analysis employed in this thesis. The first stage of quantitative data 
analysis using OLS is presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the second stage of 
quantitative data analysis using PLS. Qualitative data analysis using thematic content 
analysis is covered in Chapter 7. 
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This chapter provides statistical analysis of data from the survey of SOs in 
Indonesian local government regarding the development and use of performance 
indicators. OLS regression was used to provide evidence about organisational and 
technical factors and their relationships with the extent of performance indicator 
development and the use in ILG. It does so in line with the main objectives of this 
research, and in consideration of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. To perform the 
statistical analysis, SPSS 15.0 for Windows was employed. The software package is 
well recognised and widely used in social and behavioural science, as well as in 
management and accounting research. Both this chapter and Chapter 6 consider the 
results of the survey as the first stage of the study. Chapter 7 presents the second 
stage of the research. 
 
Section 5.2 presents general information about the survey whilst Section 5.3 details 
validity, reliability, and normality tests. Section 5.4 provides measurement and 
profiles of both dependent and independent variables. A comparison of ILGs along 
with supporting t-test results is presented in Section 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. 
Finally, Section 5.7 provides the OLS regression to hypothesise the effects of 
independent variables on the development and use of performance indicators. 
 
5.2 The Survey 
 
This section describes the response rate, the non–response bias, and demographic 
information pertaining to the respondents. 
 
5.2.1 Response rate 
 
Surveys were sent to the SOs responsible for performance reporting in all local 
governments across Indonesia. As of 2008, there were 457 ILGs. This total included 
211 ILGs that were newly established because of the districts‘ and cities‘ separation 
processes over the previous five years following the reform era. Table 5.1 presents 
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the distribution of responses from the survey. Of the 457 surveys sent, a response 
rate of 21.9% (100 surveys) was achieved. Senior local officials are normally very 
busy in their day-to-day managerial duties and the majority of them are not interested 
in research. This could partly explain the relatively low response. However, low 
responses are not unusual in mailed-surveys involving not-for-profit and government 
officials as respondents (e.g., Kluvers & Tippett, 2010; Olson, 2000; Sheehan, 1996). 
Due to invalid data, two responses were ineligible for further analysis and thus 
excluded. Consequently, 98 usable responses, equivalent to a 21.4% effective 
response rate, were analysed. 
 
Table 5.1: Distribution of Responses 
 Sent (457) Received (100) Response rate 
 
(21.9%) 






























































 457 100 100 100  
Note: Due to invalid data, two responses were excluded and 98 were further analysed 
 
Among the respondents, 44 were from Java with 56 from outer-Java. Most 
respondents (78%) came from districts and only 22% came from cities. When 
comparing the response rate of local government by type, the sample was relatively 
comparable. Table 5.1 shows that response rates from districts and cities is 21.5% 
and 23.2%, respectively. With regard to location, there was a 16.4% response rate 
from out-of-Java, whilst that from in-Java was 38.3%. These figures are very close to 
the percentage of the number of districts and cities in Indonesia, thus providing a 
good representation of the entire population. 
 
The relatively low response rate can be explained by a further two factors. First, lack 
of experience in performance reporting of the 211 newly established local 
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governments was the most likely reason for not responding. This explanation was 
supported by the fact that almost all responses came from local governments in 
existence long before the reform era (old local governments). This possible reason 
was explored further in the interview phase. Second, in an Indonesian context, very 
low responses are normally expected from local, out-of-Java governments. 
 
5.2.2 Non-response bias 
 
Subjects of this study were all from local governments, situated within 33 provinces 
with a total population of 237 million.
18
 The survey was distributed in mid-
September 2008. Mail surveys are determined to be an appropriate method for 
collecting data in a community-based study. This method is particularly useful for 
research involving large and/or geographically dispersed populations such as those in 
Indonesia. Using this method of collecting data increases the coverage of the study 
and decreases the time necessary to conduct the survey in a cost-effective manner. 
Therefore, this method was suitable in this kind of study with a sample of 
respondents spread over a geographically large and dispersed region (McDonald & 
Adam, 2003). 
 
Researchers must exercise care in appropriately addressing the issue of non-response 
bias; otherwise the results of the study could not be generalised. One way to deal 
with the non-response bias issue is by using the extrapolation method. This method is 
based on the assumption that subjects who respond less readily are more like non-
respondents (Pace, 1939 in Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Armstrong and Overton 
(1977, p. 397) claimed that: 
 
The most common type of extrapolation is carried over successive waves of 
implementing a questionnaire. Wave refers to the response generated by a 
stimulus (i.e. follow-up questionnaires). SOs who respond in later waves 
are assumed to have responded because of the increased stimulus and are 
expected to be similar to non-respondents. 
 
                                                 
 
18
 Data gathered from Indonesian Bureau of Statistic (www.bps.go.id)  as of 2010 
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Of the responses, 11.8% were received within a month after the questionnaires were 
sent as shown in Table 5.2 below. To increase the response rate, in December 2008, 
30 questionnaires were resent to those ILGs that did not respond to the initial 
mailing. Of the 30 questionnaires resent, fourteen were returned from January to 
February 2009. 
 
Table 5.2: Times of Responses 
Period Frequency Percentage of response (%) 
October 54 11.8  
November 32   7.0  
Jan and Feb * 14   3.1  
Total   100** 21.9  
Legend: * after follow-up questionnaire sent in December 2008, ** 2 unusable and excluded (from 
October) 
 
To ensure that there was no response bias, the fourteen late responses were then 
compared to the 84 earlier responses using the Mann-Whitney test (Field, 2009). 
Table 5.3 provides the results from the test. 
 
Table 5.3: Mann-Whitney Test Results 























































Table 5.3 shows that for all variables employed in this study, the mean ranks 
between earlier and later responses were not very different, and for all variables, the 
difference was not significant as evidenced in the last column of the table (P-value > 
0.05). Therefore, analysis of responses to the second wave of returns revealed no 
significant difference from the earlier wave of responses. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that there are no issues of response bias; hence, the generalisation of 
results is not compromised. 
 
5.2.3 Demographic information 
 
The demographic information of the respondents is summarised in Table 5.4, which 
shows that only 9.2% of the respondents were female and 88.8% were male. These 
figures are representative of the population of the study given the fact that the 
percentage of female SOs in Indonesian civil service is only 9.5% as shown in Table 
5.5. 
 
Of the respondents, 5.1% did not answer the questions on age. Of those that did, the 
majority (81.6%) were over 40 years of age. With regard to the respondents‘ 
education, only 2% had a background in accounting. However, 64.3% had a post-
graduate degree in management with the remaining 33.7% having an 
undergraduate/bachelor degree in various fields—mainly in the social sciences. 
Concerning the workforce, 76.6% had worked in local government for more than 
eleven years. This was expected, as the respondents were senior officers; the figure 
confirmed that the respondents had appropriate knowledge to complete the 











Table 5.4: Demographic Information of Respondents (N=98) 
Characteristics Frequency Percentage 















































































Male (No/%) Female (No/%) 
1 619 (90.5) 65   (9.5) 684  
2 10,671 (93.4) 750   (6.6) 11,421  
3 46,770 (86.8) 7,096 (13.2) 53,866 
Source: Badan Kepegawaian Negara (State Employment Agency) www.bkn.go.id 
 




The construct validity test is required to indicate the degree to which a test (i.e. a 
series of questions and their corresponding scores) captures the underlying construct 
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purportedly measured by the test. A validity test was conducted using a non-
parametric, bivariate correlation to see whether the score of each question correlated 
to the score of the construct in order to be valid (Field, 2009). Table 5.6 (on the next 
page) provides the results from conducting Spearman correlations on the variables 
used in this study. 
 
Results determined that 95% of the associations were significant at the 5% level or 
better (two-tailed). Table 5.6 shows that correlation between development and 
managerial use of indicators had a relatively high score (0.654), but it was still well 
below the cut-off point of 0.8 (Field, 2009).
19
 This indicates that the development of 
performance indicators and their managerial use were strongly and positively related 
to each other. Out of five independent variables tested, four variables—technical 
knowledge, management commitment, legislative requirements, and organisational 
capacity—had a relatively strong correlation (range from 0.219 to 0.610) to their 
respective dependent variables, while metric difficulty was the only variable that had 
a relatively weak and negative correlation to the dependent variables. This significant 
correlation between core variables in the model was needed for further analysis, 
especially in testing hypotheses using multiple regressions, reported later in this 
chapter. Given the results, core variables were ready and appropriate for further 
hypotheses testing. 
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Table 5.6: Spearman Correlations Coefficient 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Development 1          
2. Managerial Use .654** 1         
3. Higher Use .482** .589** 1        
4. Internal Accountability .422** .536** .625** 1       
5. External Accountability .480** .546** .408** .608** 1      
6. Metric Difficulties -.282** -.250*   -.102   -.094   -.076 1     
7. Technical Knowledge .506** .558** .346** .465** .531**   -.160 1    
8. Management Commitment .578** .735** .473** .576** .610** -.230* .524** 1   
9. Legislative Requirements .501** .543** .351** .493** .487**   -.044 .524** .505** 1  
10. Organisational Capacity .192 .146 .182  .219* .474**    .103 .290** .347** .148 1 
Legend:  






This study used Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient as the most popular reliability test. 
Table 5.7 presents the results of the test. 
 
Table 5.7: Cronbach Alpha Coefficient 
Variables Coefficient  
1. Development 0.869 
2. Managerial Use 0.907 
3. Higher Use 0.857 
4. Internal Accountability 0.792 
5. External Accountability 0.947 
6. Metric Difficulties 0.901 
7. Technical Knowledge 0.788 
8. Management Commitment 0.890 
9. Legislative Requirements 0.838 
10. Organisational Capacity 0.725 
 
As shown in Table 5.7, all variables show a high coefficient alpha, ranging from 
0.725 to 0.947, much higher than 0.6, the minimum level suggested by Nunnaly 
(1967), for adequate construct reliability. Hence, the final questionnaire utilised in 




Table 5.8 provides test results regarding normality of data. It shows that the 
distribution of score values of skewness (-0.943 to -0.57) were relatively close to 
zero (perfect normality), which meant that the data could be considered normally 
distributed. 
 
A histogram and a P-P plot (see Appendix A.5-1) can also be used to visually 
observe normality of data (Field, 2009). From these observations, it was concluded 
that the data regarding all core variables employed in this study were normally 
distributed. Therefore, no data transformation was required and all the core variables 








Table 5.8: Normality Test 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
N   98 98 98 98 98 98 97 98 98 98 
                  
Mean 3.4480 3.3712 3.3946 3.6735 3.9775 3.2224 3.1943 3.7959 4.0816 3.7194 
Std. Deviation 
.69480 .72320 .88690 .78024 .72535 .79529 .70081 .83266 .70599 .66510 
Skewness -.769 -.696 -.507 -.617 -.943 .061 -.368 -.725 -.543 -.057 
Std. Error of Skewness 
.244 .244 .244 .244 .244 .244 .245 .244 .244 .244 
Kurtosis 1.207 .644 .273 .631 1.422 -.072 .044 .257 -.160 -.113 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 
.483 .483 .483 .483 .483 .483 .485 .483 .483 .483 
Minimum 1.14 1.13 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.20 1.40 1.33 2.00 2.00 
Maximum 5.00 4.88 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.80 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Legend:  
1= Development, 2= Managerial Use, 3= Higher Use, 4= Internal Accountability, 5= External Accountability, 6= Metric Difficulty, 




5.4 Measurement and Profile of Variables 
 
Respondents were requested to provide their assessments on all variables in the 
model. A scale (1=no extent, 2=small extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent, 
5=very great extent) was used to measure the assessment. The results are provided in 
Tables 5.9 to 5.17. 
 
5.4.1 Development of performance indicators 
 
Table 5.9 presents an overall descriptive profile of how the SOs rated performance 
indicator development. As indicated in the table, amongst all types of indicators, the 
output indicator was the most developed with 68% (54.6%+13.4%) of respondents 
having replied to a great or very great extent. This finding is higher than that found 
by Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) in the United States with only 60.8%. 
 
Table 5.9: SOs’ Ratings for Development of Indicators 
Types of indicators 1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
1. Input 2.0% 8.2% 27.6% 45.9% 16.3% 3.66 0.92 
2. Output 1.0% 5.2% 25.8% 54.6% 13.4% 3.74 0.79 
3. Outcome 3.1% 12.2% 35.7% 41.8%  7.1% 3.38 0.90 
4. Efficiency 2.0% 11.2% 41.8% 37.8%  7.1% 3.37 0.85 
5. Benefit 3.1% 14.4% 35.1% 39.2%  9.3% 3.38 0.94 
6. Impact 4.1% 18.4% 26.5% 41.8%  9.2% 3.34 1.01 
7. Process 4.1% 14.3% 37.8% 36.7%  7.1% 3.29 0.94 
Total (N=98)      3.45 0.69 
 
Process and efficiency indicators were the least developed indicators with 43.8% and 
44.9%, respectively. As shown in Table 5.9, performance-based indicators (i.e. 
outcome) were much lower than output indicators. This finding indicated that even 
though performance-based budgeting had been in place for a decade, outcome 
indicators had not been developed as expected. 
 
5.4.2 Use of performance indicators 
 
Table 5.10 shows the survey results regarding the use of performance indicators both 
for managerial and higher level use. SOs stated that they used performance indicators 
mainly for managerial purposes, depending upon the type of indicator. The results 
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showed that the lowest managerial use for performance indicators in ILG was 
rewarding employees at 32.6% and the highest use was setting strategy at 66.3%. 
 
Table 5.10: SOs’ Ratings for Use of Indicators 
Types of Use 1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
Managerial Use  
1. setting strategy  2.0%   8.2% 23.5% 49.0% 17.3% 3.71 0.92 
2. allocating resources 4.1%   9.2% 21.4% 51.0% 14.3% 3.62 0.98 
3. adopting new program  3.1% 19.4% 36.7% 37.8%   3.1% 3.18 0.89 
4. coordinating program  2.0%   7.1% 28.6% 45.9% 16.3% 3.67 0.91 
5. refining program  3.1% 13.3% 40.8% 34.7%   8.2% 3.32 0.91 
6. setting performance goal 4.1% 20.4% 35.7% 36.7%   3.1% 3.14 0.92 
7. setting job expectation 2.0% 19.4% 34.7% 36.7%   7.1% 3.28 0.93 
8. rewarding employees 4.1% 26.5% 36.7% 26.5%   6.1% 3.04 0.97 
Total (N=98)      3.37 0.72 
Higher Use  
1. Develop budget 7.1% 16.3% 36.7% 32.7%   7.1% 3.16 1.02 
2. Funding decisions 3.1% 13.3% 26.5% 42.9% 14.3% 3.52 1.00 
3. Changes management 4.1% 12.2% 25.5% 45.9% 12.2% 3.50 1.00 
Total (N=98)      3.39 0.89 
 
For higher level decisions, 57.2% of the respondents indicated that they used 
performance indicators extensively for funding decisions and 58.1% for change 
management purposes. However, only 39.8% of the respondents believed that 
results-oriented performance information had a major influence on local government 
budgets. There was a low percentage of use of performance indicators for developing 
budgets, given the fact that ILGs had been implementing performance-based 
budgeting for a decade. This indicated that performance indicators had not been well 




Table 5.11shows the survey results regarding the extent of internal accountability in 




Table 5.11: SOs’ Ratings for Internal Accountability 
  1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
1. Officials at my level are   
held accountable for the 
results of their activities. 
4.2%   4.2% 10.5% 45.3% 35.8% 4.04 1.010 
2. Employees in my LG 
receive positive 
recognition for helping the 
LG accomplish strategic 
goals. 
4.1%   8.2% 31.6% 41.8% 14.3% 3.54   .976 
3. The individual I report to 
periodically review my 
activity‘s results with me. 
3.1%   8.2% 27.6% 49.0% 12.2% 3.59   .918 
4. The existence of incentives 




3.1% 15.3% 25.5% 38.8% 17.3% 3.52 1.048 
Total (N=98)      3.67 0.780 
 
The questionnaire requested SOs to provide assessments on a list of content 
descriptors of performance reporting as they applied to their institutions. The list 
included organisation-wide policy priorities/goals; goals and objectives of the 
program; functions and activities; output and outcome indicators of the program, 
narrative performance information about the program; trends of performance 
indicators; and comparison of performance indicators. 
 
Table 5.12: SOs’ Ratings for External Accountability 
  1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
1. ILG priorities/goals 1.0% 3.1%   8.3% 43.9% 43.9% 4.27 .82 
2. Program‘s goal & objectives 0.0% 3.1%   8.2% 46.9% 41.8% 4.28 .74 
3. Program‘s function 1.0% 5.1% 10.2% 53.1% 30.6% 4.07 .84 
4. Output indicators 0.0% 3.1% 19.6% 38.1% 39.2% 4.13 .84 
5. Outcome indicators 1.0% 4.1% 25.8% 39.2% 29.9% 3.93 .90 
6. Narrative information 1.0% 6.1% 22.4% 51.0% 19.4% 3.82 .85 
7. Trend of indicator 1.0% 8.2% 29.0% 48.0% 13.3% 3.64 .85 
8. Comparison of indicators 2.0% 8.2% 27.6% 44.9% 17.3% 3.67 .93 
Total (N=98)      3.67 .78 
 
A majority of ILGs provided more general information in their accountability 
reporting. As shown in Table 5.12, information related to ILGs‘ priorities and 
program goals/objectives sat at the top of the list to which respondents stated their 
agreement at 87.8% and 87.7%, respectively. Table 5.12 also shows an interesting 
result where item numbers 5 to 8 (information related to performance indicators) 
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have a relatively lower mean (bolded) than items 1 to 4 (more general information). 
Given that ILGs had implemented performance-based budgeting where performance 
indicators become the core elements, this result was unexpected. As such, the 
unexpected results indicated the existence of barriers in performance indicator 
development and in practical use. 
 
5.4.4 Metric difficulties 
 
With regard to metric difficulties, several factors (F1 to F5) hindered the 
development and use of performance indicators in ILG: 
 
1. Difficulty determining meaningful measures 
2. Results of our program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) occurring too far in the 
future to be measured 
3. Difficulty distinguishing between the results produced by the program and 
results caused by other factors 
4. Difficulty determining how to use performance information to improve the 
program 
5. Difficulty determining how to use performance information to set new or 
revise existing performance goals 
 
The survey results regarding metric difficulties are shown in Table 5.13. 
 
Table 5.13: SOs’ Ratings for Metric Difficulties 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
F1. 1.0% 14.3% 38.8% 31.6% 14.3% 3.44 .94 
F2. 0.0% 18.4% 43.9% 29.6%  8.2% 3.28 .86 
F3. 3.1% 22.4% 32.7% 33.7%  8.2% 3.21 .99 
F4. 3.1% 26.5% 33.7% 30.6%  6.1% 3.10 .97 
F5. 2.0% 27.6% 36.7% 27.6%  6.1% 3.08 .94 
Total (N=98)      3.22 .79 
 
Table 5.13 shows that difficulty determining meaningful measures (factor 1) was the 
most influencing factor that hindered development and use of performance 
indicators. This was supported by 45.9% of the respondents indicating that they had 




5.4.5 Technical knowledge 
 
Technical knowledge is defined here as the ability of ILG employees and officials to 
develop and use performance indicators. Several factors have an impact on the 
process of developing and using performance indicators in ILG. 
The factors (F1 to F5) are as follows: 
 
1. Training for SOs on development and use of performance indicators 
2. Training for staff on development and use of performance indicators 
3. Published information for SOs on how to develop performance indicators 
4. Published information for staff on how to develop performance indicators 
5. External experts or consultants involvement in developing performance 
indicators 
 
Table 5.14: SOs’ Ratings for Technical Knowledge 
 Factors 1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
F1. 4.2% 15.8% 43.2% 29.5%   7.4% 3.20  .94 
F2. 4.1% 14.4% 37.1% 41.2%   3.1% 3.25  .89 
F3. 1.0% 15.5% 36.1% 36.1% 11.3% 3.41  .92 
F4. 2.1% 21.6% 30.9% 36.1%   9.3% 3.29  .98 
F5. 9.3% 32.0% 30.9% 23.7%   4.1% 2.81   1.03 
Total (N=98)      3.19  .70 
 
Published information (i.e. guidelines from central government regarding 
performance indicator development) was beneficial in assisting ILG to develop 
performance indicators. Table 5.14 shows that 47.4% of the respondents stated that 
published information received by SOs assisted them to a "great" and "very great" 
extent in developing performance indicators. 
 
5.4.6 Management commitment 
 
Table 5.15 presents the extent to which some forms of organisational commitment 
assisted in developing and using performance indicators. The forms (F1 to F3) of 
organisational commitment used were as follows: 1) Existence of leadership, 2) 




Table 5.15: SOs’ Ratings for Management Commitment 
 Forms 1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
F1. 1.0%   5.1% 14.3% 38.8% 40.8% 4.13 .91 
F2. 1.0%   7.1% 23.5% 49.0% 19.4% 3.79 .88 
F3. 3.1% 13.3% 28.6% 43.9% 11.2% 3.47 .96 
Total (N=98)      3.80 .83 
 
Table 5.15 indicates that the existence of leadership was crucial to the success of 
developing and using performance indicators in ILG. This was evidenced by a very 
high percentage (79.6%) of respondents stating a "great‖ and "very great" extent to 
that form of commitment. 
 
5.4.7 Legislative requirements 
 
In this research, the intensity of SO and staff involvement in LAKIP-related activities 
was used as a proxy for legislative requirements. Table 5.16 presents evidence that 
SOs involvement in implementing LAKIP was higher than that of staff. The 
percentages were 81.7% and 78.6%, respectively. 
 
Table 5.16: SOs’ Ratings for Legislative Requirements 
  1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
SO involvement 0.0% 2.0% 16.3% 49.0% 32.7% 4.12 .75 
Staff involvement 0.0% 3.1% 18.4% 50.0% 28.6% 4.04 .77 
Total (N=98)      4.08 .71 
 
 
5.4.8 Organisational capacity 
 
With regard to organisational capacity, the SOs stated their assessment on four 
questions reflecting organisational capacity as the pre-condition for accountability 







Table 5.17: SOs’ Ratings for Organisational Capacity 
Driver  1 2 3 4 5 MN SD 
Management 
information systems  
0.0%   7.1% 18.4% 49.0% 25.5% 3.93   .85 
Performance-based 
budgeting (PBB) 
0.0%   3.1%   6.1% 49.0% 41.8% 4.30   .72 
Staff capability 2.0%   9.2% 25.5% 46.9% 16.3% 3.66   .93 
Budgetary surplus 7.2% 24.7% 41.2% 16.5% 10.3% 2.98 1.06 
Total (N=98)      3.72   .66 
 
A majority of respondents believed that PBB was the most important driver for 
accountability reporting. As shown in Table 5.17, 90.8% of the respondents stated 
their agreement. This indicated that the implementation of PBB in ILG had 
encouraged ILG to provide accountability reports. However, given the fact that 
information related to performance indicators was not extensively provided in the 
reports, the influence of PBB, so far, may still be at a rudimentary level. 
 
5.5 Comparison of Indonesian Local Governments 
 
An initial analysis using descriptive statistics was conducted with results presented 
here. Further analysis, using independent t-tests, is presented in Section 5.6. 
 
5.5.1 By type 
 
This section examines the mean comparison between respondents from cities (urban 
government with typically more dense populations) and districts (rural government 
with less dense populations), as provided in Table 5.18. Responses from cities, for all 
























Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1.  Development  3.75 .45 3.36 .73 3.45 .69 
2.  Managerial Use 3.62 .58 3.30 .75 3.37 .72 
3.  Higher Use 3.74 .62 3.29 .93 3.39 .89 
4.  Internal Accountability 3.84 .62 3.62 .82 3.67 .78 
5.  External Accountability 4.07 .71 3.95 .73 3.98 .73 
6.  Metrics Difficulties 3.29 .77 3.20 .81 3.22 .79 
7.  Technical Knowledge 3.45 .58 3.12 .72 3.19 .70 
8.  Management Commitment  3.96 .70 3.75 .86 3.80 .83 
9.  Legislative Requirements 4.36 .54 4.00 .73 4.08 .71 
10.Organisational Capacity 3.70 .65 3.72 .67 3.72 .67 
 
With regard to implementation factors (metric difficulties, technical knowledge, 
management commitment, and legislative requirements), the relatively higher mean 
scores for legislative requirements (in bold) in both types of governments was the 
key concern. This implied that issues surrounding central government regulations, in 
general, remained crucial as a primary concern for local government managers, 
despite the fact that decentralisation has been in place for about a decade. This table 
also shows that cities‘ mean (4.36) is higher than districts‘ mean (4.00). The result 
implied that officers in cities were more concerned about the issues than were those 
from districts. 
 
5.5.2 By location 
 
Table 5.19 presents mean comparisons between respondents from Java as the main, 
and most populated, island and the rest of the islands spread over the Indonesian 
archipelago. As can be seen, for all core variables, responses from Java showed a 
relatively higher mean than those from outer-Java. With regard to implementation 
factors, again, the relatively higher mean scores for legislative requirements (in bold) 

















Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1.  Development  3.65 .58 3.29 .74 3.45 .69 
2.  Managerial Use 3.46 .63 3.30 .79 3.37 .72 
3.  Higher Use 3.58 .79 3.25 .94 3.39 .89 
4.  Internal Accountability 3.57 .80 3.80 .74 3.67 .78 
5.  External Accountability 3.98 .80 3.98 .63 3.98 .73 
4.  Metrics Difficulties 3.27 .82 3.18 .78 3.22 .79 
5.  Technical Knowledge 3.44 .59 3.00 .73 3.12 .70 
6.  Management Commitment  3.81 .77 3.79 .89 3.80 .83 
7.  Legislative Requirements 4.23 .63 3.96 .74 4.08 .71 
10.Organisational Capacity 3.70 .68 3.74 .65 3.72 .67 
 
Again, this indicates that issues on central government regulations, in general, 
remained important as a primary concern for local government managers, despite the 
fact that decentralisation had been in place for a long period. This table also shows 
that in-Java‘s mean (4.23) was higher than out-of-Java‘s mean (3.96). This implied 
that in-Java officers were more concerned about the issues than were those from out-
of-Java. 
 
5.5.3 By size 
 
Table 5.20 presents comparison between small (up to IRD 500,000 millions) and 
large ILG (more than IRD 500,000 millions). The revenue data were gathered from 
the website of the Ministry of Finance Affairs (MoFA). The data were downloaded 
on 13 October 2009. For the purpose of this analysis, the questionnaires were coded 
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Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1. Development  3.41 .74 3.48 .65 3.45 .69 
2. Managerial Use 3.27 .83 3.46 .59 3.37 .72 
3. Higher Use 3.33 .98 3.45 .80 3.39 .87 
4. Internal Accountability 3.60 .86 3.75 .70 3.67 .78 
5.External Accountability 3.98 .86 3.98 .57 3.98 .73 
4. Metrics Difficulties 3.27 .77 3.16 .82 3.22 .79 
5. Technical Knowledge 3.08 .77 3.31 .61 3.19 .70 
6. Management Commitment  3.78 .91 3.80 .77 3.80 .83 
7. Legislative Requirements 4.04 .80 4.10 .59 4.08 .71 
10.Organisational Capacity 3.70 .66 3.74 .67 3.72 .67 
 
A slightly different result was found when comparing the means between different 
sizes of government. Larger LGs tended to have a higher mean than did the small 
ones for most variables except metric difficulties (in bold, smaller ILGs claimed 
metric difficulties had more impact on development and use of performance 
indicators). This indicated that the extent of development and use of performance 
measures in larger ILGs was higher than it was in smaller ILGs. 
 
5.6 Independent t-Tests for Control Variables 
 
To provide statistical support to the above section, an independent t-test was 
employed for the three control variables in the model. The summary of results for the 
independent t-test for all control variables is presented in Tables 5.21 and 5.22. 
 
5.6.1 By type 
 
The results of the independent sample t-test for both types of ILGs and for the five 
dependent variables were mixed. For development of indicators and higher use of 
indicators, the test revealed a score of 0.022, and 0.036, respectively (see Table 
5.21). Hence, there was a significant difference between districts and cities with 
regard to development and higher use of indicators. In Indonesia, cities developed 
and used performance indicators at a higher level more extensively than the districts 
did. This implies that ILGs situated in urban areas, which generally have a high 
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population, developed, and used more performance indicators than did those situated 
in rural areas. This was not unexpected given that ILGs in densely populated urban 
areas tend to deal with heterogeneous and complex issues regarding public service 
activities. In addition, people in urban areas tend to be more demanding than were 
those in rural areas. Hence, those ILGs need to provide more indicators in order to 
respond to the demands. 
 
In addition, cities usually have better resources (human resources, information 
technology, etc.) than districts. Interestingly, according to Van Dooren (2005), a lack 
of resources does not affect either development or use of performance indicators. 
However, unlike Van Dooren's claim, the finding of this study indicated that lack of 
resources did affect development of indicators but did not affect the use of 
performance indicators (refer to Chapter 8 for more discussion). 
 
With regard to accountability (both internal and external), the test revealed a score of 
0.255 and 0.508 respectively (see Table 5.22). This indicated that there was no 
difference in the levels of accountability practices between types of ILGs. 
 
5.6.2 By location 
 
The results of an independent sample t-test for different locations of ILGs and the 
five dependent variables were also mixed. The in-Java ILG was found to develop 
more indicators than that of out-of-Java, with a t-test score of 0.007 (see Table 5.21). 
Meanwhile, the scores for use of indicators (both managerial and higher) were 0.273 
and 0.065, respectively (not significant). This indicated that in-Java ILGs tended to 
develop more performance indicators than out-of-Java ones. However, all ILGs used 
performance indicators at relatively the same level regardless of their location. This 
suggested that the lack of resources (attributed to out-of-Java ILGs) affected the 
development of indicators, but had no effect on the use of indicators. The same 
results were also found for accountability practices. The test revealed scores of 0.149 
and 0.998, respectively (see Table 5.22). This indicated that ILGs seemed to 




5.6.3 By size 
 
For all five independent variables (development, managerial use, higher use, internal, 
accountability, and external accountability), the results did not support public 
expectation that larger ILGs perform better than smaller ones as the scores were 
0.611, 0.204, 0.546, 0.334, and 0.995, respectively (see Tables 5.21 and 5.22). Larger 
ILGs developed and used performance indicators to relatively the same extent as the 
smaller ones did. The levels of accountability practices were also similar. 
 
This finding indicated that the extent of development and use of performance 
indicators as well as the levels of accountability within ILGs was indifferent, 
regardless of the size. This is not unusual given that in the Indonesian setting, larger 
revenue (financial resources) does not always correlate to higher resources (i.e. 
human resources, information technology, etc). Many ILGs have higher revenue due 
to the existence of natural resources (i.e. oil and gas mining). Consequently, 
according to Law No. 33/2004, the central government allocates a higher proportion 
of money to ILGs that have oil and gas in their jurisdictions. This explains why 
larger revenue size does not correlate to the ability to develop and use performance 
indicators.  
 




Development Managerial Use Higher Use 
Sig. Mean Sig. Mean Sig. Mean 
Type  0.022* -0.38 0.067 -0.32 0.036* -0.45 
Location  0.007*   0.37 0.273   0.16 0.065   0.33 
Size 0.611 -0.07 0.204 -0.19 0.546 -0.11 
Legend:  *=Significant at 95% confidence level (< 0.05, 2-tailed) 
 




Internal Accountability External Accountability 
Sig. Mean Sig. Mean 
Type  0.255  -0.22 0.508  -0.12  
Location  0.149    0.23 0.998   0.00 
Size  0.334  - 0.15 0.995   0.00  




5.7 Hypotheses Testing 
 
This section presents the results and discussions from testing the relevant hypotheses. 
The first part describes how all independent variables were regressed to dependent 
variables without considering control variables. The second part addresses the 
integration of the three control variables of ILG—size, type, and location—in the 
regression analysis. 
 
The model, along with the relevant hypotheses, was developed based on previous 
literature and it can be seen in Chapter 3, Figure 3.1. This model was used to 
investigate the relationships among the three factors and the outcomes of 
performance measurement initiatives (i.e. development and use of performance 
measures). 
 
All hypotheses regarding the relationships among organisational and technical 
factors and the development and use of performance indicators were tested using 
multiple regression analysis. Although discussed in detail in Chapter 3, for simplicity 
this section repeats the hypotheses at the beginning of each sub-section. The use of 
OLS regression enabled an assessment of the direction and extent of the relationships 
among the dependent and independent variables. Chapter 4, Section 4.6.3 specifies 
the linear models underpinning the regression analysis in this section. 
 
This section also considers if there are any differences between local government 
size and location on the development and use of performance measurement. Finally, 
the effects of possible differences between the two types of ILGs—district and city—
on the development and use of performance measurement are examined. 
 
5.7.1 Development of performance indicators 
 
To reiterate, the hypotheses are: 
 
H1a: The development of performance indicators is negatively associated 
with metric difficulties. 
 
H2a: The development of performance indicators is positively associated 




H3a: The development of performance indicators is positively associated 
with management commitment. 
 
H4a: The development of performance indicators is positively associated 
with legislative requirements. 
 
All four hypotheses were tested using multiple regression analysis and the results are 
provided in Table 5.23. 
 





Development of Indicators 
Coefficient Sig. 
Metric Difficulties     H1a (-) -.168 .039** 
Technical Knowledge  H2a (+) .191      .054* 
Management Commitment  H3a (+) .322 .001** 





F-statistics = 18.471 
Sample size = 96 
Legend: * moderately significant, ** significant 
 
Table 5.23 provides evidence of factors that affect the development of performance 
indicators in ILG. Due to missing responses for some of the variables, the sample 
size was 96 for this analysis. The resulting regression was significant, with an 
adjusted R
2 
of 42%. The results from the regression analysis firmly supported 
hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a, and H4a of the study. Metric difficulties significantly 
deterred the extent of performance measures development (P-value < 0.05). Top 
management commitment and legislative requirements exhibited significant positive 
association with the development of performance measures (P-value < 0.05). There 
was a moderately significant positive association between technical knowledge and 
the development of performance measures (P-value <0.1). 
 
As evidenced from the results of the regression analysis in Table 5.23, management 
commitment had the strongest effect on the development of indicators with the 
highest regression coefficient (0.322) among other variables. This indicated that 
beside the measurement, knowledge, and regulation issues, the existence of strong 
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commitment from within ILG was the most important factor in the success of 
developing performance indicators. 
 
5.7.2 Managerial use of performance indicators 
 
The hypotheses considered here are: 
 
H1b: Managerial use of performance indicators is negatively associated 
with metric difficulties 
 
H2b: Managerial use of performance indicators is positively associated with 
related technical knowledge 
 
H3b: Managerial use of performance indicators is positively associated with 
management commitment 
 
H4b: Managerial use of performance indicators is not associated with 
legislative requirements 
 
The results of the hypotheses testing are provided in Table 5.24. 
 





Managerial Use of Indicators 
Coefficient Sig. 
Metric Difficulties    H1b (-) -.090 .184 
Technical Knowledge  H2b (+) .168   .043* 
Management Commitment  H3b (+) .533      .000*** 
Legislative Requirements  H4b (+) .182    .027** 
Adjusted R
2
 = .591 
F-statistics = 35.649 
Sample size = 96 
Legend: * moderately significant, ** significant, *** highly significant 
 
The resulting regression was mixed, with an adjusted R
2 
of 59.1%. This meant that 
metric difficulties, technical knowledge, management commitment, and legislative 
requirements were responsible for 59.1% of the factors that affected the managerial 
use of indicators. The rest, 40.9%, would be explained by other factors, which were 
not covered in the model tested. With regard to the association between actual 
managerial use of performance indicators and the implementation factors, 
management commitment had a highly positive association (P-Value < 0.001), and 
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legislative requirements and technical knowledge had positive associations (P-Value 
< 0.05). These results supported hypotheses H2b, H3b, and H4b. 
 
Contrary to prediction, metric difficulties were not associated with the actual 
managerial use of performance measures. Therefore, hypotheses H1b was not 
supported by the analysis. This implied that despite the difficulties in developing 
indicators, ILGs formally made use of the indicators (i.e. in preparing annual 
performance reports) once they were available, regardless of the difficulties in 
understanding the meaning of the indicators. It seems contradictory but it is not 
uncommon in the ILG setting. As evidenced in the previous section, metric 
difficulties negatively affected the development of indicators. 
 
In other words, at the managerial level, the local government officer did not 
acknowledge the difficulties in use of indicators as the use was based on the 
indicators already developed. In addition, in ILG the main use was only for formal 
reporting. Therefore, ILGs need to use the indicators as material to prepare and 
report LAKIP and to integrate them in budget documents as required by regulation. 
This finding supported the claim of previous researchers (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 
2006; Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004) that ILGs developed performance indicators for the 
sake of formality, making them more symbolic than having substance. This symbolic 
development of performance indicators, again, occurs most likely due to the 
mandatory requirement for ILGs to submit a LAKIP report to the central 
government. To get more insight in this matter, the interview explored this finding 
further. 
 
Amongst the implementation factors examined, management commitment was the 
only variable that had a very strong association with the actual managerial use of 
indicators in Indonesian local government. This result supported de Lancer Julnes, 
and Holzer (2001) who concluded that internal stakeholders‘ (i.e. top executives and 
managers) participation had a positive effect on the use of indicators in organisations. 
Legislative requirements, the last implementation factor examined, appeared to have 
a moderate positive association with the development of indicators and showed 




In addition, the findings also supported the study by de Lancer Julnes, and Holzer 
(2001) who claimed that the development and use of performance indicators was 
heavily influenced by rational/technical factors (i.e. metric difficulties and technical 
knowledge) while the use of indicators was more heavily influenced by 
political/cultural factors (i.e. management commitment and legislative requirements). 
 
5.7.3 Higher use of performance indicators 
 
The relevant hypotheses are: 
 
H1c: Use of performance indicators is negatively associated with metric 
difficulties 
 
H2c: Use of performance indicators is positively associated with related 
technical knowledge 
 
H3c: Use of performance indicators is positively associated with 
management commitment 
 
H4c: Use of performance indicators is not associated with legislative 
requirements 
 
The results of the hypotheses testing are provided in Table 5.25. For higher use of 
indicators, the resulting regression was also mixed, with an adjusted R
2 
of 21.1%. 
This meant that metric difficulties, technical knowledge, management commitment, 
and legislative requirements were responsible for only 21.1% of the factors that 
affected the managerial use of indicators. The rest 78.9% would be explained by 
other factors, which were not covered in the model tested. The relatively low R
2
 
could be explained by the new model discussed more in Chapter 8. There is actually 
another factor that is directly associated with higher use of indicators, which is the 
development of the indicator, while the four factors tested here have only indirect 









Higher Use of Indicators 
Coefficient Sig. 
Metric Difficulties    H1c (-) -.003 .977 
Technical Knowledge  H2c (+) .096 .402 
Management Commitment  H3c (+) .363     .002** 
Legislative Requirements  H4c (+) .114 .316 
Adjusted R
2
 = .211 
F-statistics = 7.406 
Sample size = 96 
Legend: * moderately significant, ** significant, *** highly significant 
 
Unlike managerial use discussed in the previous sub-section, higher use of indicators 
showed only one significant factor: management commitment (P-Value < 0.05). The 
other factors showed no significant results. This indicated that at the higher level ILG 
officers used performance indicators regardless of the difficulties associated with 
developing them. These difficulties included a lack of knowledge and the perceived 
pressure of complying with legislation. 
 
Amongst the implementation factors examined, management commitment was the 
only variable that had a strong association with the actual higher use of indicators in 
Indonesian local government. This result supported de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 
(2001) who concluded that internal stakeholders‘ (i.e. top executive and manager) 
participation had a positive effect on the use of indicators in organisations. 
 
5.7.4 Internal accountability 
 
For this variable the hypotheses tested are: 
 
H3d: Internal accountability is positively associated with management 
commitment 
 
H4d: Internal accountability is positively associated with legislative 
requirements 
 
H5d: Internal accountability is positively associated with organisational 
capacity 
 











Management Commitment H3d (+)  0.428  .000*** 
Legislative Requirements H4d (+)  0.273 .004** 
Organisational Capacity H5d (+)  0.030       .727 
Adjusted R
2
 = .368 
F-statistics = 19.837 
Sample size = 97 
Legend: * moderately significant, ** significant, *** highly significant 
 
For internal accountability, the resulting regression was also mixed, with an adjusted 
R
2 
of 36.8%. This meant that management commitment, legislative requirements, and 
organisational capacity were responsible for only 36.8% of the factors that affected 
internal accountability. The other 63.2% could be explained by possible other 
variables not in the model. The strongest variable was management commitment, 
followed by legislative requirements. Organisational capacity seemed not to have had 
an effect on internal accountability. This result was consistent with the result of the 
independent t-test, presented in the previous section. Despite differences in 
organisational capacity, the extent of internal accountability practices were 
indifferent between large and small ILG. 
 
Similar to discussion provided in Sub-section 5.7.1, the relatively low R
2
 could be 
better explained by the new model (refer to Chapter 8, Section 8.7). In this case, the 
three factors tested here were not the only factors actually influencing internal 
accountability. There are other factors such as the development of the indicator and 
higher use of the indicator. 
 
5.7.5 External accountability 
 
Here the relevant hypotheses are: 
 
H3e: External accountability is positively associated with management 
commitment 
 





H5e: External accountability is positively associated with organisational 
capacity 
 
The results of hypotheses testing are provided in Table 5.27. 
 







Management Commitment H3e (+)  0.376  .000*** 
Legislative Requirements H4e (+)  0.252 .004** 
Organisational Capacity H5e (+)  0.307  .000*** 
Adjusted R
2
 = .482 
F-statistics = 31.041 
Sample size = 97 
Legend: * moderately significant, ** significant, *** highly significant 
 
Unlike internal accountability, the results of the regression for external accountability 
were homogenous, with an adjusted R
2 
of 48.2%. Management commitment and 
organisational capacity were the strongest followed by legislative requirements. This 
result was in contrast to the result of the independent t-test presented in the previous 
section. Large ILGs (attributed to high capacity) did practice more external 
accountability than did small ILGs (attributed to low capacity). This inconsistency 
was explored further in the interviews. Table 5.28 presents a summary of regression 
results. 
 
Table 5.28: Summary of Regression Results 
Variables Dev MUse HUse IAcc EAcc 
Metric Difficulties -- 0 0   
Technical Knowledge + ++ 0   
Management Commitment ++ +++ ++ +++ +++ 
Legislative Requirements ++ ++ 0 ++ ++ 
Organisational Capacity    0 +++ 
Legend: 
blank = not hypothesised within the model, 0 = no association, -- = significant negative association, + 









This chapter tested whether the independent variables influenced the development of 
indicators, the use of result-oriented performance indicators, and accountability of 
performance in ILG. The regression analysis results indicated that the model for 
explaining the extent of performance measures development and use provided strong 
support for the hypotheses. Three out of four independent variables had a significant 
positive association with the development of indicators. One variable, metric 
difficulty had a significant negative association with the development of indicators. 
With regard to the actual use of measures, three out of four variables tested had a 
significant positive association. The metric difficulties variable was the only variable 
that had no significant association with the actual use of indicators. All independent 
variables tested (management commitment, legislative requirements, organisational 
capacity, and use of indicators) showed significant positive associations with respect 
to external accountability. 
 
An independent sample t-test on the control variables provided mixed results. This 
test revealed that there was a significant difference between two types of ILG in 
development and higher use of indicators. Cities tended to develop and use indicators 
more frequently than districts did. Similarly, in-Java ILGs tended to develop more 
indicators, but there was no difference in the level of use between in-Java and out-of-
Java ILGs. In contrast, size did not have any effect on performance measurement and 
accountability in ILG. Both large and small ILGs tended to develop indicators and 
use them at the same level. Similar results were found for accountability practices. 
 
Finally, descriptive statistics analysis determined that the most highly developed 
indicators were output indicators, despite the implementation of performance-based 
budgeting. Conversely, the use of indicators was mainly for setting strategies and 
determining program priorities, allocating resources, and coordinating programs 









Following on from Chapter 5, a further analysis using second-generation multivariate 
analysis—PLS regression—was undertaken in order to gain more rigorous statistical 
results (Barclay, et al., 1995). Due to its ease of use, SmartPLS Rel 2.0 M3 software 
was used to conduct the analysis. The chapter begins with selection of the estimation 
method (Section 6.2) followed by measurement model assessment (Section 6.3), 
structural model assessment (Section 6.4), hypotheses testing (Section 6.5), OLS and 
PLS compared (Section 6.6), sensitivity analysis (Section 6.7), and a comparison of 
initial model and new model PLS results (Section 6.8). 
 
6.2 Selection of Estimation Method 
 
6.2.1 Estimation method 
 
Data were analysed using SEM. There are two types of SEM techniques: covariance-
based techniques and variance-based techniques. PLS is the most prominent 
representative for the latter (Henseler, et al., 2009). PLS is a second-generation 
multivariate data analysis technique that allows the simultaneous assessment of 
reliability and validity whilst also estimating the relationships among constructs 
(Barclay, et al., 1995). This analysis is a latent variable modelling technique that 
incorporates multiple dependent constructs and explicitly recognises measurement 
error (Fornell, 1982). PLS has been used in a number of accounting studies (S.W. 
Anderson, et al., 2002; Chenhall, 2004, 2005; Ittner, et al., 1997; Vandenbosch, 
1999), and is particularly suited to this study because it makes minimal data 
assumptions and requires relatively small sample sizes (Wold, 1985). SmartPLS Rel 
2.0 M3 software was utilised in conducting the analysis. 
 
Considering the nature of the study and the existence of multiple path relationships 
among variables within the model, it was decided that PLS was the most appropriate 
statistical tool to conduct further analysis. The relationships among variables in the 




Figure 6.1: Initial Structural Model 
Legend:  
Com = management commitment, Met = metric difficulties, Kno = technical knowledge, Leg = 
legislative requirements, Dev = development of indicator, MUse = managerial use of indicator, HUse 











6.2.2 Sample size 
 
Sample size is an important issue in the SEM approach, as it will affect the results of 
the analysis. Gefen et al. (2005) argued that the sample size should be no lower than 
10 times the number of items within the most complex construct of the model tested. 
Given the rule, the sample size for this study would have needed to be a minimum 80 
cases (n=8 items related to managerial use of indicator and external accountability x 
10). There were 98 valid cases in this study, which exceeded the minimum number 
required; thus, the data set satisfied the requirement for a sound PLS analysis. 
 
6.2.3 Data examination 
 
Before proceeding to further data analysis, it was considered a sound practice to 
eliminate any outliers that might produce misleading results (Alrect & Settle, 1995). 
As such, the data set was scanned on a line-by-line basis to find possible errors such 
as missing data or disordered records. No errors were found and the data set was 
ready for further PLS procedures. Unlike OLS regression, PLS regression analysis 
does not require the data to be normally distributed (Chin, et al., 2003). 
Consequently, tests for normality such as skewness, kurtosis, and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov were not necessary. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of Variables in the Model 








1 Development of Indicator  Dev exogenous Dev_1–Dev_7 7 
2 Managerial Use of Indicator  MUse exogenous MUse_1–MUse_8 8 
3 Higher Use of Indicator  HUse exogenous HUse_1–HUse_3 3 
4 Internal Accountability  IAcc exogenous IAcc_1–IAcc_4 4 
5 External Accountability  EAcc exogenous EAcc_1–EAcc_8 8 
6 Metric Difficulties  Met endogenous Met_1–Met_5 5 
7 Technical Knowledge  Kno endogenous Kno_1–Kno_5 5 
8 Management Commitment  Com endogenous Com_1–Com_3 3 
9 Legislative Requirements Leg endogenous Leg_1–Leg_2 2 
10 Organisational Capacity  Cap endogenous Cap_1–Cap_4 4 
Total 49 
 
Forty-nine items within ten latent variables (variables) were used in the model (as 
shown in Table 6.1). Five exogenous variables (dependent variables)—development 
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of indicator, managerial use of indicator, higher use of indicator, internal 
accountability, and external accountability—and five endogenous variables 
(independent variables) —metric difficulties, technical knowledge, management 
commitment, legislative requirements, and organisational capacity—were employed 
in the model. It should be noted that a minimum of two indicators for each variable 
were used in the questionnaire (Kline, Schwartz, Allen, & Dikman, 1998). The 
number of indicators within the model ranged from two to eight, with only one 
variable (legislative requirements) having only two indicators. 
 
6.3 Measurement Model Assessment—Initial Model 
 
6.3.1 Item reliability 
 
The measurement model of PLS analysis consists of two phases: convergent validity 
followed by discriminant validity. The first phase is to assess the model‘s convergent 
validity using two measures: individual item reliability and internal consistency 
(Santosa, et al., 2005). Individual item reliability measures the convergence of each 
indicator variable on its associated construct. Item reliability is assessed by 
examining the loading (i.e. correlations) of the indicator with its respective construct. 
Convergence, then, is assessed by comparing the loadings with a certain benchmark. 
Table 6.2 displays the single item reliability. As indicated in the table, all indicators 
had a loading value above the minimum requirement (0.4) suggested by Igbaria et al. 














Table 6.2: Item Reliability-Initial Model 
Construct Item Loading 















Higher Use of Indicator (HUse) HUse_1 0.776 
HUse_2 0.933 
HUse_3 0.926 




External Accountability (EAcc) EAcc_1 0.828 
 EAcc_2 0.835 
 EAcc_3 0.879 
EAcc_4 0.857 
 EAcc_5 0.843 
 EAcc_6 0.805 
 EAcc_7 0.888 
 EAcc_8 0.877 










Management Commitment (Com) Com_1 0.893 
Com_2 0.940 
Com_3 0.887 
Legislative Requirement (Leg) Leg_1 0.924 
Leg_2 0.931 






6.3.2 Internal consistency 
 
The second reliability testing of PLS analysis is measuring the internal consistency 
of the constructs. Internal consistency is a measure of reliability that indicates 
whether several different measurement items all measure the same construct. This 
study utilised the composite reliability used by Fornell and Larcker (1981) in 
determining internal consistency. This measure is considered superior to the 
traditional measure of consistency (Cronbach‘s alpha) because it does not depend on 
the number of indicators. Adequate reliability is gained when the composite 
reliability value is greater than 0.5. As shown in Table 6.3, all the constructs 
exhibited adequate reliability. 
 
Table 6.3: Internal Consistency and AVE-Initial Model 





Development of Indicator 0.904 0.876 0.574 
Managerial Use of Indicator 0.926 0.908 0.609 
Higher Use of Indicator 0.912 0.858 0.777 
Internal Accountability 0.863 0.791 0.625 
External Accountability 0.955 0.946 0.726 
Metric Difficulties 0.926 0.901 0.716 
Technical Knowledge 0.860 0.793 0.558 
Management Commitment 0.933 0.892 0.823 
Legislative Requirements 0.925 0.838 0.861 
Organisational Capacity 0.904 0.876 0.574 
Legend: *presented only for comparative purposes 
 
Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggested that convergent validity can also be assessed 
by using a more conservative test known as the AVE method. It measures the amount 
of variance captured by the construct in relation to the amount of variance 
attributable to measurement error. AVE should equal or exceed 0.5 to be adequate. 
The final column of Table 6.3 shows that the AVE was also satisfactory for all 
constructs. 
 
6.3.3 Discriminant validity 
 
Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which a nominated construct is different 
or distinct from other constructs in the model (Barclay et al., 1995). Within 
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SmartPLS, two methods are commonly used to assess the level of discriminant 
validity: (1) correlation of constructs and (2) cross loading of constructs. Regarding 
indicator level validity, Barclay et al. (1995) suggest that no indicator variable should 
load more highly on another construct than it does on the construct it is supposed to 
measure. Appendix A.6-1 provides a summary of the cross-loading results for each 
individual item across each of the constructs in the model. Analysis of the results 
showed that no individual item (in bold) loaded higher on another than that of the 
construct it was supposed to measure. Based on the results obtained from the cross-
loading constructs analysis, the study claims that the model items demonstrated an 
adequate level of discriminant validity. At construct level, discriminant validity is 
adequate when the variance shared between a construct and any other construct in the 
model is less than the variance that construct shares with its indicators (Fornell, 
1982). Table 6.4 presents the correlation matrix of the construct and the square root 
of AVE (in bold). 
 
Table 6.4: Correlation of Constructs and the Square Root of AVE-Initial Model 
  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Cap 0.758                   
Com 0.390 0.907                 
Dev 0.238 0.581 0.758               
EAcc 0.491 0.614 0.483 0.852             
HUse 0.224 0.490 0.501 0.424 0.881           
IAcc 0.275 0.620 0.442 0.642 0.644 0.790         
Kno 0.339 0.516 0.513 0.528 0.361 0.466 0.747       
Leg 0.189 0.505 0.510 0.491 0.361 0.507 0.515 0.928     
Muse 0.179 0.732 0.652 0.545 0.608 0.552 0.556 0.546 0.781   
Met 0.073 -0.231 -0.280 -0.069 -0.109 -0.114 -0.172 -0.043 -0.252 0.846 
 
Previous literature suggested that these tests are best tabulated as in Table 6.4, 
because the off-diagonal items (correlation of constructs) must be less than or equal 
to the bolded diagonal items (square root of the AVE) in the corresponding rows and 
columns (Igbaria, et al., 1997; Barclay et al., 1995; Gefen et al., 2005). Table 6.4 
shows that diagonal values were greater than the off-diagonal values in their 
corresponding rows and columns; therefore, there should be no issues with the 




6.4 Structural Model Assessment—Initial Model 
 
The structural model, also known as the inner model, focuses on the hypothesised 
relationships or paths between the latent variables (Hair et al., 2006). A structural 
model can be used to draw conclusions about the significance of the relationships 
among constructs and to comment on the predictive power of the theoretical model 
proposed (Goles, 2001). Assessment of the model was divided into two key areas. 
The first area assessed the predictive capabilities of the model; the second examined 
the strengths of the relationships among the model variables. The method used to 
assess the predictive power of the model was to calculate the R
2 
value or the amount 
of the variance in the construct explained by the model. Interpretation of the R² value 
obtained from the SmartPLS software is similar to the R² value obtained from a 
multiple regression analysis (Barclay et al., 1995). The higher the value of R² or the 
explained variation, the greater the explanatory power of the model and the better the 
fit with the data.
 
 
As shown in Table 6.5 below, the R
2 
values of the exogenous variables (i.e. 
dependent variables) ranged from 0.265 to 0.607. The strongest R
2 
value was that of 
managerial use of indicators (0.607), which suggested that 60.7% of use of indicators 
for managerial level purposes could be explained by the construct used in the model. 
The second strongest was for external accountability (0.497), while the lowest was 
that of higher use of indicators (0.265). All R
2 
values met the 0.10 minimum limit 








Development of Indicator (Dev) 0.455 
Managerial Use of Indicator (MUse) 0.607 
Higher Use of Indicator (HUse) 0.265 
Internal Accountability (IAcc) 0.437 
External Accountability (EAcc) 0.497 
Legend:  






6.5 Hypotheses Testing—Initial Model 
 
To test the hypotheses, it was necessary to interpret the construct equations with 
standard errors and test statistics. The construct equations measure the extent to 
which one factor relates to another; that is, they measure the structural path 
coefficients and t-values between hypothesised constructs, reflecting direct 
relationships (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). These path coefficients and associated t-
values identify and demonstrate the direction and strength of each relationship, and 
as indicated throughout this chapter, they are obtained by using a bootstrapping 
technique in SmartPLS software. "The t-values (robust scores) need to be significant 
to support the hypothesised paths and should be above 1.64 or 2.33 for alpha 
protection level of 0.05 and 0.01, respectively" (Gefen, Straub and Boudreau, 2005, 
pp.34-35; Byrne 1994, p.60). The results for the structural relationships are reported 
in Table 6.6 as the path coefficient and t-value outputs from the bootstrap analysis. 
The table indicates that five path relationships are not significant; however, 13 other 
paths show a significant level of relationship. 
 
Table 6.6: Bootstrapping Results—Initial Model 
Hypotheses Path (Sign) Coeff. T-Value Significance 
H1a Met -> Dev (-)    -0.162 1.956** P < 0.05 
H2a Kno -> Dev (+)  0.195 2.224** P < 0.05 
H3a Com -> Dev (+)  0.322  2.534*** P < 0.01 
H4a Leg -> Dev (+)  0.240  2.735***  P < 0.01  
H1b Met -> MUse (-)    -0.092      1.500 NS  
H2b Kno -> MUse (+)  0.171 2.077** P < 0.05  
H3b Com -> MUse (+)  0.529  7.243*** P < 0.01  
H4b Leg -> MUse (+)  0.187  2.346*** P < 0.01  
H1c Met -> HUse (-)  0.002      0.020 NS 
H2c Kno -> HUse (+)  0.108      0.854 NS 
H3c Com -> HUse (+)  0.377  3.498*** P < 0.01  
H4c Leg -> HUse (+)  0.115      0.987 NS  
H3d Com -> IAcc (+)  0.472  3.621*** P < 0.01  
H4d Leg -> IAcc (+)  0.261 2.298** P < 0.05  
H5d Cap -> IAcc (+)  0.042      0.346  NS 
H3e Com -> EAcc (+)  0.374  3.449*** P < 0.01  
H4e Leg -> EAcc (+)  0.245  2.618*** P < 0.01  
H5e Cap -> EAcc (+)  0.299  2.398*** P < 0.01  
Legend:  






The results provided support for hypothesis H1a: "Development of performance 
indicators is negatively associated with metric difficulties". The score 1.956 was well 
above the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05). Similar to the significant results obtained 
from OLS, the result from PLS was also considered significant. Hence, this 
suggested that problems related to metric difficulties in performance measurement 




The results provided strong support for hypothesis H2a: "Development of 
performance indicators is positively associated with related technical knowledge". 
The score 2.224 was well above the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05) and stronger than 
the result obtained from the OLS (marginally significant). This result implied that the 
development of indicators in ILG increased as their officers and staff gained more 




The results provided very strong support for hypothesis H3a: "Development of 
performance indicators is positively associated with management commitment". The 
score 2.534 was well above the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01). Similar to the results 
obtained from OLS, which were significant, the outcome from PLS was also 
considered significant. This suggested that management commitment from ILG 




The results provided very strong support for hypothesis H4a: "Development of 
performance indicators is positively associated with legislative requirements". The 
score 2.735 was well above the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01), confirming the result 
obtained from the OLS with even stronger support. This implied that the 
development of indicators in ILG increased as legislation regarding performance 
reporting intensified. In other words, as new regulations related to performance 
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reporting emerged, ILGs responded promptly by providing more indicators as 




The results provided no support for hypothesis H1b: "Managerial use of indicators is 
negatively associated with metric difficulties". The score was only 1.500, which was 
less than 1.64 (P<0.05). H1b was not significant; therefore, the hypothesis was not 
supported. This result confirmed the finding obtained from the OLS analysis. This 
indicated that using performance indicators at the managerial level had nothing to do 
with the problems that existed in the process of developing performance indicators. 
Once indicators became available, ILG officers at the manager level just used them 




As in H1b, the results provided no support for hypothesis H1c: "Higher use of 
indicators is negatively associated with metric difficulties". The score was only 
0.020, which was far below the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05). Therefore, this 
hypothesis was definitely not supported. This result, again, confirmed the result 
obtained from the OLS analysis. It suggested that just like in the managerial level, 
for higher level ILG officers, the use of performance indicators was not affected by 
the difficulties in developing the indicators. Higher level ILG officers simply used 
the indicators that became available for them. This result was logical and not 
surprising given that mid-level ILG managers are normally the people responsible for 




The results provided strong support for hypothesis H2b: "Managerial use of 
indicators is positively associated with related technical knowledge". The score 
2.077 was higher than the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05). This was in line with the 
result obtained from the OLS analysis. This implied that the extent of use of 
performance indicators by managerial level officers was affected by the level of their 
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technical knowledge. As the knowledge they had increased, the more they made use 




The results provided no support for hypothesis H2c: "Higher use of indicators is 
positively associated with related technical knowledge". The score 0.854 was below 
the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05), confirming the result obtained from the OLS 
analysis. This indicated that technical knowledge was not a determinant in the use of 
performance indicators by higher level ILG officials. In other words, the extent of 
use of performance indicators at a higher level remained unchanged despite their 




The results provided very strong support for hypothesis H3b: "Managerial use of 
indicators is positively associated with management commitment". The score 7.243 
was well above the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01). This result firmly confirmed the 
result obtained from the OLS analysis. This implied that the use of indicators in ILG 
at the managerial level was highly influenced by the commitment of ILG officers. 





The results provided strong support for hypothesis H3c: "Higher use of indicators is 
positively associated with management commitment". The score 3.498 was well 
above the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01) and confirmed the result obtained from the 
OLS analysis. This result implied that the use of indicators at a higher level was 
influenced by the commitment of ILG officers. Similar to the finding at the 










The results provided strong support for hypothesis H4b: "Managerial use of 
indicators is positively associated with legislative requirements". The score 2.346 
was higher than the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05). This was in line with the result 
obtained from the OLS analysis. This result implied that the use of indicators at the 
managerial level was affected by regulatory requirements received by ILG. It seemed 
that regulations related to performance reporting (mainly imposed by the central 
government) did have an impact on the level of use of indicators at the managerial 
level. This finding might have indicated the existence of coercive isomorphism; 




The results provided no support for hypothesis H4c: "Higher use of indicators is 
positively associated with legislative requirements". With the score of only 0.987, 
this was well below the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05) and confirmed the result 
obtained from the OLS analysis. This result implied that, unlike at the managerial 
level, the use of indicators in ILG at the higher level was unaffected by regulatory 
requirements received by ILG. It seemed that regulations related to performance 
reporting (mainly imposed by the central government) had no impact on the level of 
use of indicators at the higher level. This was inconsistent with the finding in H4b. 
ILG officials at a higher level responded differently to the regulatory requirements 
than did those at the managerial level. This was further explored in the interview 




The results provided very strong support for hypothesis H3d: "Internal 
accountability is positively associated with management commitment". The score 
3.621 was well above the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01), which strongly confirmed 
the result obtained from the OLS analysis. This result implied that the extent of 







Similar to the H3d findings, the results provided very strong support for hypothesis 
H3e: "External accountability is positively associated with management 
commitment". The score 3.449 was well above the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01). 
Consistent with the result obtained from the OLS analysis, the result from PLS 
analysis indicated that there was a positive association between external 
accountability and management commitment. This implied that the extent of external 
accountability provided by ILG to their stakeholders was affected by the officers‘ 
commitment to implementing PMS. It seemed that high commitment was effective in 




The results provided strong support for hypothesis H4d: "Internal accountability is 
positively associated with legislative requirements". The score 2.298 was well above 
the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05), confirming the result obtained from the OLS 
analysis. This result implied that legislative requirements (imposed by the central 




The result provided very strong support for hypothesis H4e: "External accountability 
is positively associated with legislative requirements". The score 2.618 was higher 
than the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01) and in line with the result obtained from the 
OLS analysis. This result indicated that legislative requirements had a strong impact 
on the level of external accountability in ILG. It suggested that the mandatory nature 
of performance reporting regulations did assure improvement in the external 




The results provided no support for hypothesis H5a: "Internal accountability is 
positively associated with organisational capacity". The score 0.346 was far below 
the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05), confirming the result obtained from the OLS 
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analysis that organisational capacity (i.e. management information systems and staff 





Contrary to the finding in H5d, the results provided strong support for the hypothesis 
H5e: "External accountability is positively associated with organisational capacity". 
The score 2.398 was higher than the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.05), which confirmed 
the result obtained from the OLS analysis that organisational capacity (i.e. 
management information systems and staff capability) had an impact on the level of 
external accountability. The higher the capacity of ILG was (in terms of management 
information systems, human resources capability), the higher was the level of 
external accountability. Interviews were used to gather more comments and 
explanations on the inconsistent results between H5d and H5e. 
 
6.6 Ordinary Least Squares and Partial Least Squares Compared 
 
As indicated in Table 6.7 below, in six hypotheses tests (H2a, H3a, H4a, H4b, H3c, 
and H4e), the PLS showed stronger results than the OLS analysis. The results for the 










Table 6.7: Comparison of Hypothesis Testing 
No. Hypothesis Path OLS PLS  
1 H1a Met -> Dev ++ ++ 
2 H2a Kno -> Dev + ++ 
3 H3a Com -> Dev ++ +++ 
4 H4a Leg -> Dev ++ +++ 
5 H1b Met -> MUse 0 0 
6 H2b Kno -> MUse ++ ++ 
7 H3b Com -> MUse +++ +++ 
8 H4b Leg -> MUse ++ +++ 
9 H1c Met -> HUse 0 0 
10 H2c Kno -> HUse 0 0 
11 H3c Com -> HUse ++ +++ 
12 H4c Leg -> HUse 0 0 
13 H3d Com -> IAcc +++ +++ 
14 H4d Leg -> IAcc ++ ++ 
15 H5d Cap -> IAcc 0 0 
16 H3e Com -> EAcc +++ +++ 
17 H4e Leg -> EAcc ++ +++ 
18 H5e Cap -> EAcc +++ +++ 
Legend:  
+++=highly significant, ++=significant, +=marginally significant, 0=not significant 
 
There appeared to be an indication that hypotheses testing using PLS showed 
stronger results than those obtained from using OLS. This finding provided support 
for the utilisation of PLS as a second-generation regression for further analysis, 
supplementing or even replacing OLS regression. 
 
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The previous section provided the results of PLS analysis for the initial model, the 
same model analysed using OLS with results presented in Chapter 5. Considering the 
findings in the previous section and the explorative nature of this study in Indonesia, 
it is argued here that there was a possibility of new relationships among the 
constructs. In this situation, PLS was the appropriate analytical tool to explore the 
data further and to uncover new relationships amongst variables not hypothesised in 
the initial model. Based on these considerations, a possible alternative model was 





Figure 6.2 presents the new model to be tested. The same logics and procedures to 
test item reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant validity were applied to 
the new model (see Appendix A.6-4 for details). 
  
Figure 6.2: New Structural Model 
Legend:  
Com = management commitment, Met = metric difficulties, Kno = technical knowledge, Leg = 
legislative requirements, Dev = development of indicator, MUse = managerial use of indicator, HUse 
= higher use of indicator, IAcc = internal accountability, EAcc = external accountability, Cap = 
organisational capacity 
 
Given that all the criteria had been fulfilled for assessing the measurement model of 
the new model (see Appendix A.6-4), the assessment could proceed to the next 
step—the assessment of the new structural model. Table 6.8 shows the R
2 
values 
























Development of Indicator (Dev) 0.455 
Managerial Use of Indicator (MUse) 0.607 
Higher Use of Indicator (HUse) 0.265 
Internal Accountability (IAcc) 0.437 
External Accountability (EAcc) 0.497 
Management Commitment (Com) 0.435 
Organisational Capacity (Cap) 0.039 
Metric Difficulties (Met) 0.030 
Legend:  
* 0.67 = substantial, 0.33 = moderate, and 0.19 = weak 
 
As shown in Table 6.8, the R
2
 values of the exogenous variables (dependent 
variables) ranged from 0.265 to 0.607. The strongest R
2
 value was that of managerial 
use of indicators (0.607), which indicated that 60.7% of the use of indicators for 
managerial level purposes could be explained by the constructs used in the model. 
The second strongest was for external accountability (0.497), while the lowest was 
that of higher use of indicators (0.265). Two R
2
 values (organisational capacity and 
metric difficulties) did not meet the 0.10 minimum requirements. This occurred 
because, within the model, these new exogenous variables both had only one 
antecedent variable. Table 6.9 shows that the path coefficients of the model ranged 
from the weakest of only 0.000 (for Met -> IAcc) to the strongest of 0.472 (for HUse 
-> IAcc). Table 6.9 shows that 17 paths out of 36 relationships tested using 
















Table 6.9: Bootstrapping Results—New Model 
Hypotheses Path Coefficient t-value Significance 
H1a Met -> Dev -0.159   1.859** P < 0.05 
H2a Kno -> Dev 0.186     2.363*** P < 0.01 
H3a Com -> Dev 0.337     3.108*** P < 0.01 
H4a Leg -> Dev 0.229     2.801*** P < 0.01 
H1b Met -> MUse -0.049      0.785 NS 
H2b Kno -> MUse 0.120      1.424 NS 
H3b Com -> MUse 0.447    4.014*** P < 0.01 
H4b Leg -> MUse 0.127      1.446 NS 
H1c Met -> HUse 0.053      0.493 NS 
H2c Kno -> HUse 0.050      0.422 NS 
H3c Com -> HUse 0.268   2.277** P < 0.05 
H4c Leg -> HUse 0.043      0.381 NS 
H3d Com -> IAcc 0.361     2.859*** P < 0.01 
H4d Leg -> IAcc 0.200   1.747** P < 0.05 
H5d Cap -> IAcc -0.008      0.086 NS 
H3e Com -> EAcc 0.071      0.500 NS 
H4e Leg -> EAcc 0.072      0.747 NS 
H5e Cap -> EAcc 0.288  2.182** P < 0.05 
# Dev -> Muse 0.253  1.963** P < 0.05 
# Dev -> HUse 0.315    2.427*** P < 0.01 
# Dev -> IAcc -0.097      0.809 NS 
# MUse -> IAcc -0.107      0.642 NS 
# HUse -> IAcc 0.472    3.967*** P < 0.01 
# Met -> IAcc 0.000      0.005 NS 
# Kno -> IAcc 0.117      1.155 NS 
# Kno -> EAcc 0.085      0.901 NS 
# Dev -> EAcc 0.082      0.882 NS 
# HUse -> EAcc -0.131      1.159 NS 
# IAcc -> EAcc 0.398     3.184*** P < 0.01 
# MUse -> EAcc 0.160      1.306 NS 
# Met -> Com -0.202    2.496*** P < 0.01 
# Kno -> Com 0.216  2.300** P < 0.05 
# Leg -> Com 0.331    3.334*** P < 0.01 
# Cap -> Com 0.271    2.723*** P < 0.01 
# Kno -> Met -0.174      1.571 NS 
# Leg -> Cap 0.198      1.629 NS 
Legend:  
# new potential hypothesis, NS=not significant, ***=highly significant, **=significant, *=marginally 






Figure 6.3: Significant Relationships—New Model 
Legend: 
Com = management commitment, Met = metric difficulties, Kno = technical knowledge, 
Leg = legislative requirements, Dev = development of indicator, MUse = managerial use of indicator, 
HUse = higher use of indicator, IAcc = internal accountability, EAcc = external accountability, Cap = 
organisational capacity- Path coefficient in bold = highly significant relationship 
 
Consistent with the results from initial model, the new model also indicated that 
management commitment had a central role amongst variables tested. In the initial 
model, five paths involving management commitment were highly significant, whilst 
in the new model, the results were even stronger with six paths having highly 

































commitment and managerial use of indicators with a coefficient of 0.447 and a t-
value of 4.014. Figure 6.3 depicts all significant relationships among the variables 
tested. 
 
It appeared that management commitment was significantly influenced by four 
independent variables: 1) organisational capacity (Cap); 2) legislative requirements 
(Leg); 3) technical knowledge (Kno); and 4) metric difficulties (Met). Management 
commitment, in turn, had a significant impact on the other four variables: 1) 
development of indicators (Dev); 2) managerial use of indicators (MUse); 3) higher 
use of indicators (HUse); and 4) internal accountability (IAcc). Next, the 
development of indicators had an impact on the use of indicators at both managerial 
and higher level management in ILG. Finally, higher use of indicators significantly 
affected internal accountability, and ultimately, would have an impact on external 
accountability (EAcc). 
 
6.8 Initial and New Model Partial Least Squares Results Compared 
 
To achieve further explanation and to sharpen the analysis, it was important to make 
a comparison between the old and new models. Table 6.10 presents a hypotheses 
testing results comparison between the initial and new models using PLS. 
 
Table 6.10: Comparison t values of Initial Model and New Model 
No. Hypothesis Path Initial Model New Model 
1 H1a Met -> Dev  1.956
++
       1.859
++
 















5 H1b Met -> MUse         1.500
0
       0.785
0
 
6    H2b * Kno -> MUse  2.077
++
       1.424
0
 





8    H4b * Leg -> MUse   2.346
+++
       1.446
0
 
9 H1c Met -> HUse         0.020
0
       0.493
0
 
10 H2c Kno -> HUse         0.854
0
       0.422
0
 
11 H3c Com -> HUse   3.498
+++
       2.277
++
 
12 H4c Leg -> HUse         0.987
0
       0.381
0
 





14 H4d Leg -> IAcc         2.298
++
       1.747
++
 
15 H5d Cap -> IAcc         0.346
0






No. Hypothesis Path Initial Model New Model 










18 H5e Cap -> EAcc 2.398
+++
   2.182
++
 
Legend:  +++=highly significant, ++=significant, +=marginally significant, 0=not significant 
 
As provided in the table above, the results for the majority of hypotheses were very 
similar for both models and there were no major variations. However, there were 
exceptions for four hypotheses. Contrasting to the results found in the initial model, 
in the new model, there were no significant results found for those four hypotheses 
(H2b, H4b, H3e, and H4e). Hence, these seemingly contradictory results needed 
further explanation. Interestingly, the PLS analysis enabled the researcher to create a 
new model to uncover many new relationships, or even a chain of relationships, not 
included in the initial model. This provided assistance in explaining inconsistent 





The results provided no support for hypothesis H2b: "Managerial use of indicators is 
positively associated with related technical knowledge". The score 1.424 was lower 
than the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05). This was inconsistence with the result 
obtained from the initial model. However, other significant relationships emerged 
and lead to an indirect relationship between technical knowledge and managerial use 
of indicators. Figure 6.4 presents these new relationships. 
 
 














The results showed that technical knowledge had no direct relationship to managerial 
use of indicators. However, they related indirectly through the intervening variable of 
either management commitment or development of indicators or both. 
 
This implied three possible scenarios: 
 
1. As the knowledge of managers increases, their commitment improves, and as 
a result, they make more use of performance indicators. 
2. As the knowledge of managers increases, they are able to develop more 
indicators, and as a result, they make more use of performance indicators. 
3. As the knowledge of managers increases, their commitment improves and 
motivates them to develop more indicators, and in the end, they make use of 




The results showed no support for hypothesis H4b: "Managerial use of indicators is 
positively associated with legislative requirements". The score 1.446 was lower than 
the cut-off point of 1.64 (P<0.05). As in H2b, this is inconsistent with the result 
obtained from the initial model. However, other significant relationships emerged 
and lead to an indirect relationship between legislative requirements and managerial 
use of indicators. Figure 6.5 presents these new relationships. 
 
 














This result implied that the use of indicators at the managerial level was not affected 
directly by regulatory requirements imposed on ILG. It seemed that regulations had 
an effect on management commitment and development of indicators, and in turn, 
would influence the use of indicators at the managerial level. Despite the different 
results, these findings also indicated the existence of coercive isomorphism. Once 
again, management commitment and the development of indicators acted as 
intervening variables for this relationship. Using the same logic as with the case of 
H2b, three possible scenarios could be used to explain the relationship between 
legislative requirements and managerial use of indicators in ILG: 
 
1. The mandatory nature of the regulations forces ILG officials to commit to 
make more use of performance indicators. 
2. The mandatory nature of the regulations forces ILG officials to develop 
and then to make use of performance indicators. 
3. The mandatory nature of the regulations forces ILG officials to commit 
and then to develop indicators, and in the end, to make use of the 




The results provided no support for hypothesis H3e: "External accountability is 
positively associated with management commitment". The score 0.500 was well 
below the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01). This was inconsistent with the result 
obtained from the initial model. However, new significant relationships among other 





Figure 6.6: New Model for Com and EAcc 
 
This implied that the extent of external accountability was affected indirectly by the 
officers‘ commitment through three other variables functioning as intervening 





The result provided no support for hypothesis H4e: "External accountability is 
positively associated with legislative requirements". The score 0.747 was far lower 
than the cut-off point of 2.33 (P<0.01) and was not in agreement with the result 
obtained from the initial model. New significant relationships among other variables 
occurred for this hypotheses; they are presented in Figure 6.7. 
 














Figure 6.7: New Model for Leg and EAcc 
 
In the case of hypothesis H4e (legislative requirements  external accountability), 
an interesting logical explanation could be drawn from the new model where there 
was actually a chain involving many variables with very strong relationships (i.e. the 
chain involves legislative requirement  management commitment  development 
of indicators  higher use of indicators  internal accountability  external 
accountability). 
 
Based on the logical sequence of this chain, it could be inferred that a new legislation 
might not directly affect external accountability. However, it could improve external 
accountability indirectly through the improvement of management commitment, 
development of indicators, higher use of indicators, and internal accountability. In 
summary, PLS analysis offered many interesting new paths to be explored in future 























This chapter has detailed and tested the measurement model and the structural model 
of the study using PLS analysis. The chapter revealed that both OLS and PLS 
provided consistent results and supported and rejected exactly the same hypotheses. 
However, in general, PLS showed stronger results and provided avenues to extend 
new relationships among variables. Based on the initial model results, a new model 
was proposed and analysed with PLS and the results were discussed in comparison to 
the initial model. The majority of the results from the new model confirmed the 
results from the initial model. Out of eighteen hypotheses tested, only four showed 
inconsistencies (H2b, H4b, H3e, H4e). The new model offered eight new 
relationships among variables within the model. Four of them showed highly 
significant associations, while the other four indicated significant associations. PLS 
analysis revealed many possible relationships not included in the initial model. This 








In the previous two chapters, the empirical findings from the survey were discussed 
to provide answers to the first research question using a quantitative approach. 
Descriptive statistics and hypotheses testing using OLS regression and PLS were 
used in the analysis. The results showed that the development and use of 
performance indicators in ILG were influenced by several technical and 
organisational factors: metrics difficulties, technical knowledge, management 
commitment, and legislative requirements. The results also provided an indication of 
the existence of three isomorphic pressures—coercive, mimetic, and normative—in 
the development and use of performance indicators. 
 
Given the nature of the method and subsequent analysis, the results from the survey 
provided a tentative indication of the existence of institutional isomorphism. 
Therefore, a number of these findings were then utilised to help in guiding the 
development of interview questions for in depth, face-to face interviews with 
relevant ILG officials. This qualitative approach, as the second stage of the study, 
was designed not only to confirm empirical results but also to provide insight into 
institutional isomorphism as one explanation for ILG‘s use and development of 
performance indicators. The interviews provided a pathway to answer the fourth 
research question, "Does institutional isomorphism exist in the development and use 
of PMS and accountability practice in ILG?" 
 
In this chapter, evidence collected from the interviews with selected ILG officials is 
examined and discussed. The qualitative analytical tool used is thematic analysis. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the interviews, followed by an analysis of 
the responses. Among the most crucial issues discussed are the three isomorphic 
pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative), the factors influencing development 
and use of performance indicators, the factors impeding PMS success, the reasons for 




This chapter ameliorates the empirical results with an institutional perspective of 
performance measurement and accountability practices in the Indonesian public 




Interviews were conducted with selected officials from Indonesian local 
governments. The main objective of the interviews was to determine whether the 
empirical findings presented in the previous two quantitative analysis chapters were 
supported by the perceptions of ILG officials responsible for preparing the 
performance reports. The interviews were also conducted to obtain insights into the 
existence of institutional isomorphism in the development and use of performance 
indicators. In addition, the interviews provided other important qualitative data on 
respondent perceptions of accountability and performance measurement practices. In 
line with the objective of the study, a list of questions covering three main topics—
accountability, performance measurement, and isomorphism—was prepared to 
provide guidance in the interviews (see Appendix A.4-1 for complete list of 
questions). 
 
7.2.1 Overview of the interviews 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, survey packages were sent to all officials who were 
responsible for the production of performance reports across all ILGs during the first 
stage of the study. A form was included in each package to be completed by the 
respondent regarding his or her willingness to participate in in-depth interviews 
during the second stage of the study. Almost half of the respondents (48%, 47/98) 
completed this form indicating their willingness to participate in the interview. Table 








Table 7.1: Profile of Interviewees 
ILG Type Location Revenue * Division Gender 
K1 District Out-of- Java 460,934 Internal Auditor Female 
K2 District Out-of- Java 486,821 Finance Male 
K3 District Out-of- Java 492,713 Finance Female 
K4 District Out-of- Java 739,782 Finance Female 
K5 District Out-of- Java 465,003 Finance Male 
K6 District Out-of- Java 477,197 Finance Male 
K7 City Out-of- Java 418,417 Finance Male 
K8 City In-Java 348,176 Finance Female 
K9 City In-Java 375,119 Secretary Male 
K10 District In-Java 700,427 Planning Male 
K11 City In-Java 336,978 Secretary Male 
K12 District In-Java 1,292,371 Secretary Male 
K13 District In-Java 901,208 Planning Male 
K14 City In-Java 715,241 Secretary Male 
K15 District Out-of- Java 639,691 Finance Male 
K16 District Out-of- Java 791,257 Finance Male 
K17 City In-Java 703,967 Secretary Male 
K18 District Out-of- Java 918,290 Finance Male 
K19 District In-Java 864,314 Finance Female 
K20 City Out-of- Java 706,573 Finance Female 
K21 District In-Java 575,115 Secretary Male 
K22 District In-Java 709,502 Planning Male 
K23 District In-Java 909,361 Internal Auditor Female 
K24 District In-Java 829,475 Secretary Male 
Note: * IDR millions 
 
Purposive sampling was used to select the 24 ILG officials from among those 
indicating their willingness to participate. They were deliberately chosen so that 
there was a relatively balanced representation of the samples. Therefore, the selection 
of the interviewees was based on several aspects including type, location, size, 
managerial position, and gender. Time and financial constraints of the researcher 
were also considered. 
 
As Table 7.1 shows, the interviewees came from different types of ILGs (seven cities 
and seventeen districts), different locations (thirteen in-Java and eleven out-of-Java), 
and various managerial positions. Interviews ranged from half an hour to two hours 
in length. Seven females and seventeen males were involved in the interviews. 
Female representation was quite high (29%) given the low proportion of female 
officials (9%) in the ILG population. Reasons for this high response rate from 
females could have indicated that women tended to be more open to outside 
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assistance and opinion than were their male counterparts. In a study on the 
comparison of male and female city managers, Fox and Schumann (1996) found that 
female managers were more likely than their counterparts to embrace a style of 
management that relied on input from others (e.g. citizens). Findings here would 
appear to support that. 
 
7.3 Thematic Analysis 
 
The qualitative data was analysed using thematic content analysis, which can be 
defined as a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within 
a set of data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This section provides the results of the 
thematic analysis of the responses collected from the interviews. As explained in 
Chapter 4, a semi-structured interview guide was used during the interview process. 
All interview questions were open-ended to allow respondents to state their opinions 
through a free flowing discussion. The supporting evidence on the existence of the 
three types of isomorphic pressures are discussed at the beginning of this section 
followed by discussions on further insights into the factors influencing the 
development and use of performance indicators, and the factors impeding PMSs. The 
reasons for accountability and the challenges to achieving accountability are 
discussed at the end of the chapter. 
 
7.3.1 Answering the fourth research question 
 
One of the reasons for conducting the interviews was to obtain evidence on the 
possible existence of institutional isomorphism in the development and use of 
performance indicators in ILG. As part of institutional theory, the concept of 
isomorphism is by no means new to public sector literature (see e.g., Lounsbury, 
2007). Tuttle and Dillard (2007) provide one such study that uses the three types of 
isomorphism suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) —coercive, mimetic, and 
normative. As suggested by the words, coercive refers to organisations being forced 
into a certain course of action; mimetic refers to organisations copying each other; 
and normative refers to the professionalisation of norms (; Dacin, 1997). It is 
suspected that the three types of isomorphic pressures have the potential to affect the 




To collect the information needed for further analysis regarding the possible 
existence of isomorphic pressures, interviewees were asked several relevant 
questions (refer questions under "Isomorphism" in the interview guide). 
 
Using the three isomorphism categories as the themes, Table 7.2 presents a summary 
of interview results regarding the process of performance report preparation. The 
three isomorphic pressures potentially affect the development and use of 
performance indicators in ILG. 
 
Table 7.2: Performance Reporting Preparation Process 
Performance Report Preparation Theme Number of Responses 
refer to:   
Regulation & Guidelines Coercive 15(62.5%) 
Other ILG Report Mimetic   6(25.0%) 
Other Government Report Mimetic   3(12.5%) 
assisted by:   
BPKP Normative 12(50.0%) 
Local University Normative   5(21.5%) 
Independent Consultant Normative                2(  8.0%) 
Menpan Normative                2(  8.0%) 
Others (BPK, LAN, Internal Unit) Normative   3(12.5%) 
 
Referring back to the interview guide (Appendix A.4-3), Questions 20 and 23 were 
raised to provide insight into coercive pressures. Secondly, Questions 25 and 26 were 
used to uncover the existence of mimetic pressures. The majority of ILG officials 
(62.5%) pointed out that the main reference in the development and use of 
performance indicators were regulations and guidelines issued by the central 
government. Other local government reports and some other general government 
reports were referred to by 25% and 12.5% of ILG officials, respectively. Thirdly, to 
provide some explanation of the existence of normative pressures, Question 28 was 
included. Half of the interviewees stated that in the process of PMS implementation 
they received assistance from BPKP. Others got help from the local university, 
independent consultants, other central government institutions (i.e. Menpan, BPK 




The evidence on the three common themes (coercive, mimetic, and normative), 
acquired from the interviews and relevant to the investigation of institutional 




One major driver behind the adoption of a new system, including PMS, is pressure 
from regulation (Katharina, Matook, & Rohde, 2009). This also applies to the 
adoption of PMS in Indonesia. Since the emergence of Inpres No.7/1999 just a year 
after the fall of the authoritarian regime under President Soeharto, government 
entities at all levels, including local governments, turned their attention to 
performance reporting. This regulation required all government entities to submit 
performance reports to the central government annually. 
 
Despite the potential benefits PMS offers to ILG in the midst of their efforts to 
enhance accountability, the majority of ILGs were actually not ready to implement 
the system. Many ILGs claimed that they had little time and that they were still 
struggling with low technical capability, especially with their relatively low quality 
of human resources. As the submission of performance reports is compulsory, ILGs 
were forced to adopt PMS despite the fact that they were not ready to do so. In 
preparation, they needed to install new systems capable of producing the required 
reports. 
 
As confirmed by the interviews, the main driver of the adoption of PMS was a law 
(e.g. Inpres No. 7/1999) compelling ILG to introduce PMS for measuring and 
reporting performance indicators. Therefore, the adoption was not so that they could 
utilise a better managerial tool; it was driven simply by the need to comply with 
regulatory requirement. 
 
Since the emergence of Inpres No.7/1999 we are required to prepare and 
submit a performance report. It‘s compulsory. (K21, Secretary) 
 
Since the emergence of regulation regarding performance reporting, we are 





It can be seen from these comments that there was consensus among ILG officials 
that the central government regulation on performance reporting forced the ILGs to 
submit a performance report despite the fact that ILGs were facing many difficulties 
in producing the reports. 
 
Although ILGs are allegedly autonomous, they are still financially dependent on the 
central government to some extent. The shared funds ILGs receive are determined by 
the central government via a national budget allocation process. One important 
requirement before the fund can be transferred to a particular ILG is LAKIP 
submission. As a result, the compulsory nature of the regulation has forced 
government organisations, including ILGs, to comply with it regardless of their 
unpreparedness to implement the systems. ILG has no other choice but to comply 
with the regulation if they do not want to face adverse consequences in their budgets. 
The most common example of such consequences is a delay of fund transfer from the 
central to local government pending the submission of the reports. This explains why 
the majority of respondents ranked this factor highest on the list. The result is 
consistent with DiMaggio‘s and Powell‘s (1983) claim that coercive isomorphism is 




In the era of reforms, many new regulations from central governments affecting ILG 
have emerged and are often overlapping; some are even in conflict with each other. 
In a situation like this, an ILG, which possesses insufficient knowledge to choose the 
right course of action, would simply mimic the behaviour of others considered as 
successful in pursuing legitimacy (Haveman, 1993). 
 
Moreover, when successful adaptation is not well understood and it is difficult to 
evaluate a program output directly, an easy path is to copy what others have done 
well. From the interviews, many ILG officials, especially the ones located out-of- 
Java or those from ILGs with fewer resources, stated their agreement regarding the 




When it comes to preparing the performance report, initially we refer to 
other leading ILG as we as a relatively less advanced organisation need to 
learn from other more advanced ones. (K4, Finance) 
 
Yes, we first refer to the nearest ILG and as we were unhappy with that we 
then turn to the better example from in-Java ILG. (K5, Finance) 
 
We first tried our best then refer to other ILG in regard to the format of the 
report. (K6, Finance) 
 
With regard to the performance report, my ILG was copying the report 
from provincial government and sharing this information with other ILG. 
(K18, Finance) 
 
When preparing performance report we were getting examples and copying 
the practices of other ILG. (K19, Finance) 
 
It is apparent from responses presented above that many of the ILGs saw copying 
best practice from others as the safe and easy way to comply with the regulations. 
Interview results indeed provided evidence that ILGs did copy the practice of 
performance reporting from other government organisations, either at local or 
provincial levels. There was a tendency for smaller ILGs to use larger ILGs as the 
benchmark in producing performance reports. In addition, there was also evidence 
that out-of-Java ILGs copied the practices of in-Java ILGs. 
 
Three findings from the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 5 were extended 
and supported here: 1) the extent of development and use of performance indicators 
in larger ILGs was higher than in the smaller ones; 2) in-Java ILGs tended to be 
more concerned with PMS than out-of-Java ILGs; and 3) the urban-type ILGs 
(usually better-resourced) expressed more interest in PMS than did the rural-type 
ILGs (usually less well resourced). Interview results were able to explain these initial 
findings further. From the quotations above, many interviewees from small ILGs 
mentioned that, given their low capability, to produce performance reports, they 
needed to refer to the large ILGs‘ performance reports as examples. With regard to 
resources, out-of-Java ILGs tended to lag behind in-Java ILGs. This was also the 
case with rural-type ILGs and urban-type ILGs. It is not an uncommon phenomenon 
that smaller organisations copy the practices of the larger ones. These results were 
161 
 
consistent with those previously reported by Ryan and Purcell (2004) and Collin, 




The majority of respondents stated that the PMS they adopted was designed by an 
external consultant (mainly BPKP, refer to Table 7.2 for details)
21
, with active 
participation of a team established internally and comprised of relevant ILG 
employees. This team, that represented the recipients of the systems, acquired the 
knowledge through interaction with the external consultant. Some respondents also 
mentioned the role the university played in shaping their knowledge on many topics 
in public management, including PMS. 
 
The Role of Auditors 
 
Given the low quality of employees and officials in the majority of ILGs, the role of 
professionals from outside the organisation, such as BPKP, was crucial to reduce 
errors and increase the chance of success in adopting and implementing 
institutionalised practices (Joon & Jasook, 2010). 
 
With regard to preparing performance reports, due to this lack of capable staff, many 
ILGs looked for help from expertise outside their organisations. One way of doing 
that was by requesting technical assistance from BPKP. As the central government 
audit office, BPKP had the capability and capacity to help other government 
organisations such as ILGs in their effort to enhance their capacity. BPKP had a long 
history of working with ILGs in their capacity of providing audit services. Hence, 
from the point of view of the ILGs, BPKP was the right organisation to provide 
assistance. 
 
Initially we asked for help from BPKP to prepare performance report. (K15, 
Finance) 
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 BPKP (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan dan Pembangunan) is a central government agency who 






At the early stage, BPKP provided technical assistance to us. They provide 
us with some kind of in-house consultation in preparing performance 
report. (K21, Secretary) 
 
At the beginning, we got help from BPKP. (K22, Planning) 
 
We directly asked for technical assistance on the adoption and 
implementation of PMS from BPKP. In the process, there were transfers of 
knowledge from them to us. Over time as we gain some of the knowledge, 
the role of BPKP was gradually reduced. (K23, Internal Auditor) 
 
It is clear, from all comments cited above, that the role of BPKP was central in 
assisting ILGs in implementing PMS, especially in the early stage of the 
implementation as local officials and employees needed to learn the new systems. 
 
Working with many diverse ILGs over a relatively long period enabled experts from 
BPKP to diffuse knowledge and best practices in developing performance indicators 
as they moved from one ILG to the next. 
 
Traditionally, almost all ILGs have struggled with their low quality of employees and 
officials. In the past, under the centralistic government, this did not seem to be a real 
problem as ILGs were an integral part of government as a whole. Hence, employees 
and officials at the local level were only implementing pre-determined programs and 
policies driven from the top. 
 
Since the era of reform began, when local autonomy commenced, ILGs became more 
independent in conducting their day-to-day tasks of providing public services to their 
local people. These changes required ILGs to have more capable employees and 
officials than ever before, as they needed to manage everything by themselves, 
without direct involvement from the central government. 
 
The Role of University 
 
Interviews results revealed that local universities also provide a major contribution in 




We were so lucky to have high quality well-reputed universities in our 
neighbourhood so we had a good opportunity to benefit from them [to 
access their high-quality education programs and expertise]. Universities 
assisted us in the early-stage of LAKIP implementation. For a long-term 
purpose, we sent our employees to both for short-term non-degree programs 
(i.e. training/seminar/workshop in performance measurement/management) 
or for degree programs (i.e. master degree in public management). We did 
that in the past and will continue to do so as we believed in quality 
education to build our capacity. (K17, Secretary) 
 
There has been a nation-wide trend in the last decade for many organisations to send 
their employees for further education to universities. ILGs across Indonesia were no 
exception as many universities, especially the large ones, promptly responded to the 
emerging needs by offering new degree/non-degree programs such as public sector 
accounting and public management/administration. 
 
While attending educational programs in universities, ILG employees had the 
opportunity to gain new management skills and knowledge in PMS as they studied 
theories as well as examples of best practice in the classroom. They also had the 
opportunity to share their experiences of PMS implementation with their colleagues 
from other ILGs across the nation. When they returned to their work places, they 
could share this new knowledge and experience with their colleagues. Thousands of 
ILG employees and officials attended and graduated from such programs. As a 
result, they brought about changes in their ILGs and made the practice of 
performance reporting more homogeneous than before. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
argued that the more educated the workforce became, in terms of academic 
qualifications and participation in professional and trade associations, the greater the 
extent to which organisations would become similar to other organisations in the 
field. In this case, the quality of performance reports was expected to improve in the 
future as many officials who undertook further degrees at universities returned to 
their ILGs. 
 
It is clear that ILG have benefited from outside expertise such as from BPKP or 
universities in dealing with PMS. The situation would enable normative isomorphism 
to take place in the process as organisations attempting to follow best practices or 




7.3.2 Factors influencing the development and use of performance indicators 
 
In the previous two chapters, four factors—legislative requirements, metrics 
difficulties, technical knowledge, and management commitment—were found as the 
factors that significantly influenced the development and use of performance 
indicators in ILG. These findings were based on survey responses, and therefore, as 
in any survey, the results might have had potential bias due to respondents‘ 
subjectivity. Given this inherent weakness, further evidence through interviews was 
needed to anticipate the potential weaknesses, and hence, to strengthen the findings. 
Interviewees were asked why their organisations developed performance indicators. 
The interviews confirmed that all four factors influenced the development of 
performance indicators in ILG. In general, all the interviewees claimed that they 
faced challenges related to all the factors in the model in dealing with performance 
reporting issues. 
 
The most common reason for developing performance indicators in ILG was the 
existence of legislative requirements from the central government, which began with 
the emergence of new regulations regarding accountability reporting (well-known in 
Indonesia as LAKIP) at the beginning of reform era in 1999. 
 
To be honest with you, for the time being, we developed performance 
indicators simply to fulfil regulation requirement. Besides, so far there has 
not been a performance audit carried out. Auditors are only concerned 
about ILG‘s financial performance. (K7, Finance) 
 
We developed performance indicators as it was part of our obligation to 
follow instructions from central government [as regulation requirement]. 
Even though we actually need performance information as well to make 
sure we achieved results, in this matter regulation requirements were 
central. (K15, Planning) 
 
These responses were also examples of the existence of coercive pressure imposed 
by regulations. Officials viewed this force as the major driver behind the 
development of performance indicators; while the use of performance information to 
assist managerial need was only secondary. However, some interviewees stated that 
there was a real need to improve ILG performance in providing quality services to 
the people. To fulfil this goal, a managerial tool such as PMS was needed to provide 
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information required to monitor and evaluate performance of activities or programs 
carried out by ILG. 
 
Despite the fact that the majority of respondents claimed that regulation requirements 
were the main reasons behind the development and use of performance indicators, 
some did point out that their reasons were more about increasing performance in 
order to provide better service quality to the public. 
 
We developed performance indicators to improve our performance in 
providing services to the people. (K17, Secretary) 
 
We developed performance indicators to measure the level of success of 
our activities carried out by ILG. (K14, Secretary) 
 
These statements came from better-resourced ILGs located in urban Java. As this 
ILG was located in an urban area with highly demanding, well-educated people, it 
needed to ensure that the PMS was used for decision making and not just 
implemented as a mere formality. In other words, to this ILG, complying with the 
central regulation was necessary; however, improving public service quality on a 
continual basis to local people as the main stakeholders was just as, if not more, 
important. To fulfil this crucial task, the ILG needed an effective PMS in place. 
 
Interview results also revealed that all interviewees did confirm the survey findings 
on the factors influencing the development and use of performance indicators. 
 
Yes, I agree with all the four factors mentioned in the model. (K17, 
Secretary) 
 
All respondents agreed on all four factors affecting the development and use of 
performance indicators presented in the research model. They were also asked to 
rank the relative importance of the factors. Table 7.3 summarises these rankings in 




Table 7.3: Factor Affecting Development of Indicators 
 
The Most Influencing Factor 
Development Use 
Number of Responses 
Legislative Requirements          10 (42%)          12 (50%) 
Metrics Difficulties 6 (25%) 6 (25%) 
Technical Knowledge 6 (25%) 4 (17%) 
Management Commitment 2 (  8%) 2 (  8%) 
 
It is obvious from the table above that regulation requirements had the strongest 
effect on both the development and use of performance indicators followed by 
metrics difficulties, technical knowledge, and management commitment. In general, 




As shown in Table 7.3, the majority of interviewees (42% for the development and 
50% for the use) considered that regulation requirement was the dominant 
influencing factor for the development and use of performance indicators. With 
respect to this matter, one interviewee said: 
 
Due to strong external pressures often central government issues new 
regulations in a rush and then forces lower tiers of government, such as 
local governments, to comply. Regulation on performance reporting was a 
good example for that. (K17, Secretary) 
 
With the introduction of various reforms (detailed in Chapter 1), the Indonesian 
central government had to respond to the demand from the public regarding many 
aspects of public policies. In addition, it also needed to deal with international bodies 
(i.e. IMF, World Bank) regarding governance matters for the new Indonesia. This 
situation created a lot of pressure on the central government, often resulting in the 
issuance of new regulations in haste and without comprehensive consideration. The 
regulation on PMS is a good example of this. Like most countries in the world, 
Indonesia is open to the effects of globalisation in almost every aspect of life, 
including in public sector accountability. 
 
Following the fall of the old repressive regime, the Indonesian government, at every 
level, has faced a great deal of pressure from the public. As the democratic climate 
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changed drastically, people had an opportunity to ask openly for a more accountable 
government. As a result, in the early stage of the reform, Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat (MPR),
22
 as the highest body of people representatives, issued Tap MPR-RI 
No.XI/MPR/1998, which was a law on having a government that was free from 
corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Subsequent to this law, the President of The 
Republic of Indonesia, as the central government top executive, issued an instruction 
regarding governmental, institutional, performance accountability, which was Inpres 
No.7/1999. This instruction required government organisations, including ILG, to 
submit a performance report annually starting from the fiscal year 2000. 
 
In the first year of the implementation of LAKIP, it was very difficult, if not 
impossible, due to time constraints, for ILG to prepare a quality performance report. 
Given the submission was compulsory, ILG had to provide the reports in whatever 
format was available to them. However, the quality of the reports was far from 
sound. 
 
Referring back to the results in Chapters 5 and 6, there was an interesting finding 
regarding the relationship between legislative requirements and use of indicators. 
The use of indicators at the managerial level was strongly influenced by regulation 
requirements. However, their use at higher levels was not. Regarding this 
contradictory finding, one interviewee explained: 
 
As government official at managerial level I need to always consult and 
conform to any regulations (including the one related to LAKIP). That was 
a standard procedure explicitly stated on my job description. In short, 
regulations significantly affect my decisions in using performance 
indicators. On the other hand, Bupati (head of district) normally based his 
decision on a political consideration. He preferred to include information 
that benefits him politically. I guess that was normal as he was an elected 
official. (K22, Planning) 
 
This comment provided a clear explanation of the current process and supported the 
empirical findings. For the top level officials, political factors were more important 
to consider than other organisational or technical factors. 
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Some interviewees (25%) claimed that difficulties inherent in determining and 
understanding certain performance indicators, especially in the case of non-physical 
activities, was the dominant factor influencing the development and use of 
performance indicators. 
 
With regard to this problem, one interviewee stated the following: 
 
We also were having difficulties in determining performance indicators, 
especially for non-physical activities. (K17, Secretary) 
 
One important technical issue highlighted in the performance measurement literature 
was directly related to the problems of metrics difficulties. The ability of ILG 
officials and employees to define and assess metrics, such as performance indicators, 
that capture desired actions and outcomes was crucial (Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004). 
 
It is obvious from the comment by K17 that technical difficulties inherent in the 
development of indicators, especially in determining indicators for hard-to-measure, 
non-physical programs and activities were real problems for ILGs. It is no easy task 
to produce indicators to measure the success or failure of hard-to-measure programs. 
 
In many public organisations, including ILG, employees and officials conducted 
many programs that were difficult to evaluate accurately using objective, 
quantifiable, performance indicators (e.g. poverty alleviation, transmigration (people 
relocation), and family planning). It was very clear that information about the 
outcomes of such programs was not easily accessible, and hence, was difficult to 
determine. This inherent problem was made worse by the fact that many ILG 
employees did not have enough competencies in coping with technical matters in the 






Respondents [6 (25%) for development and 4 (17%) for use] indicated that the level 
of technical knowledge held by ILG employees, especially knowledge in PMS, was 
also considered as an important influencing factor in regards to the development and 
use of performance indicators. For example, one interviewee pointed out that: 
 
Technical knowledge [held by ILG employees] was also an important one 
but not as dominant as the regulation. When it comes to increasing the 
quality of human resources, we educated our employees by utilising the 
expertise available from the local university. (K17, Secretary) 
 
Even though not as strong as in the regulation requirement, issues in technical 
knowledge were also considered important to the success of PMS implementation. 
Given the complexity inherent in the development and use of performance indicators, 
it was a logical consequence that ILG were required to have at least one employee 
with relatively high technical competencies. Unfortunately, for ILG, this was often 
not the case as the general quality of their employees and officials was still relatively 
low. More training is still required before improvement can occur. 
 
This situation is not surprising, as traditionally, in many cases, the local government 
sector in Indonesia has only attracted second or even third class employees compared 
to private or government-owned enterprises. It is not uncommon that most high 
quality university graduates prefer to work in the private sector, including large-sized 
firms, multinational companies, or at least, government-owned enterprises (i.e. 
PERTAMINA, Telkom, etc.). From a job-seekers point of view, these organisations 
are ranked highly. The reason for these preferences is mainly financial as private and 
government-owned enterprises offer much higher salaries and excellent career 
opportunities than do local governments. Given that the level of competition in the 
job market is extremely high in Indonesia, only the brightest graduates are able to get 
places in these top ranked organisations. The second-layer graduates normally get 
positions in the medium-sized firms or in central government departments, which 
offer a moderate level of salary. Finally, the third-layer graduates have to accept 
positions in small-sized firms or in local government units. These smaller 




Low quality employees and officials have resulted in many problems in the 
development and use of performance indicators. Numerous ILG employees showed 
their frustration in dealing with this complex and often-difficult task. The outcome 
was apathetic behaviour and the creation of low quality performance reports. 
 
Many previous studies revealed the importance of technical knowledge in the success 
of the implementation of a new innovation in an organisation. The studies found that 
there is a positive association between training investments to increase technical 
knowledge of employees and implementation success (S.W. Anderson & Young, 
1999; Kwon & Zmud, 1987). 
 
Training in the design, implementation, and use of a management accounting 
innovation such as PMS allows ILG to articulate the link between the new practices 
and organisational objectives. This, in turn, provides a mechanism for employees to 
understand, accept, and feel comfortable with the innovation, and prevents 





Only two interviewees (8%) placed management commitment as the dominant 
influencing factor in the development and use of performance indicators in ILG. One 
interviewee provided an assessment on this matter: 
 
The concept was not really well-defined yet and there‘s also not enough 
time to socialise the draft. As a result it was difficult to implement as 
there‘s lack of commitment from the ILG. (K17, Secretary) 
 
Management commitment is one of the most crucial aspects to ensuring success in 
almost any management innovation (Damanpour & Schneider, 2009; Dibrell, Davis, 
& Craig, 2008; Eisingerich, Rubera, & Seifert, 2009). Yet, as indicated by this 
response, PMS implementation was hindered by a lack of commitment from the 
ILG‘s management. In many cases, without strong commitment from the 
management of an organisation (especially from top management), it is extremely 
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difficult to be successful in implementing an innovation such as PMS. When it 
comes to developing and using performance indicators, as in any organisational 
change, it is very important to note that there‘s a need to build high levels of 
commitment among senior management first and then to gather support from middle 
managers and staff (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006; Hal G. Rainey, 2003). Time 
constraints coupled with issues related to the clarity of the concept were responsible 
for the lack of management commitment. Clear guidance and a reasonable amount of 
time were needed to build a strong commitment within the management of ILG. 
 
Unfortunately, in the case of implementing PMS in Indonesia, it is clear that the 
needed commitment simply did not exist. As claimed by one interviewee, quoted 
previously, there was lack of commitment, and therefore, it was difficult to 
implement PMS. The central role of management commitment for a successful PMS 
implementation was confirmed in the empirical chapters and it was supported here. 
This research revealed that lack of top management commitment was, in many cases, 
responsible for the low motivation amongst ILG employees. This, in turn, would 
impede the PMS implementation. Lack of commitment would also explain the reason 
behind the inconsistency of hypotheses (H4b and H4c) testing results regarding the 
regulation requirement. Bupati/Walikota, as elected officials, tended to commit to 
their political affiliation instead of adhering to regulations imposed by the central 
government. This explained the lack of commitment and lack of association between 
the higher use of indicators and regulation requirements. 
 
A lack of management commitment was just one explanation for unsuccessful PMS 
implementation in ILG. Why there was a lack of commitment was the next question 
to answer. Interview results provided two reasons behind the lack of commitment. 
Firstly, the concept of PMS stated in the regulation was not well defined. The 
statement was too broad and ambiguous. Given that PMS was a relatively new 
concept for ILG and given the low quality of their officials and employees, 
guidelines that were more detailed were desperately needed. Secondly, the time 
constraint in implementing PMS was obvious. One year was definitely not enough 




In summary, even though there were only two respondents who put management 
commitment as the dominant factor, as shown in this section and in the empirical 
results, this factor was still important. 
 
7.3.3 Factors impeding performance measurement systems 
 
One of the most important goals all government, including ILG, wanted to achieve in 
the era of reform was to increase accountability to their stakeholders. PMS was an 
important tool to enable ILG to prepare performance reports as a medium to 
discharge their accountability obligation to their stakeholders. Success or failure in 
implementing the PMS was considered a crucial part in achieving accountability 
goals. Hence, the central government (MenPAN) conducts an evaluation of LAKIP 
reports annually. The LAKIP evaluation is based on five major components of 
performance management: (1) Performance planning, (2) Performance measurement, 
(3) Performance reporting, (4) Performance evaluation, and (5) Performance 
achievement. 
 
Following a comprehensive evaluation process using criteria set by MenPAN, any 
LAKIP report is given a score from 0 to 100. The score is then grouped into the six 
rating categories shown in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4: LAKIP Scoring 
Score Rating Meaning 
85–100 AA Excellence 
75–84 A Great 
66–74 B Very Good 
50–65 CC Good 
36–49 C Fair 
0–35 D Bad 
 
Interview results reported in Table 7.5 suggested that only 29% of the interviewees 
perceived that they had a relatively high percentage in achieving their accountability 
goals via performance measurement (reporting). The majority (71%) of interviewees 

















>75% 4 1 2 7 (29.0%) 
50-75% 1 3 5 9 (37.5%) 
<50% 1 4 3 8 (33.5%) 
 
Further, this fact was supported by the central government‘s recent annual evaluation 
on LAKIP reports. Based on the 2009 LAKIP evaluation, the majority of ILGs fell 
into the CC (50-65) category or lower. On this occasion, the central government also 
published a list of city and district categories as the best ten in performance 
reporting. Even these top ten ILGs fell into the CC category with the highest score 





It appeared that in general, ILGs were far from successful in 
implementing PMS, as the evaluation score suggested. 
 
In addition, the central government, via medium-term development plans called 
Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (RPJM) 2005–2010, stated that 
strengthening accountability and enhancing performance were priorities of the 
bureaucratic reform program within the next five years. Strengthening financial 
accountability is directed at increasing quality and transparency of financial 
management and it is measured by sound administration indicators, auditors‘ 
opinions, and less KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism). Strengthening 
performance accountability is measured by the percentage of government entities 
implementing sound LAKIP and increasing accountability of performance. It is 
explicitly stated in the RPJM document that, for the next five years, 100% of 
government entities will be expected to get an unqualified opinion in their financial 
statements and at least 80% of government entities will have to show sound 
performance accountability via LAKIP. 
 
Given the importance of accountability via performance measurement, it is 
interesting and important to understand what causes failure in the implementation of 
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PMS in the ILG context. The interviewees were asked to respond to questions 
regarding three aspects that contributed to the success/failure of an innovation such 
as PMS and their perceived importance. These factors were: 1) direction, 2) ability, 
and 3) motivation. 
 
Interview results revealed that all interviewees showed their agreement on those 
three factors affecting the success or failure of PMS implementation. Interviewees 
who held a mid-level or lower position explained that they were not motivated to 
implement an effective PMS, as there was not enough support from the top. They 
also claimed that there was less direction on how to deal with the problems they 
faced when preparing performance reports, especially in determining the appropriate 
indicators. The majority of interviewees admitted that they did not have enough 
knowledge to implement and understand PMS. 
 
The interview results confirmed three main factors that were responsible for the low 
level of success in implementing PMS in ILG. These are listed in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6: Factor Impeding PMS 
The Most Impeding Factor Number of Responses 
Lack of motivation 12 (50%) 
Lack of direction   8 (33%) 
Lack of ability   4 (17%) 
 
Opinions from the interviewees regarding these issues follow. 
 
In our ILG the most impeding factor which was responsible for the failure 
of PMS implementation was lack of motivation followed by lack of ability 
and lack of direction. (K5, Planning) 
 
Many respondents explicitly mentioned lack of motivation as the crucial factor that 
caused the failure of PMS implementation. What caused this lack of motivation was 
the subsequent question. It seemed that there was a close relationship between 
motivation and management commitment. To increase the motivation, top 




I strongly agree to the view that lack of motivation was the most important 
thing in the failure of any system included PMS. Once we have motivation 
we‘ll be able to set the right direction to follow and will strive for 
increasing our ability to achieve our goals. However, we do need support 
from the top. Without that support, everything would be difficult. All 
depends on the leader at the top. (K1, Finance) 
 
Along with the lack of motivation mentioned above, the interview results also 
revealed the low level of top management commitment. Table 7.7 below presents the 
percentage of top management committed to the effort of achieving accountability 
goals. The data was classified into three categories based on the managerial level of 
the interviewees to see if there was some bias in the responses they provided. 
 
Table 7.7: Percentage of Top Management Commitment 
Management Commitment 
Management Levels 
Top Mid Low Total 
>75% 6 3 2 11 (46%) 
50-75% 0 2 4   6 (25%) 
<50% 0 3 4   7 (29%) 
 
Table 7.7 suggests that less than 50% of ILG officials had a high level of top 
management commitment. It was important to note that there was a tendency for top 
level officials to claim they had a high level of commitment. In contrast, the majority 
of low and mid-level officials claimed that top management commitment was 
relatively low. If this bias were taken into consideration, the percentage of top 
management commitment would have been much lower. 
 
In short, lack of commitment from the top decreased the level of motivation within 
the organisation and resulted in a lower level of internal accountability, and thus, a 
lower level of external accountability. This fact confirmed the findings from the 
quantitative analysis in Chapter 6. 
 
In addition to the previous three factors, one interviewee claimed that lack of 
coordination between units in ILG had also contributed to the low level of 





Formally various units including technical departments were included in a 
team that was created to take responsibility on the development of 
performance indicators. This team was led by Secretary Office. However, 
in reality the secretary office as the leader worked alone. Other members of 
the team were only supplying the data needed for the preparation of the 
report without direct involvement in the process. (K16, Planning) 
 
It seemed that the deviation from the "substance over form" principle also occurred 
in the development of the performance indicators process.
24
 As mentioned by one of 
the respondents, formally a team, which was responsible for the task of producing 
performance indicators in ILG, consisted of officials from many different units. The 
purpose of this was to enable comprehensive discussions to occur before certain 
indicators were determined. Unfortunately, in reality, there was no real discussion 
among them as the leader of the team (the Secretary Office) was working alone, 
while the other units were only supplying data needed for the task of preparing the 
report. 
 
Without direct involvement from other units, the Secretary‘s office alone as a 
coordinator unit did not have the capacity necessary to achieve the goal of producing 
good performance indicators. In fact, other units knew more about the programs and 
activities under their responsibility. Therefore, their involvement needed to be taken 
into account in the whole process of performance indicator development. In addition, 
direct involvement from other units would have increased commitment in using 
performance indicators in day-to-day decision making. 
 
7.3.4 Reasons for accountability 
 
During the interview process, participants were asked to provide relevant information 
regarding their experiences dealing with accountability issues within their 
organisations in the last ten years. The respondents were asked to provide their 
comments related to the fact that in the last decade there appeared to have been an 
increased interest regarding accountability in Indonesia in general, and in local 
government in particular. 
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 Substance over form is a principle used to ensure that a report presents a relevant, accurate and 
complete picture of the subject being reported rather than to merely fulfill regulation requirement. 
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All of the interviewees firmly stated their agreement with the increasing interest in 
and concern about accountability issues in Indonesia. However the reasons 
underlying that phenomenon varied amongst ILG officials. A number of reasons 
were suggested with two common themes emerging regarding the reasons for 
increased attention to accountability issues. The first theme was an institutional 
factor and the second was an organisational factor. The former referred to factors 
related to the interrelationship between ILG and other organisations and the 
environment in which the ILG operated, whilst the later referred to the factors within 
the ILG. Table 7.8 lists the reasons behind the increasing interest in accountability by 
ILG. 
Table 7.8: Reasons for Accountability 
 





Transparency /Openness, Trust & Participation Institutional 20 
External Pressures (people, DPRD, NGO, etc) Institutional 14 
Shift of paradigm (centralistic to local autonomy) Institutional 12 
Regulation requirement (Inpres 7/1999) Institutional   9 
Improving bureaucracy & service quality Organisational   8 
Increasing ILG performance Organisational   5 
Reducing uncertainty Organisational   1 
Improving control Organisational   1 
Note: *A total of 24 ILG were interviewed 
 
Based on information provided in Table 7.8, it was apparent that the reasons behind 
the increasing interest in accountability in ILG was primarily dominated by 
institutional factors such as responses to demands for 
transparency/openness/trust/participation, external pressures, shifts of paradigm, and 
regulations. The reasons were less dominated by organisational factors such as the 
need to improve bureaucracy and quality of services, and the need to increase 
performance and control. 
 
Actually, ILG is responsible to the people. Financial resources managed 
and spent by ILG were people‘s money. However, in the past, people didn‘t 
really care about this issue. ILG officials could spend the money as they 
like. After the local autonomy was given to ILG via the new regulations, 
the case was totally different. It seems that local people now put their eyes 
very closely on every cent of the money spent by ILG officials. In addition, 
this reform era was also signalled by the emergence of so many newly-
established NGOs. These organisations put a lot of pressures on ILG 




In the past, under a very repressive New Order regime, people were not able to 
protest or question any government action or policy they thought was wrong. Silence 
was the preferred option in order to avoid any adverse consequences. This situation 
lasted for more than three decades (from 1966 to 1998) and created apathetic 
behaviour across the nation for a long time. During this period, government official 
behaviour was not questioned and accountability was inconsequential. 
 
Given a more conducive situation, people started to express their opinions more 
freely and directly or via one of the newly established NGOs built to keep an eye on 
policies and actions of government at every level, including local government. 
Government officials could no longer do what they liked, as they were now 
accountable for their actions. Hence, accountability is now an important concept in 
ILG. 
 
With respect to which aspect of accountability is the most important, from the point 
of view of performance report preparation, the answers were mixed. Table 7.9 
summarises the responses. 
 
Table 7.9: The Most Importance Aspect of Accountability 
Aspect Number of Responses 
Financial   4 
Non-financial   3 
Both 17 
 
One interviewee commented that 
Both financial and non-financial aspects are crucial, however currently 
many external parties such as local people and NGOs are more concerned 
with financial matters…on how ILG spend the money. For example they 
focus only on the results of financial audits. No one seems to be concerned 
on performance audits. (K9, Secretary) 
 
It is clear that both financial and non-financial performance were considered 
important by stakeholders of ILG. However, there was a perception that external 
stakeholders were more concerned with financial aspects. Many considered financial 
aspects more important as the figures were straightforward and easier to comprehend 
than non-financial aspects. Financial figures from budgets and financial reports were 
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also relatively easy for them to understand compared to non-financial performance 
indicators. The increasing incidences of corruption in government institutions were 
responsible for this perception. 
 
7.3.5 The challenges to achieving accountability 
 
The interview results revealed that all interviewees have common agreement on the 
importance of accountability in ILG over the past ten years. Moreover, all agreed that 
accountability has been a much discussed topic in Indonesia in the last decade, 
especially in the local government environment. However, achieving accountability 
was not an easy task as there were many challenges for the ILG. Table 7.10 reveals 
some of the challenges to achieving accountability, raised by interviewees. For the 
purpose of analysis those various challenges were categorised into four relevant 
themes: (1) technical—factors such as measurability of performance indicators, (2) 
organisational—factors related to process within an organisation such as reward and 
punishment systems, (3) political—the influence of external parties such as central 
regulation, and (4) moral—characteristics embedded in people such as honesty. The 
first two themes, technical and organisational, could normally be controlled by the 
organisation, while political and moral factors were beyond its control. However, 

















Table 7.10: Challenges to Accountability 
Challenges for Accountability Theme Number of Responses 
Quality of human resources Technical 9  
Commitment Organisational 7 
Political interest Political 7 
Measurability of outcome Technical 3 
Central Regulations Political 3 
Database Technical 3 
Honesty Moral 3 
Lack of resources Organisational 2 
Low Morality Moral 2 
Quality of local representatives Technical 2 
Bad Planning Organisational 2 
Number of reports Political 2 
Resistance Organisational 2 
Money politics Political 1 
Media to discharge accountability Political 1 
Trust Moral 1 
Input focused Organisational 1 
Fat organisation Organisational 1 
Lack of reward and punishment systems Organisational 1 
Heterogeneity of population Political 1 
Difficult to maintain performance Organisational 1 
KKN Moral 1 
Red tape Technical 1 
 
Clearly from Table 7.10, there were three dominant challenges to achieving 
accountability goals: quality of human resources, commitment, and political interest. 
The problems caused by low quality of human resources (both employees and 
officials) within ILG turned out to be the most challenging factor in achieving 
accountability goals, followed by lack of top management commitment and political 
interference from political parties. 
 
These findings were in accordance with survey results presented in Chapter 6 where 
there was a chain of relationship amongst variables such as technical knowledge (as a 
proxy of human resource quality), management commitment, and accountability. The 
lack of technical knowledge of ILG‘s employees was significantly lower than 
organisational commitment. Next, lack of commitment, for instance, would result in 





Many scholars have theorised regarding the distinctions between public organisations 
and private organisations. The distinctions include greater reliance on political 
control (Damanpour & Schneider, 2009). Thus, the interview results regarding the 
importance of political interest in affecting accountability practices in ILGs 
supported this theorising. Polidano (2001) claimed that administrative and political 
leadership was crucial in ensuring the success of a certain reform in the public sector. 
 
The interview results on organisational commitment strengthen the quantitative 
findings using OLS and PLS analysis discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. 
These results made management commitment a central and important influencing 
factor for accountability practices in ILGs. Therefore, this research supported 
previous studies regarding the central role in management innovation, especially in 
PMS as a form of management innovation to discharge accountability. As a result, 
management commitment was considered the central variable in a new conceptual 
model on PMS and accountability (discussed in detail in Chapter 8). 
 
Relevant interview results are discussed next. Firstly, 9 interviewees (37.5%) found 
it difficult to achieve the goals of accountability as the quality of human resources 
working within ILG was low. 
 
Achieving accountability goal is easy to say but very difficult to be done. 
The real challenge is lack of understanding on appropriate performance 
indicators to be used by employees and officials. I believed this condition 
exists due to the low quality of employees and officials in our organisation. 
(K4, Planning) 
 
Given the many facets embedded in the concept of accountability, appropriate and 
relevant reported performance indicators are central in discharging accountability to 
the public. Therefore, to develop and use performance indicators that will effectively 
achieve accountability goals, ILGs need to have employees and officials that have 
the required technical capability in dealing with PMS. The key aspects of good 
management include planning, staffing, controlling, budgeting, and problem-solving 
(Kotter, 1996). Quality workers are needed for good staffing in any organisation 
including ILG. Unfortunately, for many ILGs, despite its importance, the quality of 




Secondly, 7 (29%) of interviewees found it difficult to achieve the goals of 
accountability, as there was lack of commitment in ILG. 
 
The main challenge in achieving accountability, in my opinion, is a lack of 
commitment from top level executives. Even though we in the middle or 
lower level officials have quite strong willingness to make an effort in 
achieving accountability goals it is really hard to make it happen as there is 
not enough support from the top. It seems that they [top level executives] 
did not really care about this matter. (K20, Finance) 
 
In any aspect of management, the role of top management is crucial to make sure that 
any management innovation is put in place, as the final decision ultimately rests in 
the hands of top management. In accountability practices, this important role is no 
exception. For ILG, having highly motivated low and middle managers is not enough 
without the support of its top management. 
 
Thirdly, 7 (29%) of the interviewees also found that political interest contributed to 
the difficulty in making ILG more accountable. 
 
Based on my experience in our case there is too much political interests 
involved in almost every aspect of local government policy and action in 
enhancing ILG accountability. For example, a certain policy made by 
executive is considered alright at the beginning, however as the new 
election time approaching many opposing parties start questioning that 
policy in order to attract public attention. (K21, Planning) 
 
Implied in the comments was the fact that ILGs have faced many challenges from 
internal and external parties. From inside the organisation, problems resulting from 
the low quality of their employees coupled with the low commitment of top level 
officials were apparent. At the same time, they had to deal with political pressure 
from outside the organisation (i.e. from politicians, central government officials, etc.) 
 
To focus the analysis, the various challenges for accountability (from Table 7.10) 
were regrouped from four themes into three main themes: (1) political/moral were 
combined as they came from external parties, and hence, were uncontrollable by 




Table 7.11: Summary of Challenges for Accountability 





Political and moral aspects were listed as providing the greatest number of 
challenges followed by technical and organisational aspects. Apparently, too much 
political interference and alleged corruption were regarded as the main barriers to 
achieving accountability goals. In addition, due to the low quality of human 
resources and lack of infrastructure, many ILGs were still struggling with technical 
and organisational obstacles. 
 
Two of the most important components of the political theme used in this thesis were 
political interest and central regulations. These two components from external parties 
appeared to affect accountability practices in ILG. In addition to those two aspects, 
ILGs seemed to have problems with their organisational and technical aspects (e.g. 
low commitment and red tape). Ohemeng (2010) argued that political aspects have 





This chapter has presented the data obtained from the in-depth, face-to-face 
interviews focusing on the experience of ILG officials in developing and using PMS. 
The 24 participants were asked to respond to all the open-ended questions from the 
interview guide. Five major issues were identified to assist in answering the fourth 
research question, support quantitative findings from the previous two chapters and 
provide suggestions for future research. These five issues were (1) the existence of 
three isomorphic pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative) in the adoption and 
implementation of PMS; (2) four factors (metric difficulties, technical knowledge, 
management commitment, and regulation requirement) influencing development and 
use of performance indicators; (3) three impeding factors (lack of direction, lack of 
motivation, and lack of ability) in the implementation of PMS; (4) the reasons for 
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increasing interest in accountability; and (5) the challenges to achieving 
accountability goals. 
 
The results of the qualitative analysis indicated that all three elements of institutional 
isomorphism—coercive pressures, mimetic pressures and normative pressures—
existed in the process of adoption and implementation of PMS in the ILG context. 
The interviews revealed that institutional isomorphism was a major factor that drove 
the decision to adopt and implement PMS in ILG because of the pressure exerted by 
the central government via the enactment of new regulations related to performance 
reporting. However, the perceived undemocratic process and the haste with which 
the regulations were implemented resulted in symbolic practices on performance 
reporting in Indonesia. 
 
Results were used to answer the fourth research question, "Does institutional 
isomorphism exist in the development and use of PMS and accountability practice in 
ILG?" As evidenced in this chapter, all three isomorphic pressures (coercive, 
mimetic, and normative) influenced the adoption and implementation of PMS in ILG 
with coercive pressure being the most significant. 
 
Chapter 8 links the different themes and findings together and relates them to the 








The aims of this chapter are to provide a summary of previous chapters, the 
implications of the findings, the strengths and limitations, and a recommendation for 
future research in the area of PMS and accountability practices in ILG. This chapter 
begins with a brief review of the motivation and research objectives (Section 8.2) 
followed by a summary of findings (Section 8.3). Research implications (Section 
8.4) and practical implications (Section 8.5) are then highlighted. A discussion of the 
strengths and limitations of the thesis (Section 8.6) follows and the proposal for the 
new model (Section 8.7) is described. The final two sections regarding implications 
for future research (Section 8.8) and concluding remarks (Section 8.9) close the 
thesis. 
 
8.2 Brief Review of Motivation and Research Objectives 
 
Within good governance and the NPM paradigm, PMS is a crucial tool for public 
sector organisations to achieve both internal and external goals. Internally, PMS 
plays an important role in assisting organisations to achieve organisational efficiency 
and effectiveness. Externally, PMS assists public sector organisations to increase 
transparency and discharge accountability to their stakeholders. Bearing those in 
mind, this thesis focuses on PMS and accountability practices in ILG. Specifically, it 
examines a model regarding technical and organisational factors influencing the 
development and use of performance indicators. In addition, it investigates the 
motivation behind the implementation of PMS and accountability practices in ILG 
within an institutional theory framework. 
 
ILGs were chosen as the context of the study because they have played a major role 
in Indonesian society since reform commenced in 1998. In 1999, Indonesia 
experienced pivotal changes from a centralistic and authoritarian country to a 
democratic and decentralised one. Hence, Indonesia has embarked on grand scale 




There is an indication that the outcome of the decentralisation process has not been 
as expected. Despite significant reform efforts, the World Bank claims that the 
regional budget process, for example, is not yet transparent and accountable. The 
budget formulation process has focused more on inputs than on implementing 
governments‘ priorities (World Bank, 2007). In general, accountability mechanisms 
in every level of government organisation remain weak. Therefore, to address the 
issue of PMS as an important tool for enhancing accountability practices in a new 
decentralised Indonesia, four important research questions were raised in this thesis. 
These research questions are summarised in Table 8.1. 
 




Data Source Analytical Tools 
1 















Do metric difficulties, technical 
knowledge, management 
commitment, and regulation 
requirement influence the 
development and use of 
performance indicators in ILG? 




Do management commitment, 
regulation requirement, and 
organisational capacity influence 
accountability practice in ILG? 
4 
Does institutional isomorphism 
exist in the development and use 
of PMS and accountability 















the main themes 
 
The first three research questions were answered in phase one using quantitative data 
gathered from a postal survey covering the entire population of ILG. The answer to 
the final question regarding the existence of institutional isomorphism in the process 
of developing and using performance indicators was found in phase two. The second 
phase considered data obtained from semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 24 





8.3 Summary of Findings 
 
To provide valid and rigorous results in addressing the four research questions, both 
quantitative and qualitative analytical tools were employed. Analysis included 
descriptive statistics, t-tests, OLS, PLS, and thematic content evaluation. 
 
8.3.1 Research question one 
 
Firstly, the study used descriptive statistics analysis to answer the first research 
question. The survey results showed that, in general, ILG only moderately developed 
performance indicators (Mean = 3.45 on a scale 1 to 5). Table 8.2 presents the rank 
of different types of performance indicators developed in ILG to see the relative 
importance from the perspective of ILG officials. 
 
Table 8.2: Rank of Performance Indicators Developed 
Types of indicators Mean 
Output 3.74 
Input 3.66 




Total  3.45 
 
Output and input indicators are on the top of the list, while outcome and efficiency 
indicators are only moderately developed. This indicates that ILG has not ranked 
outcome indicators as the most important. This is not only an unexpected finding but 
also an ironic one, given performance-based budgeting, which normally focuses on 
outcome, has been implemented for over a decade. The majority of the interviews 
convincingly showed their agreement regarding the lack of outcome indicator 
development in ILG. One explanation for this was that many of the interviewees 
found difficulties in measuring the outcomes of government programs, such as 
family planning programs. It is very hard to decide what outcome indicators to use, 
as the success of the program is dependent upon many different factors that are not 
always the responsibility of the department responsible for conducting the program. 
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This finding was in accord with the statement made by The World Bank (2007) in its 
report on "Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia's New 
Opportunities". 
 
Next, Table 8.3 presents a summary of the use of performance indicators in ILG. 
 
Table 8.3: Rank of Use of Performance Indicators 
Managerial Use Mean 
1. setting strategy  3.71 
2. coordinating program  3.67 
3. allocating resources 3.62 
4. refining program  3.32 
5. setting job expectation 3.28 
6. adopting new program  3.18 
7. setting performance goal 3.14 
8. rewarding employees 3.04 
Total  3.37 
Higher Use  
1. Funding decisions 3.52 
2. Changes management 3.50 
3. Develop budget 3.16 
Total  3.39 
 
As in the case of developing indicators, the survey indicated that ILG only 
moderately used performance indicators. Performance indicators were used at both 
the managerial level (mean = 3.37) and the higher level (mean = 3.39). At the 
managerial level, ILG used performance indicators mainly for setting strategy, 
coordinating programs, and allocating resources, whilst at the higher level, they were 
used for funding decisions and changes in management. At both levels, less emphasis 
was placed on rewarding employees (mean = 3.04) and developing budgets ( mean = 
3.16). This finding indicates that the practice of performance-based budgeting in 
ILG, which was expected to integrate performance indicators into the budget 
document as well as to facilitate the evaluation of employee performance, is 
questionable. These findings support those of Ho (2005) where the issue of 
integrating PMS into other systems (e.g. reward and punishment system) of 




Another interesting finding was the fact that the majority of ILGs have given more 
emphasis to more general information (e.g. setting priority goal) than to specific 
information regarding performance measurement (e.g. comparison on indicators). 
This is quite unexpected given PMS has been in place for more than a decade. This 
fact may indicate the existence of barriers to the development and use of 
performance indicators. Despite a decade of implementation, ILG still struggles with 
performance indicators. Interviews confirmed that ILG officials still have technical 
difficulties in developing and using performance indicators. 
 
Moreover, during the interviews, the majority of interviewees admitted that they used 
performance indicators simply for the sake of producing the mandatory performance 
reports required by central regulations without considering their real use of 
improving organisational performance. This supports the claim of Cavalluzzo and 
Ittner (2004) that implementation of externally mandated PMS was used merely to 
fulfil regulation requirements and was only symbolic in nature without any real 
impact on the performance of organisations. 
 
In addition, descriptive analysis also provided the opportunity to make comparisons 
regarding the extent of development of indicators, use (both managerial and higher 
level) of performance indicators, and accountability (both internal and external) for 
different sizes, types, and locations of ILG. The comparison is summarised in Table 
8.4.and Table 8.5. 
 





Type Different No difference Different 
Location Different No difference No difference 
Size No difference No difference No difference 
 
With regard to developing performance indicators, the survey revealed that the size 
of the ILG did not really matter. The extent of the performance indicator 
development was indifferent regardless of the size of the ILG. The type (district or 
city) and the location (Java or out-of Java) of the ILG, however, did make a 
difference. City governments tended to develop more indicators than did district 
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governments. The mean for development of indicators was 3.75 and 3.36, 
respectively. Similarly, in-Java ILGs were generally developing more indicators than 
those out-of-Java. The mean was 3.65 and 3.29, respectively. 
 
One possible explanation for these findings is that ILG officials, who come from the 
city or in-Java ILGs, tended to have a better knowledge and understanding of the 
issues related to adoption and implementation of performance management. This was 
evident during the interviews and was, in fact, not unsurprising given that Indonesian 
cities (located in urban areas) normally have better human resources than the districts 
(located in rural areas). The assumption was also true for the case of in-Java and out-
of-Java ILGs. In-Java ILGs had the privilege of being prioritised to get more 
resource allocation from the central government. This condition was a result of 
development strategies implemented by the New Order regime administration. 
Obviously this put Java Island as the centre and focus of national development 
programs. 
 
With regard to development of indicators, lack of resources does have an impact. 
This result partially supports the claim of Van Dooren (2005) that lack of resources 
has an impact on both development and use of performance indicators. This explains 
why the types and locations of ILGs did matter in this case. Cities and in-Java ILGs 
tend to have better resources (e.g. human resources) than district and out-of-Java 
ILGs. 
 
With respect to the use of indicators, unlike in the development of indicators, there is 
generally no difference between type, location, and size of ILG regarding the extent 
of use. The only exception was for the use of indicators at the higher level where city 
governments indicated they used performance indicators more than those of district 
governments. The mean was 3.74 and 3.29, respectively. Hence, when it comes to 
the use of indicators, type, location, and size of ILG does not matter as the majority 
of ILGs are concerned only about developing indicators to include in the LAKIP as a 
formal report and do not really care about their managerial use. Interview results 
confirmed this finding as many interviewees stated that their concern was on 




Table 8.5: Comparison on the Extent of Accountability 
 Accountability 
Internal External 
Type No difference No difference 
Location No difference No difference 
Size No difference No difference 
 
As summarised in the table there is no difference regarding the extent of internal and 
external accountability, regardless of type, location, and size of ILG. 
 
8.3.2 Research question two and three 
 
Secondly, to answer the second and third research questions, both the first and 
second-generation multivariate analytical tools, OLS and PLS, were employed. Table 
8.6 presents a summary of the findings. 
 






Influencing Factors for 





 Development   
1 Metric Difficulties Strong Strong 
2 Technical Knowledge Weak Strong 
3 Management Commitment  Strong Very Strong 
4 Legislative Requirements  Strong Very Strong 
 Managerial Use   
1 Metric Difficulties No Influence No Influence 
2 Technical Knowledge Strong Strong 
3 Management Commitment  Very Strong Very Strong 
4 Legislative Requirements Strong Very Strong 
 Higher Use    
1 Metric Difficulties No Influence No Influence 
2 Technical Knowledge No Influence No Influence 
3 Management Commitment  Strong Very Strong 
4 Legislative Requirements No Influence No Influence 
 Internal Accountability   
1 Management Commitment  Very Strong Very Strong 
2 Legislative Requirement  Strong Strong 
3 Organisational Capacity No Influence No Influence 
 External Accountability   
1 Management Commitment  Very Strong Very Strong 
2 Legislative Requirement  Strong Very Strong 




In analysing the model proposed in this study, both OLS and PLS analysis generally 
provided the same results. PLS analysis, however, showed relatively stronger results 
than those of OLS for several cases. OLS analysis revealed a strong relationship 
between legislative requirements and the development of indicators. When PLS was 
used for analysing the same case, the relationship was found to be even stronger. The 
majority of relationships among variables were supported by both analyses. The 
relationships ranged from weak (only one case in OLS analysis) to very strong. Only 
a relatively small number of the proposed inter-variable relationships under 
examination (five out of eighteen) were not supported by the analysis. 
 
The five proposed relationships that were not supported statistically were: 1) 
managerial use and metric difficulties; 2) higher use and metric difficulties; 3) higher 
use and technical knowledge; 4) higher use and legislative requirements; and 5) 
internal accountability and organisational capacity. 
 
Lack of statistical support for the relationship between metric difficulties and the use 
of indicators (point 1 and 2) can be explained in two ways. Firstly, managers and top 
executives were using performance indicators that were already there (as someone 
else had developed them) without worrying about how the indicators were 
determined. In other words, they just took it for granted. Secondly, they only used 
indicators for formal reporting or political/ceremonial speeches and had never used 
the indicators for more substantial purposes such as for managerial and strategic 
decision-making processes. 
 
As mentioned previously, normally it was assumed that top executives were the users 
of indicators, not the ones that were responsible for producing them. Hence, they did 
not have to worry about the technical knowledge necessary to be able to develop 
relevant indicators. Someone in the lower level of management produced the 
indicators in readiness for their use. Similarly, top executives were not concerned 
about regulations related to performance indicators, as their subordinates were 
responsible for dealing with them. In short, higher level executives did not have to 




Organisational capacity is crucial to ensure success of an organisation, including 
achieving accountability goals. Strong support for the relationship between 
organisational capacity and accountability was consequently expected. However, this 
research found mixed results regarding the matter. Organisational capacity had a 
very strong relationship with external accountability but not with internal 
accountability. The possible explanation for this inconsistency is that it does not 
require many resources to increase internal accountability, but rather it needs 
commitment from both the leader and the subordinates. Therefore, any ILG, 
regardless of its organisational capacity, has the potential to improve internal 
accountability within its organisation. Conversely, it is not an easy task for many 
ILGs to fulfil external accountability. External accountability covers many different 
aspects, and hence, it requires a relatively high level of organisational capacity. 
 
Interviews also revealed information supporting the survey results regarding the 
factors influencing the development and use of performance indicators. All 
interviewees indicated they agreed with the factors proposed in the PMS and 
accountability model. They also provided insight into the relative importance among 
the influencing factors as shown in Table 8.7. 
 
Table 8.7: Factors Affecting Development and Use of Indicators 
The Most Influencing Factor Development Use 
1. Legislative Requirements 42% 50% 
2. Metrics Difficulties 25% 25% 
3. Technical Knowledge 25% 17% 
4. Management Commitment   8%   8% 
 
Further evidence gathered during the interviews strengthened the results of the 
survey. Among the four factors under examination, legislative requirement proved to 
be the most dominant factor influencing the development of performance indicators 
in ILG. Interview results indicated that institutional factors were considered by 
interviewees as more prevalent than technical or organisational factors in the 
implementation of a new management innovation, such as PMS. This was especially 
true when the innovation was imposed by a powerful organisation such as the central 
government. This supports de Lancer Julnes, and Holzer (2001) who argued that 
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actual implementation of a management innovation such as PMS is influenced by 
political and cultural aspects rather than by rational and technocratic ones. 
 
8.3.3 Research question four 
 
Finally, the answer to the fourth research question was revealed with the use of 
thematic content analysis. The analysis determined that all three components of 
institutional isomorphism, being coercive, mimetic, and normative, did exist in the 
process of performance indicator development in ILG. Coercive isomorphism due to 
regulatory requirements was found to be the most predominant. 
 
Strong support indicating the existence of coercive isomorphism became apparent 
during the interviews when all interviewees stated that they began to develop 
performance indicators when the central government, under President Habibie, in the 
early years of Reformasi Era issued Inpres No. 7/1999 regarding LAKIP (refer to 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3). This regulation required government organisations at every 
level to prepare and submit an annual performance report. The requirement 
commenced on the fiscal year of 2001, although it could be considered just another 
reporting requirement where evidence of coercive pressure relates to the perceived 
pressure for ILGs to perform. This was a very new beginning in Indonesia‘s public 
sector because, during more than three decades of the New Order Era under 
President Soeharto‘s administration (1966-1998), there was no performance 
reporting in government. 
 
Since the reform era, the public has demanded more responsive services from the 
government. The implementation of Inpres on LAKIP was intended to improve 
government performance and, in turn, to increase the quality of public services. 
Unfortunately, despite a decade of its implementation, the quality of service provided 
was not as good as public expectation. It is crucial to understand why this happened. 
 
One possible reason for the above is that the time available for ILGs to put PMS in 
place was quite short, given the fact that this was very new for them. Consequently, 
in the midst of uncertainty and many other constraints (e.g. lack of competence of the 
officials), ILGs did the best they could to produce the report but, as expected, the 
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quality of the reports submitted to the central government was quite low. There has 
not been any significant improvement, as it appears that the quality of performance 
reports submitted by ILGs remains low (for details refer to Chapter 7, Table 7.4). 
Despite the low quality of performance reports produced, many ILG officials 
interviewed claimed they were not concerned, as the goal of submitting the reports 
has been met. This situation suggests the practice of symbolic conformity in ILG 
because of imposed regulation by the central government. This supports Talbot 
(2008) who contended that managers in the public sector admit that legislation is 
often the main reason for changes. 
 
Evidence for the existence of mimetic isomorphism in ILG was also found during the 
interviews. Many officials from ILG located out-of-Java admitted that in the process 
of producing their performance reports they often referred to or even copied the 
performance reports from more advanced ILGs nearby, if they existed. Otherwise, 
they looked for examples from in-Java ILGs. The practice of copying others was the 
fastest and easiest way to produce the reports. In addition, by copying the reports 
from more advanced ILGs, perceived as being successful, less advanced ILGs would 
be considered legitimate in the view of their stakeholders, especially the central 
government. 
 
The existence of mimetic isomorphism in ILG is consistent with the finding of 
Barreto and Baden-Fuller‘s (2006) study regarding international imitation. They 
found that organisations imitate the practices of others in order to gain legitimacy. 
They argued that there is a tension between the pressures to conform and the pressure 
to perform. Unfortunately, the practice of simply imitating others has a negative 
impact on organisational performance as organisations tended to put more emphasis 
on conforming rather than performing. 
 
As in the Portuguese context described in Barreto and Baden-Fuller (2006), in the 
Indonesian context this negative consequence has also emerged. For a decade, many 
ILGs copied LAKIP from others to produce their reports before submission to the 
central government. By doing so they were able to fulfil the regulation requirement 
and, in turn, maintain their legitimacy. Unfortunately, there was no substantial 
improvement in terms of ILGs‘ performances. Therefore, the claim that reporting of 
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performance indicators in the Indonesian context was more to conform than to 
perform is true. In other words, it was only symbolic in nature. 
 
The interviews also provided evidence on the existence of normative isomorphism in 
ILG. In the midst of the pressures of time and lack of competency, many ILGs had to 
find assistance to produce the reports. In the early years of PMS implementation, 
many of them received assistance from external expertise (e.g. BPKP and local 
universities). The assistance given ranged from direct technical assistance to produce 
the report to the provision of a series of training sessions to improve the capacity of 
ILG officials in the area of PMS. In line with this finding, Arnaboldi et al. (2010) 
found the important role of external consultants in the adoption of managerial 
innovations in the Italian public sector. This reflects the existence of normative 
isomorphism in another public sector context. 
 
8.3.4 Other findings 
 
From the survey 
 
One of the most significant contributions of this thesis is the discovery of a new 
model designed to explain further the relationships amongst the variables. In addition 
to the initial hypothesised relationships, the new model provided new significant 
relationships amongst variables. Table 8.8 presents the new relationships and the 
significance level of the associations. 
 
Table 8.8: Additional Relationship 
No. Relationship Significance 
1 Leg -> Com +++ 
2 Cap -> Com +++ 
3 Met -> Com ++ 
4 Kno -> Com ++ 
5 HUse -> IAcc +++ 
6 IAcc -> EAcc +++ 
7 Dev ->MUse ++ 
8 Dev ->HUse +++ 
 Legend:  




Firstly, out of eight new relationships found, four of them were highly significant 
with the others being significant. The first four related to management commitment. 
As discussed in previous sections, management commitment had a strong influence 
on the development and use of performance indicators. These findings were very 
important in the study. Therefore, knowing the variables that influenced management 
commitment was also very important. Table 8.8 shows that management 
commitment was highly influenced by legislative requirements and organisational 
capacity. Two other variables that significantly influenced commitment were metric 
difficulties and technical knowledge. The fact that legislative requirements had a 
stronger influence on commitment than technical knowledge supported the existence 
of coercive isomorphism. ILG showed higher commitment due to legislative 
requirements than that caused by the more technical and normative issues such as 
measurability and knowledge of performance measurement. Secondly, higher use of 
indicators highly influenced internal accountability and, in turn, external 
accountability. This means that the higher the level of use of performance indicators, 
the higher the level of accountability. These finding implied that in order to become 
accountable externally, ILG needed to first use indicators to enhance its internal 
accountability. Finally, managerial and higher uses of indicators were influenced by 
the development of indicators. The more performance indicators developed by ILG, 
the more they were used for managerial and strategic uses. 
 
 From the Interviews 
 
Aside from answering the four research questions, factors impeding the 
implementation of PMS in ILG also emerged during the interviews. Table 8.9 
presents the three impeding factors revealed. 
 
Table 8.9: Factor Impeding PMS 
The Most Impeding Factor Percentage 
1. Lack of motivation 50% 
2. Lack of direction 33% 
3. Lack of ability 17% 
 
There is no doubt that motivation is a crucial aspect in the success of implementing 
any management innovation. Implementing PMS in ILG is no exception. Half of the 
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interviewees considered lack of motivation responsible for the unsuccessful 
implementation of PMS in ILG. This strengthened the findings of the quantitative 
analysis regarding managerial use of performance indicators in ILG. Amongst the 
eight managerial uses of performance indicators, their use for rewarding employees 
was ranked the lowest (refer to Chapter 5, Table 5.10).This implied that ILG‘s 
employees were not appropriately rewarded for their jobs. It is not surprising that 
motivation within ILG was lacking. 
 
Meanwhile, with regard to top management commitment in supporting the 
implementation of PMS in their ILG, the interviews revealed that the majority of 
ILG top management had only a medium or even a low level of commitment. Table 
8.10 presents the level of top management commitment in ILG. 
 
Table 8.10: Top Management Commitment 
Top Management Commitment Percentage 
1. High (>75%) 46% 
2. Medium (50-75%) 25% 
3. Low (< 50%) 29% 
 
This result was in accordance with the survey where top management commitment 
emerged as the strongest factor affecting use of performance indicators (see Table 
8.6). Less than half (46%) of ILG has relatively high top management support. Low 
commitment, in part, was responsible for the unsuccessful PMS implementation in 
the majority of ILGs. This finding is consistent with other research, such as that of 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) whereby they concluded management commitment was 
an important factor in the success of PMS implementation. 
 
With respect to accountability practices, several interesting findings emerged during 
the interviews. These other findings related to the aspects of accountability, the 
reasons behind the practices, and the challenges that emerged during the 
implementation process. The majority of interviewees claimed that both financial and 
non-financial aspects of accountability were equally important. They also indicated 
that institutional factors (e.g. external pressure) dominated organisational factors 




Finally, the most challenging factors in practicing accountability related more to 
political and moral aspects than to technical and organisational ones. This supported 
the claim that political commitment is essential in determining the success or failure 
of reform efforts (McCourt, 2003). 
 
Before continuing to the implications of the research, the important results presented 
earlier are listed, in brief, to recall the main points of the findings: 
 
1. ILG developed and used performance indicators only at a moderate level 
and still focused on input and output indicators instead of outcome 
indicators. 
2. City governments developed more performance indicators than districts. 
3. Java ILGs developed more performance indicators than out-of Java ones. 
4. The size of a government organisation does not affect the development of 
performance indicators in ILG. 
5. Metric difficulties, technical knowledge, management commitment, and 
regulation requirement did have an effect on the development of 
performance indicators. 
6. Metric difficulties constituted the only factor that did not have an effect 
on the use of performance indicators at the managerial level. 
7. Management commitment was the only factor that had an effect on the 
use of performance indicators at the higher level. 
8. Management commitment, regulation requirements, and organisational 
capacity did have effect on external accountability. 
9. Organisational capacity was the only factor that did not have an effect on 
internal accountability. 
10. The interviews did confirm the results of the survey regarding the four 
factors influencing the development and use of performance indicators. 
11. The interviews revealed that regulation requirements imposed by central 
government were the strongest influencing factor for the development and 
use of performance indicators in ILG. 
12. The interviews revealed that lack of motivation, direction, and ability 
impeded implementation of PMS with lack of motivation found to be the 
strongest impeding factor. 
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13. The interviews revealed that top management commitment in 
implementing PMS in ILG was low. 
14. Three components of institutional isomorphism, being coercive, mimetic, 
and normative, did exist in the process of developing and using 
performance indicators in ILG with coercive isomorphism found to be 
most prevalent. 
15. As a result of the sensitivity analysis using PLS conducted in Chapter 6, a 
new model, as a refinement of the initial model developed at the 
beginning of the research, emerged. Given the quite strong relationships 
among the variables, this new model appears to be a highly promising 
conceptual model for future investigative research in the Indonesian 
public sector in particular, or in other countries across the globe. 
 
8.4 Research Implications 
 
For decades scholars and practitioners have been interested in PMS and 
accountability practices in the public sector in many developed countries across the 
world. However, little research has been conducted in developing countries. 
Accordingly, this thesis contributes to this paucity by providing rigorous academic 
research with multiple practical implications. With regard to academic research, this 
thesis contributes at a theoretical, methodological, and analytical level. 
 
8.4.1 Theoretical implications 
 
The implication to theory from this research is substantial as it identified various 
factors affecting the adoption and implementation of PMS and reporting in ILG. It 
confirms that all three components of institutional isomorphism are evident in the 
processes. 
 
Coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism provided assistance to understand 
better the motivations and drivers behind PMS implementation in the last ten years. 
This contributes significantly to the application of institutional theory, especially 
institutional isomorphism, as the underpinning framework to explain the practice of 




Similar to the study conducted by Judge et al. (2010) and Han and Koo (2010), this 
study found the three components of isomorphism did exist in the implementation of 
PMS. Coercive pressures were found to be the most crucial amongst the three. This 
finding is also consistent with results of the study conducted by Mir and Rahaman 
(2005). They found that the major factor behind the decision to adopt IASs was to 
gain institutional legitimacy. Similarly, ILGs need this legitimacy to access funding 
from the central government who are responsible for the regulations. 
 
It appeared that coercive pressures and lack of direction from the central government 
has triggered uncertainty and, in turn, encouraged mimicking practices among ILGs. 
Even though not as strong as coercive, mimetic isomorphism was found to play a 
role in ILG reporting. Under high levels of uncertainty during the first decade of 
reform with regard to PMS and reporting, ILGs believed they needed to mimic others 
in order to gain institutional legitimacy. This finding is in accordance with that of 
Barreto and Baden-Fuller (2006) who found the practices of imitating others 
widespread in the Portuguese banking industry. 
 
Normative isomorphism was also present in ILG reporting; however, it was not as 
strong as the first two components. Widespread knowledge and training by the BPKP 
and universities also helped ILGs in maintaining legitimacy over time. Coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphism existed in ILG because of its effort to gain 
legitimacy from the environment. This confirmed what other scholars in the field of 
organisational theory claimed—that gaining legitimacy is equally important to 
improving organisational performance. Unfortunately in the ILG context, many 
acknowledged that the motivation behind the implementation of PMS in ILG was 
mainly to gain legitimacy without considering actual organisational performance. As 
a result, this research confirmed prior literature (for example, Barreto & Baden-
Fuller, 2006) that proposed that imposed regulations would create symbolic 
conformity. 
 
In summary, this research extends previous research by identifying factors 
influencing the implementation of PMS and accountability practices, and by testing 
the applicability of institutional theory within an Indonesian public sector context. It 
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substantially contributes to institutional theory, particularly in developing countries, 
and begins to fill the gap in public sector management research in Indonesia. 
 
8.4.2 Methodological and analytical implications 
 
Both survey and in-depth interviews were used as data collection methods in this 
thesis. The combination of the two different research approaches into a single mixed 
approach increased the rigor of the study. This approach was found to be more 
capable of answering diverse and complex research questions than a single method 
approach. This project has demonstrated the applicability of a mixed method in the 
field of public sector management, especially in the area of performance 
measurement and accountability. 
 
One of the major contributions of this thesis relates to the quantitative analysis. Two 
different generations of quantitative analytical tools are employed: 1) the first 
generation multivariate analysis—OLS regression, and 2) the second-generation 
multivariate analysis—PLS. The utilisation of these two generations of multivariate 
analysis provides assurance of the validity and robustness of the quantitative analysis 
results achieved. This thesis showed evidence that both OLS and PLS provide 
consistent results. The fact that PLS showed stronger results supports the claim that 
PLS is an appropriate tool for analysing a study involving causality among variables. 
This fact also supports the appropriateness of PLS analysis in a study with a 
relatively small sample. In addition, by using PLS, this thesis found several new 
relationships amongst variables that were not included in the initial model (for 
details, see Appendix A.6-5). The existence of these new relationships, which were 
not hypothesised in the initial model, was very useful in refining that model for 
future research. 
 
 8.5 Practical Implications 
 
Berman and West (1998) pointed out that it took about two decades for a new 
management innovation such as strategic planning and management by objectives 
(both were introduced in the 1970s) to gain widespread adoption (widely used in the 
1990s). It seems that the diffusion process requires a long time as many new 
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management innovations are subject to re-examination and modification along the 
way as useless features are identified and abandoned and new, promising features are 
identified and adopted. 
 
In some ways, the current state of the diffusion of PMS follows the path of the other 
management innovation implementation mentioned by Berman and West (1998). 
Indonesian government at every tier has embraced PMS and reported performance 
for over a decade. This thesis has presented a portrayal of ILG‘s endeavours in 
implementing the system in practice. Some issues emerging from the findings will be 
of immense interest and will assist local and central government, government 
auditors, and universities, to name a few. 
 
8.5.1 Local government 
 
Difficulties in dealing with different types of performance indicators, especially 
outcome indicators, coupled with the lack of technical knowledge were cited as the 
major factors behind unsuccessful PMS implementation in ILG. To overcome this, 
better recruitment and appropriate education and training are required for officials 
and employees working in ILG, especially for those directly responsible for the 
preparation of performance reports. Frequently used modes in education and training 
are: (1) enrolment in academic degree programs; (2) enrolment in short-term training 
programs; (3) training of trainers; (4) on-the-job training; and (5) consultant services. 
 
One important finding here was that the success of institutionalisation of PMS was 
mainly due to the availability of relevant skills and expertise within the ILG and the 
commitment provided by top level officials. The consistent and continuous attention 
to developing the capacity of government officials and employees at different levels 
was the key to success. Consequently, capacity building of these employees needs to 
be planned and budgeted to ensure ownership of the process and outcomes on all 
levels. Hence, there is a real need to allocate more funding to the local budgets that 





8.5.2 Central government 
 
From the national perspective, now is the right time to evaluate the outcome of the 
reform efforts. The central government is in need of valid and relevant information 
regarding what worked and what did not in ILG after a decade of reform. As the 
national policy maker, the central government issued many regulations related to the 
reform including the most notable ones regarding decentralisation that affects 497 (as 
of June 2009) ILGs across the country. 
 
The findings of this thesis indicated that regulatory requirements (issued by central 
government) have a very strong influence on the development of performance 
indicators in ILG. Regulatory requirements are obviously considered as the factor 
that has the most influence in the process of producing performance reports. Despite 
the lack of knowledge and skills in dealing with performance indicators, ILG still 
managed to submit the performance report. Not surprisingly, in light of the lack of 
these skills, the quality of the reports was quite low. The finding suggests that the 
preparation and submission of performance reports were simply triggered by a 
perceived coercive pressure from central government through the enactment of 
regulations. This, in turn, implies a practice of symbolic conformity rather than a true 
effort to improve organisational performance. Bearing this in mind, the central 
government needs to consider this in designing future policies regarding new 
management innovations, such as the PMS, in order to avoid a negative effect 
resulting from the implementation of compulsory regulations. 
 
The results from interviews also indicated that there was a lack of direction regarding 
the implementation of PMS in ILG. In this sense, the role of the central government 
as the ultimate policy maker at the national level is still very important despite 
decentralisation. The central government needs to continue providing policy 
guidance through evaluating, monitoring, and measuring provincial and local levels 
of performance and providing oversight on the PMS implementation. Given the lack 
of technical knowledge by the majority of ILG officials and employees, the central 
government needs to provide practical manuals regarding PMS, as these will become 




Other than the problems with measurement and the technical capability of their 
employees and officials, ILG were in general also facing serious problems with top 
management commitment. This issue was considered as a more crucial factor than 
many of the other factors mentioned earlier. Many ILG employees claimed that even 
if they have the capacity required to implement the PMS, without commitment from 
the top, their efforts would be overlooked. The fact that they did not have the 
capacity coupled with low top management commitment was a perfect recipe for 
failure. Unfortunately, this was the case for the majority of ILGs. 
 
Considering the significant impact of lack of management commitment on the 
employees‘ motivation in the past there appears to be an urgent need now to increase 
this commitment in the implementation of PMS. As in many other developing 
countries, Indonesia is in need of an award system that makes it possible to provide 
national acknowledgement for the implementation of successful PMS and subsequent 
reporting. This award system would create a competitive climate in the ILG 
environment and provide a positive attitude among city and district leaders regarding 
PMS. 
 
Many interviewees were interested in an award system that was designed to 
acknowledge the quality of performance reports submitted by ILG. The actual award 
could be financial incentives (e.g. more budget allocation) or national 
acknowledgement (e.g. certificate of excellence, published national league table). 
ILG may post the certificate of excellence symbol, for instance, in any document 
published including on their website. This award would inform stakeholders (e.g. 
prospective investors) regarding the achievement of the ILG. This, in turn, may 
attract domestic or international investors to place direct investments in the ILG, and 
hence, increase economic growth. 
 
The findings of this thesis show that isomorphism does exist in the implementation 
of performance reporting in Indonesian local government. Considering those 
findings, the same thing would be likely to occur in the implementation of an award 
system. It may well be perceived to be yet  another coercive pressure on ILG if the 
award system is provided by the central government. The award systems can be used 




The JawaPos Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP)
25
 pioneered an award system in ILG. 
However, this award system was designed for autonomy in general and not 
specifically for PMS. The main aspects assessed in this system are economic growth, 
public services, and local politics. Since its commencement in 2001, this award 
system has not had a significant impact on ILG performance, as JPIP is not 
legitimate enough to influence ILG officials. 
 
The fact mentioned above may explain that implementing NPM tools to improve 
productivity in the public sector is not without limitation as evidence in this case. 
Such award systems may still be useful if implemented. However, the way they are 
implemented will be crucial to succeed. The requirement of the systems need to be 
construed and implemented in ways that fit the purpose and context in order to 
reinforce ILG‘s commitments. A more respected organisation is required if the award 
system is to have a significant impact on the behaviour of ILG officials. Therefore, 
the central government should take this responsibility to facilitate the emergence of a 
more legitimate and profesional award systems by coordinating different 
stakeholders to design and implement it. The award system should be managed by a 
professional and independent organisation at national level. In addition, the 
knowledge and involvement of the ILG‘s employees and officials is crucial as the 
most important aspect determining the success of such systems is whether it is 
accepted by the managed. 
 
To accommodate an award scheme, the central government needs to build a data 
compilation system at the national level. This would enable comparison amongst 
provinces and local governments or even comparisons at an international level. 
Using the national database would ensure a fair and objective performance 
evaluation and comparison amongst ILG. 
 
The central government plays an important coordination function in promoting and 
guiding the implementation of management innovation such as PMS at national, 
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 An NGO owned by a national newspaper the Jawa Pos. 
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regional, and local levels. Unfortunately, lack of coordination was another impeding 
factor, which was raised by ILG officials during the interviews. To ensure success in 
the implementation process, the central government needs to play a bigger role in 
promoting dialogue amongst different levels of governments. This would increase 
coordination amongst them to avoid the emergence of overlapping or even 
competing new regulations or guidelines. 
 
From the perspective of Indonesia as a whole, the findings found in the local 
government context are of great interest for the central government in designing 
appropriate strategies for implementing the newly launched national program called 
Reformasi Birokrasi (bureaucratic reform). In Indonesia, this program is considered 
as the second wave of reform (2010-2015). The findings presented and discussed in 
this thesis provide lessons learnt from the first wave of reform (1999-2009). By 
taking the issues identified here into account, a greater chance exists that the second 
wave of reform in Indonesia will be a success. 
 
8.5.3 Government auditor 
 
As the auditor responsible for auditing and consulting on jobs for government 
organisations, BPKP has a strategic position and role in ensuring the success of any 
central government policy in the field of public management, in general, and 
involving PMS, in particular. By law, BPKP has the privilege of conducting both 
audit and consulting work for government organisations at all levels, including local 
government. 
 
Results from this thesis should be of interest to BPKP as they provide information 
regarding current progress in PMS implementation and, in turn, assists them in 
conducting their routine audits. These findings provide valuable information 
regarding the factors influencing the development and use of performance indicators 
in ILG. In turn, this information will assist BPKP to create a better strategy in 
assisting ILG in dealing with issues regarding PMS and reporting. 
 
As government auditors, BPKP would play an important role in diffusing best 
practice in PMS across the country. As they move from one ILG to the other, BPKP 
208 
 
could effectively disseminate the good practices from better-resourced ILGs located 
in Java Island, for example, to the less-resourced ILGs located out-of-Java. In time, 
this will improve the practice of the rest of the ILGs across the country. In 
institutional theory terms, the role of BPKP in diffusing PMS best practices across 
the country is labelled as normative isomorphism. To improve the quality of services, 
BPKP continues to build the capacity of its auditors. They frequently conduct 
internal workshops or seminars to share information with others, such as ILGs. In 
this forum, auditors may have the opportunity to learn from each other and, in turn, 
apply the lessons learnt in their next audit assignments. Ultimately, best practices 




Universities have long been considered centres of excellence and agents of change in 
Indonesian society. Having many well-educated and qualified scholars and 
researchers, universities have the competency and capacity to contribute to the 
development of society. In fact, many scholars from universities provided significant 
contributions to the crucial reform movement in 1998 that triggered decentralisation. 
 
Since the beginning of the reform, universities have played an important role in 
building the capacity of government employees and officials at all levels to cope with 
new management innovation such as PMS and accountability practices. Universities 
offer several alternative modes in the provision of capacity building: (1) degree 
programs (Bachelor, Master, and Doctoral), (2) medium-term training programs 
(one-three months), (3) short-term training programs (2-5 days), (4) in-house 
training, and (5) consulting services. Universities also provide support and 
constructive feedback regarding new policies released by the government through 
seminars and research publications. The findings of this thesis will be of interest to 
universities, as they will assist in enhancing capacity-building programs and in 
providing avenues for future research in the field of public sector performance 
measurement and accountability. 
 
Enhancing public sector accountability is one of the important priorities of 
Indonesian government programs for the next 15 years. Improving accountability is 
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not an easy task for the majority of government organisations. This situation creates 
a new opportunity for universities to maintain or even increase their involvement and 
contribution to assisting government organisations in their continuing effort to 
reform. There is no doubt that Indonesia continues to struggle with the lack of 
organisational capacity, especially in terms of improving the quality of human 
resources working at all levels of government. Hence, from the point of view of 
universities, capacity building is an excellent example of a potential program for 
government organisations. 
 
Currently, many universities (both public and private) in Indonesia, especially the 
large ones—for instance, UGM, Universitas Indonesia (UI), and Institute 
Technology of Bandung (ITB)—have directed their attention to the global market 
rather than merely the domestic one, as they have done in the past. Many of them 
have progressively built collaborative networks with different international aid 
organisations—such as USAID and AusAID—as well as universities in other 
countries as their counterparts to assist the Indonesian government in the 
development of programs. This international collaboration will definitely grow in the 
future, given the progressive reform efforts in improving government organisation 
performance. Therefore, universities need to maintain and expand their international 
networking in order to participate continuously in government programs, especially 
in capacity building. 
 
During the last ten years, UGM, as one of only a few old and large universities in 
Indonesia, for instance, has been experiencing a significant change from a state 
university to a more independent one. One of its strategic goals is to increase its 
international exposure. Specifically, it aims to become a world-class research 
university. Unlike in the past when teaching was a dominant aspect in university life, 
UGM now puts research as its main priority. 
 
Nationally, as government continues to implement reform, there are great 
opportunities for a university to participate in providing capacity-building programs 
and to conduct relevant policy research. Internationally, it could build networks in 
the field of performance measurement and accountability. By doing so, Indonesia can 
learn from the experience of developed countries that have implemented successful 
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public sector reforms. In line with government need and university missions, 
international collaboration can also flourish the fields of research and capacity 
building. 
 
8.6 Strengths and Limitations of the Thesis 
 
This thesis employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches. By doing this, the researcher was able to maximise the strengths and 
reduce the weaknesses embedded in each individual approach when used separately. 
This mixed-method approach has advantages over the two more common methods of 
performance measurement research: the single-city case study and the multiple-city 
survey, usually without required documentation or follow-up to confirm respondent 
claims. The former typically lacks the breadth supplied by a multicity study. The 
latter, usually in the form of fixed-response mail surveys, often produces information 
of questionable reliability and relevance to performance measurement practice and 
has been criticised as methodologically inappropriate. 
 
Concerning statistical analysis, this thesis utilises both OLS and PLS. Though prior 
studies have utilised and relied solely on regression analysis, a combination of both 
regression analyses using OLS (presented in Chapter 5) and PLS (presented in 
Chapter 6) is employed to provide a more rigorous explanation of the complex 
relationships between the technical and organisational factors under examination. It 
was revealed in the quantitative analysis chapters that the results of PLS were 
consistent with those of OLS. This finding supports the claim that PLS is more 




In addition, the new relationships amongst variables revealed from the sensitivity 
analysis discussed in Chapter 6 were an interesting and beneficial discovery. These 
not only revealed new relationships between two variables but also uncovered the 
existence of a chain of relationships among multiple variables. Hence, it provides 
further insight regarding a more complex relationship among variables. In the end, 
                                                 
 
26
 The survey‘s response rate of this study is 22% 
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this will enable researchers to propose alternative conceptual models for future 
research. The model is discussed further in Section 8.7. 
 
Like others, this thesis is not without its limitations. The empirical evidence provided 
is context-specific to ILGs as the third-tier government in Indonesia; however, the 
approach and the conceptual analysis have general validity, and hence, this research 
can be applied in other government contexts for future research. 
 
8.7 The New Model 
 
The emergence of new relationships among variables, uncovered following the 
sensitivity analysis, opens an opportunity for the refinement of the initial model. The 
strong relationships among the variables (refer to Table 8.8) are worth considering 
for research in the immediate future. After a comprehensive review of literature and 
prior studies, coupled with robust quantitative and qualitative analyses of results, a 
new model can be defined for further investigation. Figure 8.1 presents a proposed 
conceptual model for future empirical research. 
 
Figure 8.1: New Conceptual Model 
Legend:  
Com = management commitment, Met = metric difficulties, Kno = technical knowledge, 
Leg = legislative requirements, Dev = development of indicator, MUse = managerial use of indicator, 
HUse = higher use of indicator, IAcc = internal accountability, EAcc = external accountability, Cap = 
organisational capacity- Path coefficient in bold = highly significant relationship 
 
If compared to the initial model (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.1), the new model has a 















within the model. In this new model, the ten variables can be grouped into three 
distinct categories: 1) the antecedent factors influencing the adoption, 2) the 
implementation process, and 3) the outcome expected from the implementation. 
Table 8.11 presents the variables within the three distinct categories. 
 
Table 8.11: Variables of the New Model 








Commitment to PMS 
 
Development of Indicators 
 














It is argued here that there is a causal relationship amongst variables within the 
model as clearly indicated in Figure 8.1. Therefore, to test the new model under 
examination in future research, the use of PLS is highly recommended as it was 
designed to be able to demonstrate complex causal relationships. If this is the case, at 
the end the research process, another new refined model may appear. Should this 
iteration process continue, a robust model of PMS adoption and implementation 
could be the result. This, in turn, would significantly contribute to the enhancement 
of the body of knowledge in the area of performance management in the public 
sector. 
 
8.8 Future Research 
 
The immediate future research potential to undertake is to test the new model 
proposed in the previous section. In addition, there are a large number of possibilities 
for further research in the area of performance measurement, in particular, and 
accountability, in general. Firstly, this study focuses on ILG as the third tier of 
government in Indonesia. To expand the picture, this research could be replicated to 
provincial government (second-tier) or central government (first-tier) agencies. By 
covering all three tiers of government, a wider and holistic result would better 
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contribute to the national effort to evaluate a decade of reform in this area, and to the 
improvement of PMS and accountability practices and policies in the future. 
 
Secondly, the unit of analysis in this study is ILG as a whole. Consequently, there 
was only one respondent representing a certain local government. It would be 
worthwhile to conduct a study involving multiple respondents within each local 
government. This might extend the explanation of the practices from many different 
perspectives. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis could also be expanded by conducting research that involves 
respondents from the legislative branch, citizens, and NGOs as important 
stakeholders of ILG. This would enhance understanding of the user‘s perspective of 
performance reporting. In addition, it might uncover the real practices regarding 
political accountability, transparency, and participation as important elements of 
good governance. 
 
Fourthly, it may also be desirable to conduct case studies exploring the 
implementation of PMS from the perspective of senior, middle, and operational 
managers in different tiers of government organisations. This would enable one to 
obtain a deeper understanding on how PMS is understood, interpreted, and 
operationalised across the management hierarchy. 
 
Hence, there is scope for more research in order to generate a comprehensive 
understanding of performance measurement and accountability practices in the 
Indonesian public sector. Given the paucity of research in this area in Indonesia, the 
scientific knowledge deficit is so large that it makes it difficult to provide appropriate 
recommendations for sound public management policy, in general, and for 
performance measurement practices, in particular. Therefore, there is a need for more 
attention to scientific inquiry in the many different research approaches available and 
a need to apply those various research approaches to policies and practices in the 




In summary, this research has contributed to the current knowledge in the field of 
performance management and paved the way for future research prospects in the 
Indonesian public sector. 
 
8.9 Concluding Remarks 
 
Implementing a new management innovation is definitely not an easy task. It is even 
more difficult when the organisation still struggles with the quality of its 
infrastructure. Most organisations in developing countries across the world, including 
Indonesia, face this typical problem. 
 
 
More than a decade has passed since PMS was introduced in 1999 with the 
emergence of Inpres No. 7/1999. It is about the right time now to see what midcourse 
correction or modifications might be useful in the dissemination of PMS in 
Indonesia, specifically in ILG. If the pattern mentioned earlier is right, then PMS has 
another decade or so to go before it is widely used in Indonesia. Bearing that in 
mind, practically this thesis provides relevant and useful contributions to Indonesian 
public sector in its continuous attempt to enhance PMS and accountability practices. 
It provides insight into the practice by investigating several factors affecting the 
development and use of performance indicators as well as factors hindering the 
success of PMS in ILG. 
 
In addition, the choice of institutional theory as a theoretical lens through which to 
examine the PMS process assisted in better explaining the development and use of 
performance indicators and accountability practices in Indonesia. Institutional 
isomorphism revealed the important influence of external organisations and the 
quality of human resources in improving PMS. It is expected, in the future, that the 
quality of PMS will increase with the provision of better and clearer guidance from 
central government, proper benchmarking among ILG, and continuous education to 
increase the technical knowledge of ILG‘ employees and officials. 
 
A number of many different parties such as central government as the national policy 
maker, local governments as the ultimate services providers, BPKP as the 
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government auditor, and universities as the centres of excellence and agents of 
change in the society will find the results very useful. Proper utilisation of these 
findings will enable those parties to make the corrections or modifications required 
to maximise their contributions to the continuous efforts of enhancing PMS and 
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Appendix A.2-1 Different Uses of Performance Information 
 












































































































1.allocation of resources    x x  x x x  
2.changing work process / more efficiency    x x  x x x  
3.formulation and monitoring of licensed or 
contracted privatised services 
x   x   x  x  
4.rewarding staff / monetary incentives / 
performance pay 
 x  x   x  x  
5.strategic planning   x x  x    x 
6.communication with the public to build 
trust 
  x x x      
7.reporting and monitoring   x  x     x 
8.accountability to elected officials    x  x   x  
9.accountability to the public    x  x   x  
10.results based budgeting: budget 
documents 
 x x x       
11. results based budgeting: justified budget 
requests 
  x x     x  
12.motivation rewards for groups, 
organizations 
 x    x   x  
13.evaluation of outcomes and effectiveness x  x  x      
14.reducing duplicative services / delivery 
alternatives (including privatisation)  
  x  x x     
15.adopting new program approaches / 
changing strategy  
  x   x   x  
16.setting program priorities      x x x   
17.communication with the legislature and 
the legislative staff 
  x  x      
18.cost saving  x  x        
19.performance budgeting: no direct link  x    x     
20.setting individual job expectations / staff 
performance plans  
















































































































21.cost benefit analysis x   x       
22.trigger for further investigation and 
action 
x   x       
23.enable customer to make informed 
choices 
x          
24.improving responsiveness to customers   x        
25.creditor reporting      x     
26.grantor reporting      x     
27.output budgeting: pay per output   x         
28. outcome budgeting: pay per outcome  x         
29.changing appropriation levels   x        
30.performance budgeting: alongside 
budget figures 
     x     
31.cost accounting         x  
32.performance auditing         x  
33.capital management         x  
34.managerial incentive schemes  x          
35.management by objectives  x         
36.staff motivation / non-monetary 
incentives  
   x       
37.strategic HRM         x  
38.clarifying objectives x          
39.quality model (TQM)  x         
40.sanctioning prolong low performance    x       
41.allocating discretionary funds to high 
performance agencies or programs  
   x       
42.communication between managers     x      
43.organizational development      x     
44.coordination of activities internally or 
externally 
      x    




Appendix A.2-2 Three Paradigms in Public Sector Management 
 
Source: Hartley (2005) 
 
Good Governance 
 Continuously changing environment 
 Diverse population 
 Complex, volatile & prone to risks problems 
 Shaped by civil society 
 Networks and Partnership, civic leadership 





 Competitive environment 
 Atomized population 
 Expressed through market needs 
 Market and customer centred 
 Markets, purchasers and providers, clients 
and contractors 
 Offer public choice 




 Stable environment 
 Homogeneous population 
 Straightforward problems 
 Stated and producer centred 
 Hierarchies, public servants 
 Produce public goods 
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I am studying the local government‘s utilisation of performance measurement. As 
part of my study, I am sending a questionnaire to all local government senior 
officers (SOs), both Kabupaten and Kota, across Indonesia. This survey is being 
conducted to obtain information from SOs on their experience with performance 
measurement practices and related challenges. In the last decade, Indonesian 
government has been undertaking management reforms intended to shift the focus 
of government entities from tracking activity and staffing levels to setting goals for 
program performance, measuring results, and establishing accountability for those 
results. 
 
Most of the questions in this questionnaire can be answered by checking boxes or 
filling in blanks. Spaces have been provided at the end of the questionnaire for any 
additional comments. The questionnaire should take about 30 minutes to complete. 
The survey results will be reported in summary form only and not on an entity-by-
entity basis. Any discussion of individual answers or comments will omit any 
information that could identify the respondent. 
 
It would be appreciated if you could return your completed questionnaire in the 
enclosed reply-paid envelope within two weeks of receipt. In the event the envelope 
is misplaced, the return address is: 
 
Rusdi Akbar 
Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Gadjah Mada 
Jl. Humaniora No. 1, Bulaksumur 
Yogyakarta 55281 
 
If you have any questions, please contact: 
Phone +62 274 560 775 
Fax +62 274 563 212 
Email rusdi.akbar@postgrad.curtin.edu.au 
 
I urge you to complete this questionnaire. I cannot develop meaningful information 











Performance measurement includes 
(1) developing performance measures to track progress made in achieving pre-
determined goals and 
(2) using performance information to make organizational and management 
decisions 
 
Please check one box in each row 




1.For programs/activities/projects in your Local Government (LG), to what extent, if 
at all, do you have the following performance measures? 
 
"Extent to which my LG has performance measures related to...." 1 2 3 4 5 
a. input (i.e. labour, material)      
b. output (i.e. quantity of products or services provided)      
c. outcome (i.e. customer satisfaction)      
d. operating efficiency (i.e. cost/unit)      
e. benefit (i.e. public/citizen satisfaction)      
f. impact (i.e. achievement of social objectives)      
g. process (i.e. narrative analysis of performance)      
 
2. For programs/activities/projects in your LG, to what extent, if at all, does your LG 
use the information obtained from performance measurement when conducting each 
of the following activities? 
 
MANAGERIAL USE 
"Extent to which my LG uses information obtained from 
performance measurement when….." 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. setting strategy and program priorities      
b. allocating resources      
c. adopting new program approaches or changing work processes      
d. coordinating program efforts with other internal or external 
organizations 
     
e. refining program performance measures      
f. setting new or revising existing performance goals      
g. setting individual job expectations for government employees I 
manage or supervise 
     
h. rewarding government employees I manage or supervise       
 
HIGHER USE 
"To what extent do you agree with the following statements? " 1 2 3 4 5 
i. performance measures from my activities are used to develop my 
LG ‗s budget 
     
242 
 
j. funding decisions for my activities are based on performance 
measures 
     
k. changes by management above my level are based on 
performance measures 
     
 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
"To what extent do you agree with the following statements? " 1 2 3 4 5 
l. officials at my level are held accountable for the results of their 
activities 
     
m. employees in my LG receive positive recognition for helping the 
LG accomplish strategic goals 
     
n. the individual I report to periodically reviews my activity‘s 
results with me 
     
o. lack of incentives (e.g. reward, positive recognition) has hindered 
using performance information 
     
 
RESULTS TO DATE 
 1 2 3 4 5 
p. to what extent do you believe that your LG‘s effort to implement 
regulatory requirements on performance measurement to date have 
improved your organization‘s programs/operations/projects? 
     
 
FUTURE RESULTS 
 1 2 3 4 5 
q. to what extent do you believe that implementing regulatory 
requirements on performance measurement can improve your LG‘s 
programs/ operations/projects in the future? 
     
 
USEFULNESS 
3. For program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) that you are involved with, to what extent, 
if at all, do you believe that performance measurement information is useful when 
participating in each of the following activities? 
 
"Extent to which I perceive the information useful when….." 1 2 3 4 5 
a. setting program priorities      
b. allocating resources      
c. adopting new program approaches or changing work processes      
d. coordinating program efforts with other internal or external 
organizations 
     
e. refining program performance measures      
f. setting new or revising existing performance goals      
g. setting individual job expectations for government employee I 
manage or supervise 
     
h. rewarding government employees I manage or supervise       
i. developing my institution ‗s budget      
j. making funding decisions      
k. changing policy      
l. holding employees accountable      
m. recognising employees accomplishment      
243 
 
n. reviewing activity results      
 
METRIC DIFFICULTIES 
4. Based on your experience with the program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) in your LG, 
to what extent, if at all, have the following measurement factors hindered measuring 
performance or using the performance information? 
 
"Extent to which the following factors hindered measuring 
performance or the use of performance information" 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. difficulty determining meaningful measures      
b. results of our program(s)/operation(s)/project(s) occurring too far 
in the future to be measured 
     
c. difficulty distinguishing between the results produced by the 
program and results caused by other factors 
     
d. difficulty determining how to use performance information to 
improve the program 
     
e. difficulty determining how to use performance information to set 
new or revise existing performance goals 
     
 
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 
5. Based on your experience in your LG, to what extent have you or your staff been 
involved in your institution‘s effort in improving technical knowledge related to 
performance measurement? 
 
"Extent to which….." 1 2 3 4 5 
a. I receive training on development and use of performance 
measures 
     
b. my staff receive training on development and use of performance 
measures 
     
c. I receive published information on how to develop performance 
measures 
     
d. my staff receive published information on how to develop 
performance measures 
     
e. my LG involve external experts or consultants in developing 
performance measures 
     
 
MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT 
6. Based on your experience in your LG entity, to what extent has LG management 
been committed to your institution‘s effort in improving performance measurement? 
 
"Extent to which….." 1 2 3 4 5 
a. my institution‘s top leadership demonstrate a strong commitment 
to achieving results 
     
b. the lack of ongoing top executive commitment or support for 
using performance information to make program/funding decisions 
hindered measuring performance or using performance 
information? 
     
c. the lack of ongoing congressional commitment or support for 
using performance information to make program/funding decisions 
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7. Based on your experience in your LG entity, to what extent have you or your staff 
been involved in your local authority‘s effort in implementing regulation requirement 
on performance measurement (LAKIP)? 
 
"Extent to which…." 1 2 3 4 5 
a. I have been involved in my local authority‘s effort in 
implementing LAKIP 
     
b. my staff has been involved in my local authority‘s effort in 
implementing LAKIP 





Please check one box in each row 
1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= undecided, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree 
 
PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY 
"Our LG informs residents, elected officials, and the business 
community about…" 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. organization-wide policy priorities/goals      
b. program goals and objectives      
c. program functions and activities      
d. program output measures      
e. program outcome measures      
f. program narrative performance information      
g. trends of performance measures      
h. comparisons of performance measures      
 
ACCOUNTABILITY TOOLS 
"To inform residents, elected officials, and the business community 
about our LG activities and performance, we use….." 
1 2 3 4 5 
Professional Tools      
a. municipal budgets      
b. annual financial reports      
c. financial audit reports      
d. program evaluation reports      
e. performance audit reports      
f. performance monitoring reports      
g. performance appraisal reports      
h. code of ethics      
Political Tools      
a. council meetings      
b. legislative meetings      
c. public hearings      
d. citizen survey reports      
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e. citizen telephone hotlines      
f. citizen sms hotlines      
g. radio programs      
h. television programs      
i. websites      
j. news briefing/ conferences      
k. chamber of commerce meetings      
 
REASONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
"The reasons for accountability reporting associated with….." 1 2 3 4 5 
External pressures      
a. political competition      
b. central government pressures      
c. critical elected official      
d. critical media      
e. critical business community      
f. critical citizens      
g. LG associations influence      
h. Other LG pressures      
i. Donor institutions pressures      
Management commitment      
a. employee willingness to expose performance      
b. manager willingness to expose performance      
c. top management willingness to expose performance      
Organizational capacity      
a. management information systems      
b. performance-based budgeting      
c. capable staffs      






Please check one box and fill in blank if appropriate 
 
1. Type of your local government  □ Kabupaten  □ Kota 
 
2. Location of your organization □ in-Java Island  □ out-of- Java Island 
 




4. Gender   □Male   □Female 
 




6. Highest Education Level □ High School  □ Bachelor □ Master 
□ Doctoral 
 
7. Education Field □ Accounting 
□Other (please specify): ______________________ 
 
8. Years of employment in government □ < 2  □ 2-5  □ 6-10 
□ 11-15 □ >15 
 
9. Years of employment in current position □ < 2  □ 2-5  □ 6-10 
      □ 11-15 □ >15 
 





If you have any additional comments regarding any previous question, comments 
concerning result-oriented management, or any comments/suggestions concerning 









FOLLOW UP CONTACT 
 
Would you be prepared to participate in a face to face or telephone interview with the 
researcher to explore and explain a number of areas of performance measurement 
and accountability in local government in greater depth? This would be extremely 
beneficial to this study. If ‗yes‘ please write your name and contact below: 
 
Name:   __________________________ 
 
Address:  __________________________________________________ 
 
Phone Number: __________________________ 
 
Mode:   □ Face to Face  or □ Telephone 
 
 
Thank you very much for your kind assistance. 
Please return your completed questionnaire in the pre-paid envelope provided 
To maintain your confidentiality, the follow-up contact section may be returned 
 in a separate pre-paid envelope (also provided) 
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Appendix A.4-2 Survey Minor Amendment 
 
No. Before After 
1. Questions were grouped into a 
specific sub-heading 
Questions are not grouped into a specific 
sub-heading (sub-heading deleted) 
 
Reasons: sub-heading made respondent 
confused 
2. There were 3 negative questions (2.o, 
6.b, 6.c) 
 
2.o. lack of incentives (e.g. reward, 
positive recognition) has hindered 
using performance information 
 
6.b. the lack of ongoing top executive 
commitment or support for using 
performance information to make 
program/funding decisions hindered 
measuring performance or using 
performance information? 
 
6.c. the lack of ongoing congressional 
commitment or support for using 
performance information to make 
program/funding decisions hindered 
measuring performance or using 
performance information? 
Negative questions (2.o, 6.b, 6.c) are 
modified 
 
2.o. incentives (e.g. reward, positive 
recognition) has improved using 
performance information 
 
6.b. top executive commitment or support 
for using performance information to make 
program/funding decisions improved 
measuring performance or using 
performance information? 
 
6.c. congressional commitment or support 
for using performance information to make 
program/funding decisions improved 
measuring performance or using 
performance information? 
 
Reasons: negative questions confused 
respondent. In the case of 6.a and 6.b, these 
negative questions most likely were 
responsible for the reliability issues, as well. 
(Cronbach‘s alpha < 0.6) 
3. Section 3 item 6 cover 4 group 
 
6. Highest Education Level 





Section 3 item 6 cover 5 group (new group 
Diploma added) 
 
6. Highest Education Level 






Reasons: some respondents did not find the 
right category for them. In Indonesia the 




















Performance Measurement and Accountability 














School of Accounting—Curtin Business School 














Face to Face Interviews Questions with Senior Official 
Who is Responsible for Preparation of Performance Report 
in Indonesian Local Government 
 
 




Date of Interview 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 




1. How would you define accountability in a local government context? 
2. For the last decade, there appears to have been an increased interest regarding 
accountability in Indonesia in general and in local government in particular. Do 
you agree? If yes, what do you think has influenced this? 
3. What aspect of accountability is the most important to you as a performance 
report preparer? 
4. To whom do you (personally) consider you are accountable? Why? 
5. Who do you consider your local government is responsible to? Why? 
6. To whom is your performance report distributed? 
7. What do you see as the biggest challenge to achieving accountability? 
8. What are the chances of success in achieving accountability in a local 




9. When you develop performance indicators how is the measurement of relevant 
components determined? Who is involved in the process of developing 
indicators? Do you consult other staff such as engineers? 
10. Why does your organization develop performance indicators? 
11. Have you had training in performance measurement systems? If yes, please 
provide details. 
12. Do you consider top management in your organization is committed to the 
development of performance indicators? If yes, what percentage would you give 
this commitment? 
13. Do you use performance indicators in your local government? If yes for what 
purpose? 
14. Why does your organization use performance indicators? 
15. Do you believe that public sector officials have a clearer understanding of their 
objectives as a result of providing performance indicators? If yes, please provide 
details. If no, why? 
16. What do you see as the biggest challenge to developing and using performance 
indicators? 
17. Does your organization prepare a strategic plan? For what period? 
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19. Is your local government dependent upon external funding to assist with the 
development of performance indicators? If yes, where does the funding for 
performance indicator development come from? 
20. How do legislative requirements impact on the development of performance 
indicators? 
21. Does the amount of funding you get impact on the number of performance 
indicators you develop? 
22. Does the amount of funding you get impact on the number of performance 
indicators you use? 
23. How do legislative requirements impact on the use of performance indicators? 
24. What are these legislative requirements? 
25. Do you refer to other local governments when preparing your performance 
reports? 
26. Do you refer to external organizations—public or private—when preparing your 
performance report? If yes, what type of organizations? 
27. Are you a member of any professional associations? Which ones? Do these 
organizations provide assistance in regards to the development and use of 
performance indicators within your organization? 
28. Do you utilise outside expertise from universities or consulting firms to assist 
with your performance reporting practices? 
29. Have you won an award? If so, which one (s)? Would you like to see an award 




30. One of the results from the survey was that performance indicators are not 
integrated in local government budgeting systems. Do you budget for 
performance indicators? If yes, which ones and why? If not, why not? 
31. There are three aspects that contribute to the success/failure of an innovation 
such as performance measurement systems, these are: 1) direction, 2) ability, 
and 3) motivation. Do you agree? If yes, how would you rank them in terms of 
importance? If no, what do you think they are? Why? 
32. Are there any other comments you would like to make in regards to the matters 
raised in the interview? 
 
Questions to specific ILG 
 
33. Kab. Banjar-I noticed in relation to the development of performance indicators 
you mention customer satisfaction only plays a very small role. Why is this? 
34. Kab. Hulu Sungai Tengah-a) In relation to the development of performance 
indicators you mention that almost all types of indicators play a very small role. 
Why is this? b) In the survey you indicated that you do not use performance 
indicators for decision making. How are they used? 
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35. Kab. Kulon Progo-You indicated that performance indicators are not used for 
resource allocation decisions? Why is this? Is this common in all local 
government? 
36. Kab. Tabalong-You indicated that external pressures have only a very small 
influence in accountability reporting. Why is this? 
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Address:  ________________________________________ 
    
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am currently undertaking research for my Doctor of Philosophy at Curtin 
University of Technology, Western Australia. I am studying the area of performance 
measurement and accountability in local governments within Indonesia. 
 
Local government has undergone major changes within the last decade including the 
promulgation of new laws and regulation related to new public management in 
response to new demand for accountability from constituents in the era of 
decentralisation. 
 
My research will provide insights into emerging practices on performance 
measurement, especially in the utilisation of performance measurement systems by 
local government and will address the importance of these practices to local 
authorities and their constituents. 
 
The first stage of this research requires information using a questionnaire that needs 
to be completed by the Senior Financial Officer of each local government authority. 
It would appreciate if you could arrange to have the attached questionnaire 
completed and returned in the enclosed envelope. A second pre-paid envelope is 
provided if you supply your contact details as indicated on the last page of the 
survey. 
 
All information will be treated with confidentiality. All information will remain 
secured. Only the researcher and supervisors will have access to the information for 
the purposes of the research project. No participant will be personally identifiable in 
any published material. 
 
Your assistance in providing this information is greatly appreciated. If you have any 
queries or comments regarding this request please contact Rusdi Akbar within the 
Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta on email 


















PARTICIPANTS’ INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Name of Project: 
"Performance Measurement and Accountability in Indonesian Local Government" 
 
Name of Investigator: 
Rusdi Akbar 
 
What is the study about? 
The primary aim of this research is to examine the factors influencing the 
development and use of performance indicators in Indonesian Local Government. 
 
Who is carrying out the research? 
This research is conducted by Rusdi Akbar, a PhD Student at School of Accounting, 
Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Australia. 
 
What does the study involves? 
This study involves sending a questionnaire to senior officials who are responsible 
for preparing and submitting the performance report Importance of the study 
From a policy perspective, the study is significant in understanding the current 
practices of performance measurement. Given the nature of this study, it presents 
important avenues for future research in this area and may be of benefit to 
participants to help them improve their current practices without imposing any risks 
on them. 
 
What is required of participant? 
The participant is asked to complete a questionnaire about performance measurement 
and accountability practices in Indonesian local government. The questionnaire will 
take an average of 30 minutes to complete. 
 
What are the risks and benefits to the participant? 
Confidentiality is the only foreseeable risk to the participants and confidentiality 
issues have been carefully considered and are mitigated by measures detailed in the 




All information will be treated with confidentiality. All information will remain 
secured. Only the researcher and supervisors will have access to the information for 
the purposes of the research project. No participant will be personally identifiable in 
any published material. 
 
Participation 
Participation in the questionnaire is completely voluntary. Participants are at liberty 
to withdraw at any time without prejudice or negative consequences. 
 
 
Contact Detail of Human Research Ethics Committee 
 
Miss Linda Teasdale 
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Office of Research and Development, Curtin University of Technology 
GPO Box U1987, Perth WA 6845 
Email : hrec@curtin.edu.au 
Phone : +61 (08) 9266 2784 
 
Contact Detail of Investigator 
Rusdi Akbar 
Email : rusdi.akbar@postgrad.curtin.edu.au 
Phone : +62 274 560 775 
Fax : +62 274 563 212 
 
Contact Detail of Supervisors 
Dr. Robyn Pilcher 
Email : r.pilcher@curtin.edu.au 
Phone : +618 9266 2879 
Fax : +618 9266 7196 
 
Dr. Brian Perrin 
Email : b.perrin@curtin.edu.au 
Phone : +618 9266 7781 







Prof. Dr. Mardiasmo, MBA, Ak. 
Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan 
Departemen Keuangan Republik Indonesia 
Jl. Dr. Wahidin No.1 Jakarta Pusat 10710 
Gedung D Lt. 16 Telepon 021-3509442 Fax 021-3509443 
 







Pengukuran Kinerja di sektor publik umumnya dan di pemerintah daerah khususnya 
sangatlah penting dalam menunjang desentralisasi fiskal yang telah berjalan di negara 
Republik Indonesia dalam satu dasawarsa terakhir ini. 
 
Penelitian tentang pengukuran dan pelaporan kinerja pemerintah daerah yang mencakup 
seluruh kabupaten/kota di Indonesia masih belum banyak dilakukan. Untuk itulah saya 
sangat mendukung setiap penelitian semacam ini karena hasilnya diharapkan akan 
memberikan kontribusi bagi pemerintah pusat maupun daerah dalam mengambil kebijakan 
publik untuk mensukseskan desentralisasi fiskal di Indonesia. 
 
Sehubungan dengan penelitian berjudul "Pengukuran Kinerja dan Akuntabilitas 
Pemerintah Daerah di Indonesia" yang sedang dilaksanakan oleh Drs. Rusdi Akbar, MSc., 
Ak. PhD (Cand.) dosen Fakultas Ekonomika dan Bisnis Universitas Gadjah Mada 
Yogyakarta yang saat ini sedang menyelesaikan studi program doktor di Curtin University of 
Technology, Perth Australia, dengan ini saya memohon bantuan Bapak/Ibu Sekretaris 
Daerah Kabupaten/Kota di seluruh Indonesia agar meluangkan sedikit waktunya untuk dapat 
berpartisipasi dalam kegiatan penelitian ini, dengan catatan tidak menggangu kesibukan 
Bapak/Ibu dalam menjalankan tugas sehari-hari. 
 
Partisipasi Bapak/Ibu diharapkan dalam bentuk bantuan untuk mengisi kuesioner dengan 
lengkap berdasarkan pengalaman Bapak/Ibu selama ini di dalam menyusun LAKIP Pemda. 
Kuesioner penelitian yang telah diisi dengan lengkap kemudian mohon dikirimkan melalui 
pos ke alamat peneliti. Amplop dan perangko berlangganan telah disediakan oleh peneliti 
sehingga Bapak/Ibu tinggal memasukkannya ke kantor pos. 
 
Semoga dengan bantuan Bapak/Ibu semua peneliti bisa memperoleh masukan yang berguna 
untuk dikaji lebih jauh guna menghasilkan informasi yang sangat diperlukan bagi 
kepentingan dunia akademik dan terutama untuk keperluan praktek pengukuran dan 
pelaporan kinerja di pemerintahan daerah Indonesia di masa yang akan datang. Atas peran 





Prof. Dr. Mardiasmo, MBA, Ak. 
Dirjen Perimbangan Keuangan 
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School of Accounting 
GPO Box U1987 




RE: APPLICATION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON "PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDONESIAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT" 
 
The above subject matter is hereby referred. 
 
I am a Doctoral Candidate at the School of Accounting, Curtin University of Technology, 
Perth, Australia. In Indonesia, I am a lecturer attached to Universitas Gadjah Mada, 
Yogyakarta. Currently I am on full time study leave. I am conducting research on 
Performance Measurement and Accountability in Indonesian Local Governments. This 
research is towards fulfilling the requirement of my PhD thesis. 
 
This is an independent study under Curtin University of Technology and all the information 
collected will be treated as confidential. To gather important information to assist this 
research, interviews will be conducted with relevant officers in local authorities on the 
reasons underlying the development and use of performance indicators and accountability 
practices in Indonesian Local Governments. 
 
In the follow-up section of my questionnaire, you stated your availability to voluntarily 
participate in the interviews as the second stage of my study. I will be based in Yogyakarta 
from 19 July to 13 August 2010 and would appreciate being able to visit your organization 
during this time. I have identified your name: _______________ from the District/City 
of____________ to participate in my interview. The interview session will relate to the 
experiences and perceptions and is NOT an assessment of the officer‘s skills or knowledge. 
A formal letter will be sent later to confirm about the date and the details of the interview. 
 
If you would like further information about the study, please feel free to contact me on +614 
23522390 or by email: rusdi.akbar@postgrad.curtin.edu.au.or fax: +61 08 9266 7694. 
Alternatively, you can contact my supervisor, Dr. Robyn Pilcher on +61 08 9266 2879 or 
email: r.pilcher@curtin.edu.au. I look forward to your response and answering any question 




Rusdi Akbar (13627256) 
Doctoral Candidate  
School of Accounting 
Curtin Business School 
Curtin University of Technology 




PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
 
School of Accounting 
GPO Box U1987 
PERTH WA 6845 
 
Performance Measurement and Accountability in Indonesian Local 
Government 
 
What is the Study About? 
The purpose of this study is to gather opinions about the reasons underlying the development and use 
of performance indicators and accountability practices in ILG. Subsequent to analysis of data from a 
recently conducted survey, a few issues emerged which need further clarification. 
 
Who is Carrying Out the Study 
The study is being conducted by Rusdi Akbar. Phone: +614 23522390 Email: 
rusdi.akbar@postgrad.curtin.edu.au 
 
What Does the Study Involve 
The study involves obtaining information from ILG officers who are directly responsible for reporting 
performance indicators. 
 
Permission will be sought from individual participants for the interviewer to use a digital voice 
recorder in addition to transcribing the answers to the particular questions. 
 
How Much Time Will the Study Take? 
It is envisaged that no more than 60 minutes will be required of the interviewee. 
 
Confidentiality 
Rusdi Akbar is the only person involved in the research. Confidentiality of all 
documentation/interview material is preserved. Resulting reports and papers will conceal the identity 
of the councils and any personnel interviewed. Once collated, a copy of the information will be 
distributed to interviewed ILG and again all identities will be concealed. Instead referencing will be 
something like: G1, G2, G3 to distinguish between respondents. 
 
Participation 
Participation in the interview process is completely voluntary: you are not obliged to participate 
and—if you do participate—you can ask the interview to be stopped at any time. 
 
I (the participant) have read and understand the Participant Information Statement, and any 
questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that my participation is 
voluntary and I agree to participate in this research, knowing that I may withdraw at any time. I have 
been given a copy of the Participant Information Statement to keep. 
 
If participants wish to make a complaint on ethical grounds the details of the Human Research Ethics 
Committee is provided in the box below. 
 
This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval 
Number ___________). If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the 
Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, 








School of Accounting 
GPO Box U1987 
PERTH WA 6845 
 
 
Performance Measurement and Accountability in 














 freely choose to participate in this study and understand that I can withdraw 
without compromise at any time. 
 
 agree to allow the interviewer to use a digital voice recorder to assist in the 
provision of a true and accurate record of the interview. 
 
 also understand that the research study is strictly confidential. 
 













Appendix A.5-1 SPSS Output 
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Appendix A.6-1 Cross-Loadings-Initial Model 
  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Cap_1 0.855 0.445 0.266 0.446 0.238 0.287 0.358 0.198 0.207 0.004 
Cap_2 0.803 0.314 0.223 0.392 0.177 0.262 0.291 0.235 0.150 0.032 
Cap_3 0.681 0.163 0.142 0.295 0.171 0.136 0.270 0.066 0.118 0.042 
Cap_4 0.619 0.153 0.010 0.303 0.041 0.071 0.017 -0.012 0.012 0.196 
Com_1 0.352 0.893 0.526 0.583 0.495 0.624 0.409 0.454 0.614 -0.130 
Com_2 0.389 0.940 0.499 0.569 0.423 0.557 0.508 0.462 0.658 -0.219 
Com_3 0.320 0.887 0.557 0.518 0.413 0.503 0.489 0.457 0.721 -0.283 
Dev_1 0.120 0.228 0.661 0.173 0.280 0.227 0.368 0.393 0.375 -0.131 
Dev_2 0.208 0.382 0.747 0.334 0.338 0.331 0.497 0.573 0.469 -0.100 
Dev_3 0.236 0.510 0.812 0.448 0.481 0.425 0.410 0.412 0.529 -0.258 
Dev_4 -0.034 0.401 0.742 0.245 0.327 0.295 0.246 0.343 0.451 -0.351 
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  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Dev_5 0.224 0.570 0.809 0.450 0.466 0.415 0.439 0.390 0.553 -0.199 
Dev_6 0.168 0.479 0.748 0.427 0.457 0.356 0.331 0.256 0.545 -0.224 
Dev_7 0.300 0.457 0.775 0.428 0.274 0.258 0.404 0.321 0.517 -0.230 
EAcc_1 0.383 0.464 0.424 0.828 0.340 0.576 0.420 0.506 0.414 -0.017 
EAcc_2 0.329 0.476 0.412 0.835 0.398 0.538 0.383 0.448 0.447 -0.003 
EAcc_3 0.379 0.541 0.405 0.879 0.340 0.604 0.469 0.494 0.452 -0.015 
EAcc_4 0.500 0.435 0.406 0.857 0.261 0.502 0.416 0.331 0.396 -0.058 
EAcc_5 0.408 0.441 0.341 0.843 0.245 0.445 0.429 0.310 0.388 -0.054 
EAcc_6 0.350 0.552 0.379 0.805 0.438 0.561 0.518 0.402 0.501 -0.092 
EAcc_7 0.481 0.637 0.462 0.888 0.417 0.597 0.522 0.435 0.563 -0.117 
EAcc_8 0.496 0.599 0.447 0.877 0.421 0.534 0.428 0.403 0.523 -0.098 
HUse_1 0.094 0.290 0.257 0.262 0.776 0.473 0.222 0.231 0.366 -0.099 
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  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
HUse_2 0.198 0.481 0.466 0.371 0.933 0.570 0.292 0.342 0.559 -0.093 
HUse_3 0.264 0.485 0.542 0.456 0.926 0.643 0.411 0.359 0.634 -0.099 
IAcc_1 0.110 0.130 0.142 0.205 0.290 0.463 0.286 0.251 0.172 -0.016 
IAcc_2 0.270 0.591 0.446 0.583 0.544 0.894 0.444 0.497 0.495 -0.088 
IAcc_3 0.270 0.567 0.423 0.612 0.572 0.890 0.425 0.498 0.507 -0.159 
IAcc_4 0.176 0.514 0.291 0.509 0.583 0.833 0.313 0.304 0.474 -0.056 
Kno_1 0.162 0.326 0.455 0.384 0.248 0.363 0.773 0.448 0.364 -0.225 
Kno_2 0.306 0.423 0.487 0.445 0.340 0.388 0.864 0.413 0.488 -0.175 
Kno_3 0.341 0.402 0.304 0.414 0.260 0.363 0.755 0.426 0.362 -0.114 
Kno_4 0.272 0.425 0.326 0.409 0.309 0.354 0.778 0.393 0.468 -0.097 
Kno_5 0.181 0.350 0.309 0.306 0.162 0.260 0.521 0.227 0.374 0.000 
Leg_1 0.160 0.469 0.454 0.411 0.341 0.482 0.459 0.924 0.506 -0.034 
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  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Leg_2 0.190 0.467 0.492 0.498 0.329 0.460 0.497 0.931 0.506 -0.045 
MUse_1 0.160 0.555 0.603 0.374 0.423 0.311 0.409 0.512 0.734 -0.051 
MUse_2 -0.053 0.564 0.513 0.390 0.471 0.519 0.326 0.492 0.783 -0.181 
MUse_3 0.077 0.546 0.525 0.402 0.385 0.343 0.396 0.436 0.813 -0.237 
MUse_4 0.254 0.652 0.545 0.467 0.489 0.465 0.388 0.461 0.832 -0.200 
MUse_5 0.239 0.581 0.547 0.415 0.536 0.483 0.548 0.478 0.832 -0.247 
MUse_6 0.149 0.549 0.443 0.433 0.451 0.406 0.516 0.387 0.780 -0.190 
MUse_7 0.199 0.561 0.479 0.516 0.563 0.470 0.439 0.367 0.754 -0.257 
MUse_8 0.068 0.558 0.409 0.405 0.475 0.448 0.443 0.258 0.707 -0.205 
Met_1 0.040 -0.135 -0.227 -0.022 -0.072 -0.079 -0.115 -0.008 -0.229 0.831 
Met_2 0.051 -0.251 -0.193 -0.053 -0.052 -0.032 -0.205 -0.046 -0.187 0.837 
Met_3 0.071 -0.258 -0.279 -0.088 -0.175 -0.196 -0.128 -0.033 -0.243 0.894 
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  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Met_4 0.065 -0.189 -0.281 -0.038 -0.109 -0.082 -0.174 -0.050 -0.193 0.839 
Met_5 0.080 -0.130 -0.175 -0.097 -0.007 -0.054 -0.113 -0.049 -0.205 0.827 
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Appendix A.6-2 Cross-Loadings-New model 
  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Cap_1 0.874 0.445 0.269 0.445 0.238 0.284 0.358 0.198 0.207 0.003 
Cap_2 0.818 0.314 0.221 0.391 0.176 0.262 0.295 0.236 0.147 0.033 
Cap_3 0.654 0.163 0.140 0.296 0.169 0.134 0.272 0.066 0.117 0.042 
Cap_4 0.584 0.153 0.015 0.303 0.039 0.069 0.019 -0.012 0.012 0.198 
Com_1 0.360 0.891 0.529 0.581 0.494 0.618 0.409 0.454 0.614 -0.136 
Com_2 0.398 0.941 0.502 0.567 0.421 0.553 0.508 0.462 0.659 -0.223 
Com_3 0.328 0.889 0.563 0.516 0.411 0.497 0.489 0.457 0.721 -0.284 
Dev_1 0.123 0.228 0.638 0.173 0.279 0.225 0.368 0.393 0.371 -0.132 
Dev_2 0.214 0.381 0.730 0.335 0.338 0.328 0.496 0.573 0.465 -0.100 
Dev_3 0.237 0.510 0.817 0.447 0.479 0.420 0.404 0.412 0.528 -0.257 
Dev_4 -0.021 0.400 0.733 0.244 0.325 0.292 0.244 0.343 0.451 -0.351 
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  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Dev_5 0.228 0.570 0.824 0.449 0.462 0.410 0.436 0.390 0.554 -0.199 
Dev_6 0.176 0.479 0.769 0.426 0.457 0.352 0.328 0.256 0.546 -0.220 
Dev_7 0.310 0.458 0.773 0.428 0.274 0.251 0.403 0.321 0.517 -0.228 
EAcc_1 0.382 0.464 0.425 0.830 0.339 0.574 0.422 0.506 0.415 -0.015 
EAcc_2 0.328 0.475 0.419 0.837 0.398 0.537 0.383 0.448 0.448 -0.002 
EAcc_3 0.383 0.541 0.409 0.880 0.340 0.602 0.469 0.494 0.453 -0.014 
EAcc_4 0.495 0.435 0.408 0.860 0.261 0.500 0.415 0.331 0.396 -0.058 
EAcc_5 0.407 0.440 0.345 0.844 0.244 0.441 0.430 0.310 0.389 -0.057 
EAcc_6 0.356 0.552 0.385 0.804 0.438 0.555 0.516 0.402 0.502 -0.094 
EAcc_7 0.485 0.637 0.468 0.884 0.417 0.593 0.523 0.434 0.565 -0.118 
EAcc_8 0.498 0.598 0.452 0.873 0.421 0.529 0.430 0.403 0.526 -0.100 
HUse_1 0.104 0.290 0.262 0.260 0.785 0.473 0.223 0.231 0.369 -0.099 
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  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
HUse_2 0.201 0.481 0.470 0.369 0.928 0.570 0.293 0.342 0.561 -0.094 
HUse_3 0.266 0.485 0.548 0.454 0.926 0.646 0.409 0.359 0.636 -0.099 
IAcc_1 0.117 0.130 0.140 0.206 0.290 0.484 0.283 0.252 0.172 -0.016 
IAcc_2 0.275 0.590 0.449 0.583 0.544 0.884 0.446 0.497 0.497 -0.086 
IAcc_3 0.278 0.565 0.424 0.612 0.572 0.888 0.425 0.498 0.509 -0.159 
IAcc_4 0.179 0.514 0.296 0.509 0.584 0.839 0.313 0.304 0.479 -0.056 
Kno_1 0.165 0.327 0.453 0.385 0.249 0.363 0.768 0.448 0.363 -0.225 
Kno_2 0.315 0.424 0.487 0.445 0.340 0.389 0.855 0.413 0.489 -0.178 
Kno_3 0.346 0.402 0.299 0.414 0.259 0.360 0.770 0.426 0.362 -0.116 
Kno_4 0.277 0.425 0.321 0.408 0.311 0.352 0.785 0.393 0.468 -0.098 
Kno_5 0.190 0.350 0.308 0.306 0.161 0.262 0.514 0.227 0.371 -0.003 
Leg_1 0.167 0.469 0.447 0.410 0.340 0.481 0.460 0.925 0.505 -0.034 
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  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Leg_2 0.199 0.467 0.484 0.498 0.328 0.454 0.498 0.930 0.504 -0.047 
MUse_1 0.165 0.554 0.598 0.373 0.421 0.308 0.407 0.513 0.729 -0.051 
MUse_2 -0.052 0.565 0.514 0.389 0.470 0.517 0.325 0.492 0.786 -0.181 
MUse_3 0.081 0.546 0.523 0.401 0.384 0.338 0.394 0.436 0.808 -0.236 
MUse_4 0.256 0.652 0.550 0.466 0.488 0.458 0.387 0.461 0.832 -0.197 
MUse_5 0.244 0.581 0.545 0.414 0.534 0.484 0.545 0.478 0.829 -0.247 
MUse_6 0.154 0.550 0.448 0.433 0.452 0.408 0.512 0.387 0.777 -0.190 
MUse_7 0.205 0.561 0.487 0.515 0.564 0.471 0.438 0.367 0.761 -0.257 
MUse_8 0.072 0.559 0.415 0.403 0.472 0.446 0.443 0.258 0.712 -0.204 
Met_1 0.040 -0.136 -0.231 -0.021 -0.072 -0.072 -0.115 -0.008 -0.230 0.824 
Met_2 0.045 -0.252 -0.191 -0.052 -0.053 -0.028 -0.205 -0.046 -0.188 0.848 
Met_3 0.062 -0.259 -0.284 -0.087 -0.176 -0.197 -0.125 -0.033 -0.245 0.896 
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  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Met_4 0.054 -0.190 -0.281 -0.037 -0.109 -0.085 -0.173 -0.050 -0.195 0.837 
Met_5 0.076 -0.131 -0.174 -0.096 -0.009 -0.050 -0.114 -0.049 -0.205 0.822 
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Appendix A.6-3 Comparison of Hypotheses Testing Results 
 
No. Ho Path OLS PLS-Initial PLS-New 
1 H1a Met -> Dev ++ ++ ++ 
2 H2a Kno -> Dev + ++ +++ 
3 H3a Com -> Dev ++ +++ +++ 
4 H4a Leg -> Dev ++ +++ +++ 
5 H1b Met -> MUse 0 0 0 
6 H2b Kno -> MUse ++ ++ 0 
7 H3b Com -> MUse +++ +++ +++ 
8 H4b Leg -> MUse ++ +++ 0 
9 H1c Met -> HUse 0 0 0 
10 H2c Kno -> HUse 0 0 0 
11 H3c Com -> HUse ++ +++ ++ 
12 H4c Leg -> HUse 0 0 0 
13 H3d Com -> IAcc +++ +++ +++ 
14 H4d Leg -> IAcc ++ ++ ++ 
15 H5a Cap -> IAcc 0 0 0 
16 H3e Com -> EAcc +++ +++ 0 
17 H4e Leg -> EAcc ++ +++ 0 
18 H5b Cap -> EAcc +++ +++ ++ 
19  Dev ->MUse   ++ 
20  Dev ->HUse   +++ 
21  Met -> IAcc   0 
22  Kno -> IAcc   0 
23  Dev -> IAcc   0 
24  MUse -> IAcc   0 
25  HUse -> IAcc   +++ 
26  Kno -> EAcc   0 
27  Dev -> EAcc   0 
28  MUse -> EAcc   0 
29  HUse -> EAcc   0 
30  IAcc -> EAcc   +++ 
31  Met -> Com   ++ 
32  Kno -> Com   ++ 
33  Leg -> Com   +++ 
34  Cap -> Com   +++ 
35  Kno -> Met   0 
36  Leg -> Cap   0 
Legend: 
 +++=highly significant, ++=significant, +=marginally significant, 0=not significant, 
bold = inconsistence results between initial and new model, blank = not applicable 
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Appendix A.6-4 Reliability, Internal Consistency, and Discriminant 
Validity—New Model 
Table A6.1: Item Reliability-New Model 
Construct Item Loading 















Higher Use of Indicator (HUse) HUse_1 0.785 
HUse_2 0.928 
HUse_3 0.926 




External Accountability (EAcc) EAcc_1 0.830 
 EAcc_2 0.837 
 EAcc_3 0.880 
 EAcc_4 0.860 
 EAcc_5 0.844 
 EAcc_6 0.804 
 EAcc_7 0.884 
 EAcc_8 0.873 





Management Commitment (Com) Com_1 0.891 
Com_2 0.941 
Com_3 0.889 





Legislative Requirements (Leg) Leg_1 0.925 
Leg_2 0.930 






Table A.6.1 indicates that all indicators has loading value above the minimum 
requirement of 0.4. In regard to internal consistency, Table A6.2 presents the 
summary of output generated from SmartPLS software. For the new model adequate 
reliability is gained as composite reliability value is greater than 0.5. Hence, all 
constructs exhibit adequate reliability. The last column of the table contains the AVE 
for this mode. They are satisfactory as the values exceeding 0.5. 
Table A6.2: Internal Consistency and AVE-New Model 
Construct  Composite Reliability Cronbach‘s Alpha* AVE 
Development  0.903 0.876 0.573 
Managerial Use  0.926 0.908 0.609 
Higher Use  0.913 0.858 0.778 
Internal Accountability 0.865 0.791 0.627 
External Accountability 0.955 0.946 0.726 
Metric Difficulties 0.926 0.901 0.716 
Technical Knowledge 0.861 0.793 0.559 
Management Commitment 0.933 0.892 0.823 
Legislative Mandate 0.925 0.838 0.861 
Organizational Capacity 0.827 0.736 0.551 
Note:  
*presented only for comparative purposes 
Similar to the initial model, the new model undertook discriminant analysis test at 
both indicator and construct level using cross-loading matrix and comparing 
correlation of the construct and the AVE. It indicates that discriminant validity at the 
indicator level can be judged adequate. At the construct level, discriminant validity 
was also adequate as the variance shared between a construct and any other construct 
in the model is less than the variance that construct shared with its indicators. Table 
A6.3 presents the correlation matrix of the construct and the square root of AVE (in 
bold). It shows that diagonal values are greater than the off-diagonal values in their 
corresponding rows and columns, therefore all constructs in the new model met the 
requirement for discriminant validity. 
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Table A6.3 Correlation of Constructs and the Square Root of AVE-New Model 
  Cap Com Dev EAcc HUse IAcc Kno Leg MUse Met 
Cap 0.742                   
Com 0.399 0.907                 
Dev 0.247 0.586 0.757               
EAcc 0.492 0.612 0.488 0.852             
HUse 0.227 0.487 0.504 0.422 0.882           
IAcc 0.280 0.614 0.440 0.638 0.646 0.792         
Kno 0.350 0.517 0.506 0.528 0.361 0.466 0.748       
Leg 0.198 0.505 0.502 0.490 0.360 0.504 0.517 0.928     
Muse 0.184 0.733 0.653 0.545 0.609 0.553 0.553 0.544 0.780   
Met 0.064 -0.236 -0.281 -0.069 -0.109 -0.112 -0.174 -0.044 -0.252 0.846 
Note:  
Bolded diagonal are the square root of AVE 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
